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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The bountiful agricultural potential of the Sudan has become 
established among policymakers in the Sudan, the Middle East and 
international organizations interested in world food problems. The 
Sudan has been described as the "Breadbasket of the Middle East," a 
"granary of the world," and a "land of tomorrow" (79:47). A 
visiting Canadian economic mission was so impressed with Sudan's 
potential that it reached the astounding conclusion that, if well 
organized, the Sudan can feed one-third of the world's population 
(79:47). Indeed, since mid-1970, shortly after the present govern­
ment took office, the mood of the country with respect to organizing 
and tapping this potential has been bullish. Heretofore, the 
activity and interest in agricultural development has been concen­
trated in North-central and North-eastern Sudan, the traditional 
backbone of the countiy's economy, where are located the Gezira 
Scheme and its prototypes, the Kenana, Rahad, Guneid, Suki, 
Khashm el Girba and Gash agricultural projects. 
Presently, however, the government is making efforts to 
distribute development more equitably throughout the country's many 
regions including the long-neglected rich agricultural potential in 
Sudan's Southern Autonomous Region. Within this region the Jonglei 
Canal is now under construction and is projected to be completed by 
1985. This project will not only achieve its primary objective of 
providing additional irrigation water to Northern Sudan and Egypt; 
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It will also provide drainage to large areas that are often 
seasonally flooded in the canal area. It will also have considerable 
long tens impact on the inhabitants of the canal area and, indeed, 
on socio-economic development in the Southern Region and its 
integration with the rest of the Sudan. 
Responsibility for socio-economic development^ in the Jonglei 
Canal area has been entrusted to the National Council for Develop­
ment Projects in the Jonglei Canal area, hereafter referred to as 
the NC-JPA. Assisted by an Executive Organ, the NC-JPA was 
established in 1974 by Republican Order No. 284 and charged with 
three main objectives. These objectives are (22:5): 
1. Planning and implementation of integrated economic and 
social development projects in the area. 
2. Derivation of maximum benefit from the conditions created 
by the project for providing new living conditions to the 
inhabitants. 
3. Promotion of studies related to effects resulting from 
establishment of the project (Jonglei Canal) and undertaking 
measures to mitigate any adverse effects therefrom. 
The extent to which the Jonglei Canal will realize its full 
The term "socio-economic development" is interpreted to mean 
not only sustained growth in per capita incomes, but to include 
other social, political and quality of life aspects relating to 
equity, widespread participation in development, political and 
social stability and environmental quality. The concept is 
further discussed in Chapter IV. 
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potential contributions to the Southern Region and its integrative 
role in the Sudan will depend largely on the rural development 
strategies to be adopted by the NC-JPA in its discharge of the 
above objectives. Two such strategies, the "improvement approach" 
and the "transformation approach," already in embryonic form, are 
somewhat divergent in nature and subject of considerable informal 
discussion among officials of the Executive Organ and their 
expatriate advisors and consultants. The improvement strategy 
emphasizes the modernization of the present traditional subsistence 
agriculture. The basic tenet of this strategy is provision of 
opportunities to small land holders and pastoralists. Within this 
strategy, agricultural development would proceed within existing 
traditional subsistence production units and institutions 
accompanied by provision of basic social services, distribution 
of improved seeds, fertilizers, pest and animal disease control 
measures, iiq>rr/ed agricultural hand tools and tillage methods, 
adequate credit facilities and better policies applied to both 
inputs and outputs. There is no philosophical commitment in this 
strategy to bring about fundamental changes in the social and 
economic systems of the inhabitants of the Jonglei Projects Area 
(JFA). Economic development according to proponents of this 
strategy should ". . .affect as little as possible the existing 
social, economic and political structure of the people . . . because 
too rapid change may have detrimental repercussions" (53:576). It 
is argued that a sudden and disruptive change of the "Dinka way 
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of life" should be avoided (18:13). 
The second budding strategy may be called the transformation 
of traditional subsistence agriculture through mechanized or semi-
mechanized modem agricultural schemes comparable in scope to 
those of North-central and North-eastern Sudan. This strategy 
embraces from the onset commercial agricultural production with 
a large export potential. Proponents of this strategy argue that 
l]q>rovement in crop production within present Institutions could 
be achieved very slowly and at high cost. According to this 
strategy, the best way that maximum benefit for the inhabitants 
would be obtained from the conditions created by the canal lies 
in the transformation of the simple subsistence and traditional 
economy into a modem and con^lex economic system (109:15). 
Furthermore, proponents assert that the "lnq)rovement approach" 
fritters away scarce resources and effort to widely scattered 
and unorganized production units, and hence in the long run the 
"transformation approach" is much less costly. Sudden and 
disruptive change in the "Dinka, Nuer or Shilluk way of life" is 
seen by advocates of this strategy as a necessary and inevitable 
aspect of socio-economic development and national integration of 
the area. The problem for the Inhabitants of the JPA does not 
lie in the avoidance of sudden and disruptive change, but rather 
shaping and coping with such change. 
The general objective of this study Is to contribute to the 
debate on appropriate rural development strategies for the JPA by: 
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1) providing an analytical framework within which the various 
conflicting issues on the subject may be Identified, debated and 
resolved; 2) applying the analytical framework to the JPA to 
suggest planning elements upon which an appropriate rural develop­
ment strategy for the JPA could be based; and (3) provoking more 
discussion and review despite the fact that the strategy of 
Integrated rural development, as recommended by international 
organizations, seems to be gaining ascendency In the area (see 
Chapter VII). 
Study Approaches 
The approaches In this study are based on five major results 
of explorative interviews conducted by the author with a wide 
cross-section of Southern Sudanese society including rural 
village communities In Bor and Kongor Districts of the JPA.^ 
These five major results are: 
1. The primary and initial objective of socio-economic 
development In the JPA is the eradication of hunger, disease and 
Illiteracy, and the provision of basic social services including 
shelter, health care, nutrition, schools, transport and flood 
control. 
2. Achievement of the preceding result, while necessary, is 
not sufficient; the JPA must also contribute to regional and 
Procedures used and content of these interviews are discussed 
in Appendix A. 
national socio-economic development and share In the national 
objective of the country to become the "Breadbasket of the Middle 
East." 
3. There appears to be sufficient political commitment In 
the Southern Region to Implement fundamental changes In the 
political, social and economic Institutions should these changes 
be required for the achievement of the preceding two results. In 
the words of Sayed Abel Aller, President of the Autonomous Southern 
Region: "If we have to drive our people to paradise with sticks, 
we will do so for their own good and the good of those who come 
after us" (105:26). 
4. The primary role of government Is not only to maintain 
peace and security and to resolve conflicting Interests, but also 
to participate actively In bringing socio-economic development 
and prosperity to the citizens. 
5. The Inhabitants of the JPA, although poor and Illiterate, 
are nevertheless Intelligent, creative and responsive, and will 
participate in change of whatever magnitude If they perceive such 
change to be In their interests and that of their posterity. 
Indeed, the people In the rural areas of the JPA appear to be more 
interested in change than some of their educated brethren who 
appear to be mission-bound to protect the Dlnka, Nuer or Shllluk 
"way of life" which they themselves appear to have rejected. 
Objectives of Study 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
1. To provide a framework for examining rural development 
strategies for socio-economic development of the JPA by focussing 
on: a) the goals of socio-economic development in the JPA as they 
relate to national goals; and b) the resource potential of the JPA 
In terms of the area's contribution to regional and national goals. 
2. To ascertain the adequacy of the existing agrarian 
structure and rural development strategies in the JPA as means to 
realizing the resource potential and achieving the goals Identified 
in the preceding objectives. 
3. To evaluate alternative rural development strategies,^ 
from within Sudan's experience, that may be adapted In the JPA. 
4. To suggest planning elements upon which an appropriate 
rural development strategy for the JPA might be based. 
Methods and Procedures Used in This Study 
The general conceptual framework used in this study is the 
"means-ends continuum" model development in the literature on the 
^According to the 1973 census, 100 percent of the JPA was 
classified as rural and engaged in subsistence production. Rural 
development is Interpreted to mean the process whereby the JPA 
progresses from subsistence production to sustained modem commercial 
production for the purpose of socio-economic development. Strategy 
is the general method by which society mobilizes resources to achieve 
the goals of rural development. These terms are further discussed 
In Chapter IV. 
theory of Inquiry (45; 15). This method has been used by Tlmmons 
(95), Adam (1), Lund (68) and Vlgues-Roig (100) to investigate 
contributions of various aspects of land tenure institutions to 
agricultural development. It is hoped that application of the 
"means-ends continuum" model to the JPA will facilitate informed 
debate on choice of alternative rural development strategies for 
The "means-ends continuum" conceptual framework is used to 
develop an analytical framework for pursuing the objectives of this 
study. Within this analytical framework, linear programming is 
used In the diagnostic phase of the study to investigate the 
economics of resource allocation in a "composite farm" of the JPA. 
Variations of linear programming, including parametric programming 
and sensitivity analysis, are used to assist in ascertaining the 
possibilities and potential that can be offered by existing 
agrarian structure and institutions In the study area. 
The units of weights and measurements used in this study are 
those prevalent in Sudan. Farmland is measured in hectares, acres 
or feddans whenever appropriate. One hectare is approximately 2.47 
acres, and one feddan is 1.038 acres. Agricultural output is usually 
measured in kilograms and metric tons. The monetary unit Is the 
Sudanese Pound, currently equivalent to $2.00, and hereafter 
designated by the symbol LS. A more complete table on weights and 
measures in Included in Appendix B. A list of abbreviations used 
In this study is also provided In Appendix B for ease of reference. 
Organization of the Study 
Following this introductory chapter. Chapter II discusses 
agriculture's role in the national economy and identifies regions 
with "breadbasket" potential. One of these regions with bread­
basket potential, the JPA, Is the study area. Chapter III provides 
background information on the JPA and the Jonglei Canal Project, 
and discusses the physical and institutional environments which 
condition socio-economic development in the region. Chapter IV 
develops the "means-ends continuum" analytical framework and 
models used to pursue the objectives of this study. Chapters V, 
VI and VII consist of application of the "means-ends continuum" 
and models to the study area. The study concludes with Chapter VIII 
which includes the summary, conclusions and recommendations 
emanating from the study. 
CHAPTER II. AGRICULTURE'S ROLE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
AND REGIONS WITH "BREADBASKET" POTENTIAL 
The Democratic Republic of the Sudan was the first country 
in Africa to become politically Independent from Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium rule. Located in North-east Africa and bordered by 
Egypt and Libya to the north; Chad, Central African Republic, and 
Zaire to the west; Uganda and Kenya to the south; Ethiopia to the 
east; and Red Sea to the north-east (Map 1), the Sudan is the 
largest country in Africa and ninth in the world in terms of area 
amounting to about two and one half million square kilometers. 
Sudan's population is estimated at 18 million and growing at an 
annual rate of 2.6 percent. For administrative purposes the 
country is divided into 18 provinces, 12 in the North and six in 
the South; the latter six provinces formed the Autonomous Southern 
Region in 1972 after waging an unsuccessful war of Secession for 
17 years. The 12 Northern Provinces were also formed into 5 
Autonomous Regions In 1981. 
Agriculture In the National Economy 
Structure of the national economy 
Sudan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated at 1,822 
million Sudanese pounds In 1976/77, or about ICQ Sudanese pounds 
per capita GDP. The structure of the national economy and 
projections to 1995 are shown in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 reveals 
that agriculture will continue to play the leading role In the 
Map 1. The Autonomous Southern Region, International and 
Provincial boundaries of the Sudan and the jpA (80:5) 
Table 2.1. Structure of the Sudanese economy. Sectoral contribution to gross domestic 
product (GDP) and expenditure on GDP: 1974-1977 and projections to 1995 (24:27) 
Origin of GDP 
1974/75 
pounds 
(mil.) 
As 
X 
of 
GDP 
1976/77 
pounds 
(mil.) 
As 
% 
of 
GDP 
1994/95 
Sud. 
pounds 
(mil.) 
As 
% 
of 
GDP 
1976/77-
1994/95 
growth 
Agriculture 585 39 710 39 2,452 31 7.1 
Manufacturing 
and mining 143 9 163 9 1,147 14.5 11.4 
Electricity 
and water 21 1 23 1 158 2 11.3 
Construction 65 4 79 4 554 7 11.4 
Transportation 89 6 106 6 633 8 10.4 
Commerce, finance 
and real estate 357 24 433 24 1,820 23 8.3 
Government and 
other services 162 11 200 11 673 8.5 7.0 
GDP at factor 
1,422 94 1,714 94 7,337 94 8.5 
Customs 89 6 108 6 475 6 8.5 
GDP at market 
1,511 100 1,822 100 7,912 100 8.5 
economy well Into the next century, contributing 39 percent of GDP 
in 1976, and projected to contribute 31 percent of GDP in 1995 at 
the end of the 18-year Perspective Plan (1976/77-1994/95). 
In addition to its strategic importance as the chief export 
sector, accounting for over 90 percent of the country's foreign 
earnings, agriculture exerts important impacts on all sectors of 
the domestic economy. The agricultural sector provided ençloyment 
for about 80 percent of the labor force in 1969/70 and almost 70 
percent in 1976/77. Activities of all the other sectors of the 
economy, especially the transport and Industrial sectors, are 
critically linked with agriculture. In all, about 80 percent of 
the Sudanese people derive their subsistence from agriculture and 
related primary activities. The pivotal role of agriculture in 
the Sudanese economy is well underlined in Sudan's current Six 
Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1976/77-1982/83) 
which states in its "Highlights" that: 
Agricultural development, both in terms of plant 
and animal production, is considered the foundation of 
the national economy in its entirety, and the develop­
ment of all other sectors is closely linked to agri­
cultural expansion (19:44). 
Indeed, according to the preceding statistics, agricultural 
development is virtually synonymous with national socio-economic 
development. The rurality of the Sudan is even more true of the 
Southern Region where more than 90 percent of the population live 
and subsist in rural areas. 
Land use and potential 
The Sudan Is among a snail number of countries in the world 
that still has vast agricultural production potential. In 1973, the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (F.A.O.) 
made an assessment of this potential and estimated the land area 
suitable for agriculture at nearly 292 million feddans (300 million 
acres). A breakdown of land use is shown in Table 2.2. Sudanese 
officials are more modest and have estimated their land potential 
at an even 200 million feddans suitable for agriculture (103:12), 
still a considerable amount. Out of F.A.O.'s estimate, 152,322,000 
feddans (or 52%) of land suitable for agriculture are located in 
the Autonomous Southern Region. 
It is on the basis of the land potential figures in Table 2.2 
that Sudan has been described as the "Breadbasket of the Middle 
East." In April, 1974, before the United Nations General AssenAly, 
the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated the general frame­
work within which Sudan hoped to achieve the objective of becoming 
the "Breadbasket of the Middle East" as follows: 
What we are trying to do in the Sudan is to proffer 
this wealth of land to our friends: those who have the 
money, and those who have the technological know-how, with 
a view to financing its utilization and cultivating it with 
the latest possible tools man has yet discovered. In other 
words, a tripartite venture between us who have the land 
and the water; the moneyed who are willing to invest in 
agriculture: and our friends whose technological abilities 
we lack (7la:33). 
By 1976/77, only 15 million feddans (5% of F.A.O.'s estimated 
potential) were used for crop production. Sudanese officials 
Table 2.2.  Present and proposed land use in the Sudan (In 1,000 feddans) (101:178) 
Distribution of surface Feddans % of total Feddans % of tot) 
Total surface area of the Sudan 596,383 100 
Not suitable for agriculture 304,595 51 
Inland water area 30,895 5.2 
Swamps and desert 273,700 45.8 
Suitable for agriculture 291,788 49.0 
Forests 212,335 35.7 202,594 34.1 
Permanent pasture 54,400 9.1 49,520 8.3 
Arable land 25,053 4.2 39,674 6.6 
Arable land breakdown 
Irrigated 3,218 0.54 4,438 0.7 
Nonlrrigated 21,835 3.66 35,236 5.9 
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estimate that the total land requirements will rise to 28.5 million 
feddans by 1982/83, of which 22.5 million feddans will be under 
crop and 6 million feddans will be left fallow (see Table 2.3). 
Most of the irrigated and rainfed agriculture in the above table 
will be in North-eastern and North-central Sudan where the modem 
sector of Sudan's agriculture is located. 
Institutional Dualism in Sudan's Agriculture 
The most important Institutional aspects of Sudan's agriculture 
are directly related to the dual character of modem and traditional 
sectors. Land use, crop production, marketing, credit arrangements, 
technological and managerial systems, and other institutional 
relationships are best discussed in conjunction with the modem 
and traditional categories of Sudan's agriculture and the 
elimination of this dualism. 
Traditional agriculture 
This sector consists of unorganized and fragmented livestock 
herding and traditional cultivation characterized by settled, 
normadlc, or transhumant modes of livelihood for the inhabitants. 
Prevalent in this sector are subsistence livestock and crop pro­
duction, varying degrees of periodic production for the market, 
backward forms of irrigation and rainfed cultivation methods using 
simple hand tools and invariably, low cultivated area per family, 
low yields per unit of area and low labor effort and productivity. 
Table 2.3. Land requirements for 1976/77 and projections to 1982/83 (in millions of 
feddans) (28:117) 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 
Irrigated 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 
Rainfed 12.2 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.1 18.4 
Total 15.0 16.0 17.2 18.4 19.6 21.0 22.5 
Livestock production is a major undertaking of the traditional 
sector. The country's animal wealth is quite plentiful and under­
utilized as shown by low off-take (sales) rates and low annual 
growth rates (see Table 2.4). In general, livestock are kept for 
their numbers rather than their productivity. The primary objective 
of the herder is to maximize the number of animals in his herd, not 
to maximize their milk or meat yields or the number sold. That 
is, of course, rational behavior for several reasons. Large herd 
sizes are necessary partly as Insurance against the many natural 
calamities, partly for status reasons, and partly because the 
animals are used in important social transactions such as marriages 
(76:268). The low off-take is consistent with the objective of 
maximizing the number of animals. 
The principal form of land use practiced by traditional 
herders Is unimproved grazing. There is no private ownership of 
grazing land; men and women graze their livestock by right as 
members of a community and most communities have well established 
and acknowledged patterns of seasonal grazing migrations (76:267). 
Like livestock herding, traditional cultivation is also a 
precarious means of livelihood dependent on single hand tools and 
the erratic whims of nature. Infrastructural resources such as 
credit and marketing arrangements, transport, education, health and 
water supply are nonexistent or abysmally inadequate in many areas 
of the traditional sector. 
Except in the Northern Nile Desert regions where land Is very 
Table 2.4. Livestock numbers and off-take rates for 1976/77 and projections to 1982/83 
(in thousands of animals) (28:25) 
1976/77 1982/83 
Percent annual 
Percent net increase 
off-take in numbers 
15,832 
15,918 
12,116 
2,828 
6.9 
34.7 
16.0 
3.1 
18,905 
22,132 
15,000 
3,104 
scarce, the principal form of land tenure la communal ownership 
and individual usufructuary cultivation of plots of land within 
communal lands. 
Traditional cultivation and livestock herding are the dominant 
modes of livelihood in the whole of the Southern Region, In 
Western Sudan, and In other areas of the Sudan outside the modem 
agricultural sector. 
Modem agriculture 
The modem sector Is characterized by modem Irrigation methods, 
mechanization, cash cropping and heavy government Involvement in 
all aspects of farming. Indeed, Sudan's agriculture was wholly 
traditional until the 19208 when the colonial regime built the 
Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile for cheap extraction of cotton. 
Irrigation, cash-cropping and the partnership of state and private 
interests in farming schemes have been the fundamental features 
of government plans for Improvement and expansion of agricultural 
production. The modem agricultural sector now accounts for well 
over half of the total agricultural production of the country (see 
Table 2.5). The bulk of exports, except for gum arable^ and 
A gum, obtained from several species of acacia, con^osed chiefly 
of the calcium, magnesium, and potassium salts of arable acid. The 
best gum Is nearly white or colorless and translucent and is obtained 
from A. Senegal and A. Arabica. Gum arable is used in the manufacture 
of adheslves, inks, confectionery, etc., in textile printing and In 
pharmacy. 
Table 2.5. Shares of different production sectors in area and production of major 
crops (In percent) (71a:20} 
3 years average 3 years average 
1966/67-1968/69 1973/74-1975/76 
Irrigated 22.4 53.8 18.5 50.3 
Dnlrrigated 76.6 46.2 81.5 49.7 
Public 27.6 54.9 22.3 51.6 
Private 72.4 45.1 77.7 48.4 
Mechanized 47.2 69.2 45.6 71.2 
Traditional 52.8 30.8 54.4 28.8 
livestock, which are produced by the traditional sector, comes from 
the modem sector. 
Infrastructural resources in the modem sector are relatively 
well developed. Credit and marketing arrangements, as well as 
transport, education, health, water supply, etc., are handled by 
the corporations that manage and run the business of the modem 
The major corporations which constitute the bulk of the modem 
sector operate mainly In North-central and North-eastem Sudan (see 
Figure 2.1), and Include: (1) the Gezlra Board, which manages over 
2 million feddans of Irrigated cotton, dura, wheat and groundnuts; 
(2) the Agricultural Production Corporation (APC) which controls 
irrigated projects In Khashm el Glrba, Sukl, the White Nile Pusqping 
Schemes, the Blue Nile Pumping Schemes, the Nile Pumping Schemes, 
the flood irrigated projects at Tokar and Gash Deltas, as well as 
unlrrigated crop production in the Nuba Mountains ; (3) the 
Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC) which oversees crop production 
in more than 1,000 mechanized schemes in Gedaref and In several 
other provinces; and (A) the new Rahad Corporation. 
The modem agricultural sector is modem or progressive solely 
because of government participation in farming, which makes it 
possible to undertake huge investments from extemal and internal 
sources as Illustrated by the recent case of the Rahad Corporation. 
The Rahad is a $400 million agricultural scheme on the banks of 
the Rahad River that was opened In December, 1977. The scheme will 
Figure 2.1. The North-central and North-eastern Growth 
Area of the Modem Sector of Sudan's Agri­
culture (101:196) 
water 300,000 acres under the First Phase and provide modem home­
steads for 16,000 tenant families. Each tenant farm will Include 
about 22 acres. More than 66.7 percent of the production in the 
Rahad will be allocated to cotton and groundnuts, while the 
remaining area will be used by the tenants to grow their own 
subsistence food crops. The Rahad is the biggest agricultural 
scheme after the Gezira, differing from the latter in that it will 
be completely mechanized except for cotton picking. The scheme 
was financed by loans from the World Bank ($64 million), Kuawalt's 
Fund for Arab Economic Development ($50 million), Saudi Development 
Fund ($28 million), and USAID ($11 million) (77:63). The land 
and people who are now tenants on the Rahad scheme were part of 
traditional agriculture until only a few years ago when the 
government intervened positively in the area. Similarly, the 
people of Old Half lived a nomadic desert way of life until they 
were displaced by the Aswan Dam when the government had to move 
them to New Half, a totally new non-desert environment. 
The preceding summary of major aspects of traditional and 
modem agricultural sectors within the Sudanese economy reveals 
three important salient features of Sudan's agricultural develop­
ment: (1) rural development strategies, agrarian structures and 
institutions are fundamental in transforming traditional agriculture; 
(2) changes in rural development strategies, agrarian structures and 
institutions are initiated through deliberate government policy and 
intervention in traditional agriculture; (3) the agricultural sector 
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is characterized by dualism as a result of deliberate government 
policies and Interventions in traditional agriculture. 
Major institutional problems that will likely continue to 
confront Sudan's agriculture arise from the aforementioned dualism. 
The traditional sector will continue to be bogged down in backward­
ness, inadequate yields, lack of infrastructure, relative govern­
ment neglect, and fragmented and scattered efforts of millions of 
illiterate small scale herders and cultivators. The plight of the 
traditional sector will likely continue until government intervenes 
in a major way to transform and restructure traditional agriculture 
to a similar extent it has done so in areas that have become the 
modem sector. The modem sector, on the other hand, will confront 
qualitatively different problems such as fluctuation of world 
food and fibre prices, labor shortages as the reserve from the 
traditional sector gets exhausted as a result of the latter's own 
modernization, and rising managerial and energy costs on which 
this sector will increasingly depend. 
Major Natural Resources Affecting Development 
of Sudan's Agricultural Potential 
Besides the abundant land, other major resources affecting 
agricultural production in the Sudan include water, soil, sunlight 
and temperatures. It is on the basis of some of these physical 
conditions that several writers have divided the country into 
natural resource regions. Barbour (9) has divided the Sudan into 
six regions on the basis of climate, geology, soils, vegetation and 
human types; while Gusten (44) has divided the country into nine 
regions according to "preponderant range of climate, vegetation and 
soils." Tothill (96) and Waterbury (101) have also studied the 
Sudanese economy and society along similar natural resource 
divisions. 
Soil and water resources are two major factors that in future 
will condition development of Sudan's vast agricultural potential. 
Barbour most clearly delineates natural resource regions according 
to state of water and soil resources, and his "Economic Regions" 
are used in this section as a framework for discussing major 
natural resources affecting development of Sudan's agricultural 
potential. These regions, shown in Map 2 are; (1) Northern Sudan, 
(2) Eastern Sudan, (3) Western Sudan, (4) The Central Clay Plains, 
(5) The Southern Clay Plains, and (6) The Ironstone Plateau. The 
first four of these regions are in Northern Sudan, while the last 
two are in the Autonomous Southern Region. Sunlight and temperatures 
do not vary substantially across the regions and will not be 
discussed. However, water and soils vary widely and have important 
impacts on agricultural production. 
Water resources 
In most regions of the country the main factor limiting agri­
cultural expansion is water, too little in some places and too 
much in others. The main sources of water are rainfall, river 
^^^Plateoj 
Map 2. Natural resource regions of the Sudan (9:129) 
channels and groundwater. 
Rainfall Precipitation in the Sudan comes mostly In the 
form of rainfall, and this increases from north to south (see 
Map 3). Rainfall is virtually nil in the northern frontier with 
Egypt, increases to about 250 nm (10 inches) in the Semi-desert 
and Eastern Sudan, and averages 600 mm (24 inches) in the Central 
Clay Plains and the Qoz region of Western Sudan. In Southern 
Sudan, the Southern Clay Plains average about 900 mm (36 inches) 
and the Ironstone Plateau about 1,200 mm (48 inches). In northern 
regions where rainfall is less than 16 inches, crop production from 
rainfall alone is at best highly risky. Rainfall for purposes of 
rainfed agriculture is adequate only in the southern parts of 
the Central Clay Plains and of the Qoz regions; while it is more 
than adequate in the Southern Clay Plains and the Ironstone 
Plateau of the southern region. In terms of rainfall alone, the 
southern parts of the Central Clay Plains and of the Qoz and the 
whole of the southern region are the areas in which Sudan's "bread­
basket" objectives will likely be realized in future. 
Groundwater Underground sources of water supply have not 
been adequately surveyed throughout Sudan and this could be an 
exploitable potential in areas that are running out of water. 
In the northern regions there are two sources of underground water. 
One is the permanent ground-water table of the Nubian and Uma 
Ruwaba Series, often at considerable depth varying from 400 to 
Map 3. Rainfall map of the Sudan (101:7) 
1,000 feet (53:56). The other is local concentrations of subsoil 
water along discharge lines, derived from local rainfall and 
particularly supported by seepage from floods (96:122). The latter 
source becomes more reliable In the Qoz region as the rains and 
floods Increase In intensity and duration. Many areas of the Qoz 
frequently have shallow supplies of water underneath the sands; 
distribution and quantity depend on the burled topography and the 
amount of rainfall. In the Central Clay Plains, underground water 
sources are often poor and limited because of the Impervlousness 
of the thick sheet of clay which forms the surface stratum In these 
plains. In some localities, water is found at depths of over 
300 feet while at others, the thick accumulation of unconsolidated 
sands, gravel, and clays in the Umn Ruwaba and Muglad depressions 
east of Tendeltl has water too saline for plant and animal use. 
The basalt country of Gedaref, east of the Blue Nile In the Central 
Clays, have water in cracks in the lava but the deeper levels have 
no open cracks and are dry. The volcanic areas of Jebel Mara are 
similar. In the Ironst'^ne Plateau and the Southern Clays, water 
has been found at depths within 100 feet, especially east of the 
Bahr el Jebel, and salinity is low enough for the water to be 
consumed by both humans and animals without further treatment 
(96:123). 
Underground water will likely continue to be important In many 
regions for humans and livestock, especially during the dry season. 
However, given the scanty knowledge about underground water resources 
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In the country and high energy costs, it is unlikely that under­
ground water resources will contribute substantially to crop pro­
duction in any of the regions. 
River channels The majority of Sudan's river channels are 
concentrated In the southern region and North-central and North­
eastern Sudan. The major river systems are the Bahr el Jebel, 
Bahr el Ghazal and Sobat all with numerous major and minor 
stream tributaries in Southern Sudan; and White Nile, Blue Nile, 
Main Nile and Atabara Rivers in North-central and North-eastern 
Sudan (see Map 5). All perennial flowing streams of significant 
size in the Sudan are part of the Nile system. There are also 
numerous wadis or intermittent streams, which flow only part of 
the year. Some drain into the Nile during the rainy season, 
others drain into swaiq>s that have no outlet to a river or 
disappear into the sands of an Inland basin during the dry season. 
Some of these intermittent streams carry huge discharges during 
the rainy season and support local areas of agriculture (the Gash 
and Tokar deltas, for example). 
The White Nile (known as Bahr el Jebel In the South) receives 
much of its water from the Lake Plateau of East-central Africa 
(Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are riparian states), while the Blue 
Nile rises at Lake Tana in the Ethiopian Highlands and makes its 
way through the mountains for about 500 miles before entering the 
Sudan. The other rivers in North-central and North-eastern Sudan 
(the Atbara, Rahad, Binder, Gash and Baraka) all have their sources 
32 
In these highlands, and Ethiopia is a riparian state for all these 
All the river water development projects, with the exception 
of the Jonglei Canal, are in North-central and North-eastern Sudan. 
The Sennar Dam was the first to be built in 1924 for irrigation 
development of the already famous Gezira Scheme and, now, its 
extensions. The Jebel Avulia Dam, built in 1937, was to regulate 
the water to Egypt; it is now redundant since completion of the 
Aswan High Dam in 1971. The Kashm el Girba Dam on the Atbara 
was completed in 1964 for development of irrigation schemes for 
resettlement of Wadl Haifa residents displaced by the Aswan High 
Dam. The Roseries Dam was coiq)leted in 1966 for hydroelectric 
generation and irrigation schemes between the Blue, Rahad and 
Dinder Rivers. Modem irrigation and mechanized agriculture are 
concentrated in these Central Clay Plains projects in the key 
provinces of Blue Nile, White Nile, Gezira, Khartoum and Kassala. 
Use of the waters of the River Nile system is governed by the 
Nile Waters Agreement, which came into effect on December 12, 1959, 
between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic 
(Egypt). This century's average annual yield of the Nile as 
measured at Aswan is 84 billion cubic meters (BM^). 10 BM^ of 
this Is estimated to be lost by evaporation. The remaining 74 BM^ 
Is divided between Sudan (20.5 BM^) and Egypt (53.5 BM^). The 
text of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is included in Appendix D. 
Sudan's current Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 
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assumes that the average water requirement in the Nile area is 
4,800 per irrigated feddan. On the basis of this assumption 
and the land requirements of Table 2.3, the total annual water 
requirements for North-eastern and Northern-central growth areas 
are computed in Table 2.6. Table 2.6 reveals that further 
expansion of irrigated agriculture in this area by only 200,000 
feddans in 1983/84 over that of 1982/83 would result in water 
deficits for the first time and bring to an end the historical 
water surplus enjoyed by the region. 
Any Increase in water supply from future water development 
projects as well as any decreases through natural fluctuations or 
claims by other riparian states shall be split equally between 
the two countries (see Nile Waters Agreement). Future increases 
(from the Jonglei Canal) and decreases (from claims by the other 
riparian states) in water supply are both likely. The 1959 Nile 
Waters Agreement assumed that none of Nile source countries would 
need the water for irrigation purposes. The fear, however, still 
remains that these countries would one day decide to harness the 
waters of the lakes and rivers located within their borders. 
Indeed, in 1974 at the height of the energy crisis, a member of 
the Kenyan Parliament suggested that the Nile be harnessed at 
Lake Victoria and the water sold for oil, barrel for barrel. 
Since neither Sudan nor Egypt produced oil at the time, the 
threat remained nothing more than a bad Joke. With Ethiopia, 
however, the threat is real. Like Sudan, Ethiopia has abundant 
Table 2.6. Water requirements, surpluses and deficits In Northcentral and Northeastern 
growth area of the Sudan: 1976/77-1983/84 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
Irrigated land 
(million feddans) 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.5 
Water requirements 
(mill. M3) 13.44 14.44 15.36 16.32 17.28 18.72 19.68 21.6 
Water supply 
(constant) 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 
Water surplus (+) 
or deficit (-) 7.06 6.10 5.14 4.18 3.22 1.78 0.82 -1.1 
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land resources, over 200 million feddans of arable land of which 
only 11 percent Is under cultivation; and 7.7 million feddans of 
land suitable for irrigation of which only 33 percent is being 
utilized (78:102). 
In 1979, Ethiopia asked the Soviet Union to help in harnessing 
the saoœ rivers that flow into North-eastern and North-central 
Sudan. Ethiopia and the Soviet Union are reported to have agreed 
to build dams for irrigation and hydroelectric purposes on the 
Takeze, Atbara, Binder, Beles and Abbai Rivers as shown in 
Figure 2.2. A war of words ensued In the Press with Egypt charging 
"conspirators in the Horn (of Africa) who want to exploit events 
in the vicinity," and Ethiopia complaining that neither Egypt 
nor the Sudan "ever felt constrained to consult it before they 
made plans to dam the river, as they were required to do under 
international law." A commentary on Radio Addis Ababa Is reported 
to have enqihasized that Egypt should not be alarmed now that 
Ethiopia wants to dam the river up to the Sudanese border with 
"water actually belonging to Ethiopia" (78:104). 
Saudi Arabia, without any rights to the waters of the Nile 
system, even had plans to build a pipeline (see Figure 2.2) from 
Atbara and across the Red Seas to divert an agreed (presumably 
with Sudan and Egypt) amount of the Nile waters. 
It is clear that the peaceful and equitable utilization of 
the Nile waters in the future will require cooperation and agreement 
among all the riparian states. Whatever form such future agreement 
EGYPT 
'ETHIOPIA, 
Figure 2.2. Possible crisis in the sharing of the 
Nile Waters (78:103) 
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and cooperation takes, both Egypt's and Sudan's share of water under 
the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement will have to decrease If any of these 
countries acquire any allotments In the Nile waters. The pressure 
to Increase the. yield of the Nile, especially from sources In 
Southern Sudan,can only Increase, and the water development projects 
Indicated In Map 5 will most likely be implemented early In the 
2l8t Century. 
The preceding discussion of Sudan's water resources shows that 
the potential for Irrigated agriculture turning the country into 
a "breadbasket" Is limited and will soon become fully exhausted. 
In future years, Sudan will have to turn to ralnfed agriculture. 
The potential for this in terms of water availability is also 
great. Ralnfed agriculture on a large scale is precarious in areas 
where rainfall Is less than 400 nm (16 Inches) and risky where 
rainfall is between 400 mm and 600 mm (see Map 3). In future 
years, Sudan's modem agriculture will have to move to areas where 
rainfall is 600 mm or greater, generally In the Southern parts 
of the Central Clay Plains, the southern parts of the Qoz region, 
and the whole of the Southern Clay Plains and the Ironstone Plateau 
of the southern region. 
Soils resources 
The soils of the Sudan, covering as they do an area of 2.5 
million Km^, are quite varied in character. Five broad soil types 
can be distinguished. These are; (1) desert, (2) Qoz, (3) semi-arid, 
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Map 4. Soils of the Sudan (52:53) 
(A) alluvial, and (5) lateritic soils as shown in Map 4 (9:52). 
Desert soils These soils, found in Northern Sudan, Eastern 
Sudan, and semi-desert regions, which are part of the Sahara Desert, 
are extremely thin and support very little plant life except for 
specialized vegetation. Their potential contribution to agricultural 
development is practically nil. 
Qoz or aeollan soils The principal area of Qoz soils is a 
vast extent of now static billowy sand-dunes. The dunes are now 
stabilized partly by a shallow and slight surface cementation by 
iron oxide or clay and partly by vegetation (96:107; 9:60). The 
Qoz absorbs all rain that falls and stores it until exhausted by 
growing plants or escapes into underground channels. The Qoz is 
not a rich soil; nevertheless, some considerable areas of this 
soil are used for producing good crops of groundnuts, melons and 
millet. The agricultural potential of the Qoz for large scale 
agriculture is low as a result of the relatively low fertility of 
the soils, taken with the fact that they are too permeable for 
supplementary Irrigation if there was water, which is not available 
in sufficient quantities. The Qoz and the northern parts of the 
Central Clay Plains are moreover the areas that are threatened 
by desertification, and this could be exacerbated by large scale 
mechanized agriculture. These considerations make it unlikely that 
the Qoz region will contribute significantly to Sudan's "breadbasket." 
Semi-arid soils These are soils formed in situ under semi-
arid conditions. They are not extensive, being confined to the 
Jebel Mara In the extreme west of thé country, the Nuba Mountains 
in the center, and une extreme southeast of Southern Sudan including 
the Borna Plateau. Rainfall is higher in these highlands than in 
the surrounding areas. The soils are fertile and well-drained, and 
provide good opportunities for specialized crops especially in the 
Jebel Mara Mountains. 
Alluvial and lacustrine soils These are the most widely 
distributed soils in the Sudan. The more extensive and more 
important alluvial soils are the clays that have been deposited by 
streams from the uplands to the south and east of the country. In 
North-central and North-eastern Sudan, they form the Central Clay 
Plains, which consist of limited areas of alluvial terraces beside 
the Blue and White Niles and their tributaries, together with the 
Northern Gezira Plain, which is thought to be of lacustrine origin 
(9:57). In Central Sudan, the clays stretch from the Nuba 
Mountains to the Ethiopian foothills. In Southern Sudan, the clays 
are even more extensive, known as the Southern Clay Plains, they 
occupy a vast triangle between Lake Rudolf, Melut and Aweil (see 
Figure 3.3). The Southern Clay Plains consist of heavy, dark 
grey to dark chocolate clays that develop deep cracks in the dry 
season and expand in the wet season becoming quite impermeable. 
The clay content and the fertility of the clay plains in general 
increases from north to south. 
All studies on the Southern Clay Plains agree that these soils 
arc rich in fertility but characterized by drainage problems. In 
1954, the Jongle! Investigation Team concluded that . .on the 
whole, provided the drainage problem can be solved, they (Southern 
Clay Plains) must be regarded as one of the better agricultural 
soils In the Sudan, In spite of their inferior tilth and comparatively 
narrow range of moisture content between saturation and wilting 
points" (53:108). A similar conclusion was reached more recently 
by the International Land Development Consultants (ILACO) about the 
soils of the Pengko and Eastern Plains that . .the real vertlsols 
are most suited to agriculture provided that some protective 
measures against flooding from the Nile or against creeping flow 
from the east are taken" (64:50). The ILACO study continued to 
report that this soil group (the vertlsols) is most widely 
distributed in these plains and that the main constraint of drainage 
could be improved by the construction of a surface drainage system, 
or possibly, as they say in another report, by deep ripping and 
ploughing (65:16). 
Laterltlc or ironstone soils This is the last group of the 
five soil types. The Ironstone Plateau of Southern Sudan is covered 
throughout almost the whole of its extent by hard red concretionary 
ironstone of laterltlc type, at a depth of 15 to 30 centimeters 
(6 to 12 Inches) below the surface. The Ironstone Itself is often 3 
to 5 meters thick and goes much deeper in some areas (9:54). These 
soils are thus generally thin (less than one foot deep in most 
places), and their agricultural potential is variable depending on 
the different level of the cantenas. The exception in the Ironstone 
Plateau region Is the so-called "Green Belt" which consists of the 
area covering the extreme southwestern parts of Western Equatorla 
Province and a similar area around the Acholl Mountains In the 
Torlt District of East Equatorla Province. The soils in the Green 
Belt are like the rest of the Ironstone Plateau, but they are 
deeper and better and agriculturally very important. 
In terms of soil quality alone, the best soils are the 
limited volcanic soils of the Jebel Mara and Borna Plateau, followed 
by the extensive clays in Central and Southern Sudan, then the 
Ironstone Plateau, and finally, the Southern Qoz soils. These are 
the soils wherein Sudan's "breadbasket" potential lies. 
Regions with "Breadbasket" Potential and Future 
Directions in Sudan's Agricultural Development 
The preceding discussion of agriculture's role in the national 
economy, and of the institutional and natural resource aspects of 
Sudan's agriculture, indicates that modem agricultural development 
must move southward from its traditional center in North-central 
and North-eastern Sudan. Institutionalization of dualistlc develop­
ment in agriculture, with government and private investments 
concentrated in modem schemes in North-central and North-eastern 
Sudan while the rest of the country engages in "improving" traditional 
agriculture, is apt to have serious political implications relating 
to Instability and regional tensions. 
Sudan has Just emerged from 17 years of civil war, which was a 
result of differential development between Northern and Southern 
Sudan, and the country cannot afford to foster further Inequitable 
development among the regions. Regional equity in development Is 
particularly relevant inasmuch as the transition from traditional 
subsistence production to modem commercial production is made 
possible in the Sudan through deliberate government policy and 
interventions in traditional agriculture. 
Furthermore, as shown In this chapter, Sudan's "breadbasket" 
potential lies mostly in the Southern Clay Plains. The northeastern 
and northcentral growth areas are running out of irrigation water; 
while agriculture is not viable in other regions in Northern Sudan 
because of lack of water. The Qoz Region in Western Sudan similarly 
lacks sufficient water, and it has soils which cannot sustain large 
scale agricultural development for long periods. The Ironstone 
Plateau Region, although it has adequate water, has soils that are 
poor for most of the region. 
If the Sudan plans to realize the objective of becoming the 
"Breadbasket of the Middle East," then clearly modem agricultural 
development must be Introduced into the Southern Clay Plains. The 
Southern Clay Plains Region is identified and discussed in the 
next chapter as the Jonglel Projects Area (JPA) and the area of 
study. The Jonglel Canal, currently under construction and also 
discussed in the next chapter, falls within the JPA and provides 
necessary conditions for drainage and irrigation without which modem 
commercial agriculture cannot be viable in the area. 
CHAPTER III. AREA OF STUDY 
The first of four sections of Chapter II provide background 
Information on the Jonglai Canal within the study area, Jonglel 
Projects Area (JPA), as depicted in Figure 3.3. The purpose of this 
section is to present two main inyllcatlons of the Jonglel Canal to 
the inhabitants of the JPA. One feature is that the canal is an 
alien and sudden intrusion into the physical, economic and institu­
tional Interrelationships within the traditional economies of the 
JPA. The other implication is that the canal opens up hitherto 
dormant opportunities for economic development in the JPA. It is, 
therefore, incumbent upon policymakers and inhabitants of the area 
to take (1) necessary remedial measures against adverse effects 
of the canal and (2) maximum advantage of the new opportunities. 
Section two discusses delineation of the Jonglel Projects Area; 
while the last two sections discuss the physical and institutional 
environments of socio-economic development in the JPA. The discussion 
in the last two sections of this chapter is used later in the 
diagnostic phase in identifying physical and Institutional failure 
and success elements that Impede or promote achievement of the goals 
developed in the delimiting phase. 
Background on the Jonglel Canal Within the 
Jonglel Projects Area 
The Jonglel Canal Project is an immediate consequence of Egypt's 
growing demands for water. The River Nile is virtually the sole 
supplier of water to the Egyptian economy. During the first sixty 
years of this century, the average annual discharge as measured at 
Aswan, Egypt, was about 84 with a standard deviation of 20 
During this period, Egypt's water demands had been growing rapidly. 
By the end of the 1940's, these demands were estimated at between 
55 and 63 BM^ per annum, mostly for agricultural uses (103:3). 
Demand was thup ast catching up with supply. 
The Eg ' ".lans have always been keenly aware of the fact that 
population -owth and sustained economic growth could not be 
supported unpredictable natural discharges from the Nile. As far 
back as t beginning of this century, the Egyptian Irrigation 
Department appreciated the necessity of controlling supply through a 
system of "over-year" storage facilities throughout the Nile Valley. 
The suggestions and plans for this over-year storage came to be 
known as the "Century Water Storage Scheme." The argument for the 
storage scheme is straightforward. The unpredictable element from 
the natural Nile discharge could only be removed by storing 
successive annual floods, that Is, storing the difference between 
total discharge and total demand. 
The storage scheme conten^)lated over-year storage facilities 
at Lake Victoria, the source of the Bahr el Jebel in Central Africa, 
and at Lake Tana, the source of the Blue Nile in the Ethiopian 
Highlands. Lakes Edward, Kioga and Albert were to be used to 
regulate the discharge from Lake Victoria Into the Victoria Nile 
and the Bahr el Jebel Rivers. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic diagram 
Q*i 
Figure 3.1. Diagram of the Century Water Scheme 
as conceived around 1950 (101:282) 
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of the Century Water Storage Scheme as conceived In 1950. 
Assuming the necessary diplomatic and technical problems could 
be solved at the southern over-year storage stage, the Scheme's 
major problem still lay downstream. North of Juba, in Southern 
Sudan, the Bahr el Jebel enters the Sudd Swamps. Here the river 
reaches the flat bottom of its drainage basin and spills over Its 
banks to form a swamp which varies from 5,000 to 8,000 square 
kilometers in surface area. Between Juba and Bor the river drops 
by 33 meters over a distance of 168 kilometers, but between Bor 
and Halakal the river drops only by 37 meters over a distance of 
773 kilometers as shown In Figure 2.2. It is estimated that one-half 
of the Bahr el Jebel annual discharge of 28 BM^ In an average year 
Is lost annually through évapotranspiration In the Sudd Region. 
Clearly, the over-year storage scheme would come to naught if the 
additional stored water in Central Africa could not be passed 
through the Sudd Swamps. 
The natural solution for the Century Water Storage Scheme 
was to cut a channel through or around the Sudd Swamps. This canal, 
which came to be known as the Jonglel Canal, was first proposed by 
Egypt as early as 1904; while Egypt sought its approval as early 
as 1938 (109:5). The canal was to begin 80 miles north of Bor 
near Jonglel Village, from which the canal got its name, and 
divert the waters of the Bahr el Jebel eastwards to join the Sobat 
and White Nile Rivers at their Junction, just south of Malakal 
(Figure 3.3). 
iCcntral Sudanj 
Figure 3.2. Slope of the Nile from Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean (101:15) 
(a) 
\ (b) 
Figure 3.3. The Jonglei Canal, Old (a) and Final (b) 
Versions (22:37) 
The Jongle! Canal Project, however, could not be Implemented. 
Among other things, the Second World War Intervened and the Sudanese 
were not very enthusiastic with the plan as it called for major 
ecological changes in the region. The effects would particularly 
be great on the inhabitants of the canal area whose transhumant 
economies have for centuries evolved from and depended on the regime 
of the Nile (53:193). After the War, the situation was further 
complicated by the imminent emergence of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania 
(all riparian states) as Independent nations whose agreement would 
have to be sought by any over-year storage scheme that planned 
to use the lakes located in these countries as storage facilities 
for Egypt's water needs. 
Meanwhile, Egypt's water demands, fueled by the pressures of 
continued economic growth and the pressures of the Middle East Wars, 
continued to grow. The Egyptians, therefore, started to consider 
alternative over-year storage sites, and concluded with only 
one over-year water storage facility that was to be located in 
Egypt Itself. For this purpose construction of the giant Aswan 
High Dam was begun in 1961 and completed in 1971. The resulting 
storage facility, known as Lake Nasser in Egypt and Lake Nubia in 
the Sudan, has a storage capacity of 157 BM^. 
Construction of the Aswan High Dam, although alleviating 
Egypt's water shortage, at least temporarily, could not solve the 
problem of water losses in the Sudd Swamps. With over-year storage 
achieved at Lake Nasser and the 1955-1972 war In Southern Sudan 
ended, the Egyptians revived plans to tap the water losses In the 
Sudd. Four proposals (see Map 5) to increase the annual discharge 
into Lake Nasser were considered: (1) the old Jongle1 Canal 
proposals; (2) a canal to redirect the Barro tributary of the Sobat 
around the Hashar Swamps Into the White Nile; (3) another canal to 
channel the waters of the Bahr el Ghazal system north of the Sudd 
Swamp into the White Nile; and (A) a canal to collect the waters 
of several rivers and streams, now completely lost in the Sudd, and 
redirect them Into the Bahr el Jebel east of Bor. 
It is on the first of the above proposals, the Jonglel Canal, 
that agreement has been reached. It is estimated that digging 
of the canal, in its first phase, will be completed by 1985 at a 
cost of about $350 million. The project will Increase the Nile 
discharge at Aswan by an estimated 4 BM^ In its first phase; and on 
the basis of the 1959 fifty-fifty costs/benefits Nile Waters Agree­
ment between Egypt and Sudan, each nation will get 2 BM^ (105:26). 
The new Jonglel Canal proposal is a modified version of the old 
proposals (see Figure 3.3 which shows the old and final versions of 
the canal). When completed, the canal will be 360 kilometers long; 
longer than the Suez and Panama Canals put together and the longest 
canal in the world. The canal will be 38 meters wide for the first 
40 kilometers downstream from Bor, 50 meters wide for the last 
50 kilometers upstream from the junction of the Sobat and the Bahr 
el Jebel, and 30 meters wide in the intermediate 270 kilometers. 
lltoya; 
Uganda ) 
Map 5. Major river channels of the Sudan, and 
proposed diversionary canals and dams 
In Southern Sudan (101:217) 
The major benefits which Sudan stands to gain from the canal 
project are; (1) the share of the 2 for Irrigation use in 
Central Sudan; (2) there is considerable potential for irrigating 
millions of feddans on a supplementary basis in the canal area; 
(3) the canal and the proposed parallel all-weather road will 
greatly improve transport within the region and with the rest of 
the country; and (4) the drainage effect of the canal may be 
beneficial to the inhabitants of the area in nonagricultural 
respects as well, such as tropical disease control. On the other 
hand, the adverse effects on the flood plain pastui^es may be 
considerable. It Is estimated that at least 19 percent of these 
plains might be lost as a result (105:26). It is too early, however, 
to assess the full range of ecological effects of the canal project 
at the present. Fears by ecologlsts and environmentalists are 
highly conjectural. 
However, the canal project is pregnant with serious political 
Implications. When agreement on digging the canal was reached in 
February 1974, rumors started to circulate In Southern Sudan that 
some two million Egyptian peasants would be resettled in the canal 
area to farm the potential irrigated area that would be opened up 
by the canal. Heavy rioting broke out in Juba, Capital of the 
Autonomous Southern Sudan, in October 1974 leaving 3 people dead 
and about 200 arrested, including members of the Regional Assembly 
of Parliament (105:26). Several sources tend to give substance to 
Southern Sudanese suspicions. A recent article in the Arabic 
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Newspaper "Asharq al-Avsat" (The Middle East), for exaiuple, reported 
The plan to utilize 3 million Egyptian peasants In the 
Jonglel Canal area has been postponed because only 15 percent 
of the land suitable for agriculture In Southern Sudan will 
be opened up by the Project during Its first phase (7:5). 
Resettlement of surplus Egyptian peasants Is a recurring problem In 
the Arab World. Resettlement of Egyptian peasants in the Sudan 
would likely arouse widespread opposition not only in Southern 
Sudan but in other parts of the country as well; and it is unlikely 
that Egyptian peasants will be resettled in the JPA within the 
foreseeable future. 
The people who will bear the primary ecological and political 
effects of the canal are the present inhabitants of the canal area 
(JPA), principally the Dinka, Nuer and Shllluk people. Although 
the preceding background information on the Jonglel Canal Project 
Indicates that the canal was initially conceived and designed to 
cater primarily to interests external to the JPA; nevertheless the 
canal presents opportunities for large-scale development in the JPA. 
It also presents real problems and challenges to the capacity of 
the inhabitants of the JPA to cope with and to shape the process 
of change that will inevitably ensue from the possibilities opened 
up by the canal project. It hardly needs eiiq>haslzlng that correct 
assessment of these possibilities and selection of adequate and 
appropriate rural development strategies for the JPA from the onset 
are central to this process of change. 
Delineation of the Jonglel Projects Area (JPA) 
The JPA Is defined for the purposes of this study to coincide 
with the administrative boundaries of Jonglel Province in Southern 
Sudan, Sudan (see Map 1). This area Ilea approximately between 6® 
30' and 9" 30' North Latitude and between 30' 10' and 34" East 
Longitude. It is the area bounded by the Sobat, White Nile, and Bahr 
el Jebel Rivers in the North and West (Map 5), by the administrative 
boundary between Jonglel and East Equatorla Provinces in the South; 
and by the Sudan-Ethiopia border in the East (Map 1). The JPA includes 
the Bor, Kongor, Plbor, Akobo, Waat and Fanjak Rural Councils, and has 
a total area of approximately 120,000 square kilometers (30 million 
acres) presently in swamp, pasture and cropland. 
The area designated as the JPA in this study is somewhat 
different from that described by the (1954) report of the Jonglel 
Investigation Team, hereafter term JIT, and also from that described 
as the Jonglel Development Projects Area by the Executive Organ of 
the National Council for Jonglel Development Projects. 
According to the Executive Organ, the JPA lies between 
approximately 6' 30' and 9" 30' North Latitude, and between 
approximately 30® 10' and 31® 45' East Longitude (5:7). This area 
covers about 3 million feddans on both sides of the canal channel. 
It Is the area said to be "directly" affected by the canal. This 
definition of the JPA, the Executive Organ admits, is tentative as 
the extent of the "direct effects" of the canal cannot be known 
with reasonable precision until after completion and operation of 
the canal. The definition was adopted only for "practical 
purposes".^ 
The 1954 JIT definition of the Jonglel Area Is much broader 
than that of the Executive Organ as it Includes areas inhabited by 
people who would be "directly" as well as those who would be 
"indirectly" affected had the canal version of that time (see 
Figure 3.3) been implemented. The JIT distinguishes between those 
people who would be "directly" affected and those who would be 
"indirectly" affected In these words: 
By 'indirectly* we mean those people who will have 
to face definite losses in pasture or other existing 
economic assets as a result of changed physical conditions 
and also a reduction in potential assets not at present 
exploited. By 'indirectly* we mean those who, through 
economic and social contacts, will obviously feel the 
effects; what may be called the general repercussions 
(53:193). 
According to the JIT definition, the JPA would extend from as 
far south as Nimule and to as far north as Kostl (Map 1), a distance 
of 1,625 kilometers. It would Include the areas inhabited by: 
1) the Madl, Barl and Mandarl people in East Equatorla Province; 
2) the Olnka and Nuer people in Jonglel Province; 3) the Allab and 
Chlech Dlnka people in Lakes Province; 4) the Dlnka, Nuer and 
Shllluk people in Upper Nile Province; and 4) the Baggara people 
in Kordofan and White Nile Provinces in Northern Sudan (53:193-253). 
^As reported in Intenriews with officials of the Executive 
Organ for development projacts in the JPA. 
The total area of the JIT definition of the JFA was estimated at 
512,000 square kilometers (123 million feddans). 
The JIT version of the JFA was designed to delineate areas 
where inhabitants would be coiiq>ensated for losses suffered as a 
result of the Equatorial Nile Project (the Jonglel Canal was 
officially known by this name). Although the Executive Organ 
definition of the JFA has to date not been precise, the various 
versions, such as the one above, are based on the JIT compensation 
definition. 
As stated earlier, this study views the Jonglel Canal as an 
Infrastructural facility designed not only to increase water yields 
for irrigation further north; it is also a means to bringing socio­
economic development to the JFA. Compensation per se is relevant 
where damages to individual interests are Involved as a result of 
excavating in the area. The view expressed here is that the 
inhabitants of the JFA are not people to be merely compensated, but 
permanent participants in the benefits of the canal project 
including the water that will flow in the canal channel in all its 
uses. For this reason, socio-economic development in the JFA is 
discussed in this study within the national context of goals, and 
not as an isolated case of compensation. This view of the canal's 
role and of the national context of socio-economic development In 
the JFA is supported by the Mandate (Republican Order No. 284) of 
the NC-JFA which calls for ". . .the endeavor to derive the maximum 
benefit from the conditions created by the Froject (canal)." 
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Two possible definitions of the JPA that would be consistent 
with a developmental as contrasted to a compensatlonal delineation 
are considered and recommended. One definition Is to delineate the 
JPA as the whole of the Southern Clay Plains (Figure 3.4). This 
definition is based on similarity of the physical and social bases 
for economic development. According to Barbour: 
Throughout the Region (Southern Clay Plains) the sources 
of livelihood of the population are cattle-raising, agri­
culture and fishing. These vary in their relative importance 
according to the areas of grazing and cultivable land avail­
able, but since among the Luo people (chiefly Nuer, Dinka, 
Shilluk and Anyuak) the types of crops grown, the types of 
cattle kept, and the prevailing attitudes towards them are 
fairly consistent, it will be convenient to study the way of 
life of all these people as a unity (9:238). 
The Southern Clay Plains would thus be the most desirable definition 
of the JPA from the point of view of both the natural and cultural 
resources. However, since the Southern Clay Plains are so extensive, 
covering areas within five of the six Southern Provinces, this 
definition would be too broad in terms of development administration. 
Another definition, the one suggested and used in this study, 
is to delineate the JPA to coincide with the administrative 
boundaries of Jonglei Province (Map 1). The advantage of this 
definition is that Jonglei Province is a large portion of the 
Southern Clay Plains (see Figure 3.4 for the area bounded by the 
Baro and Bahr el Jebel Rivers, the Ethiopian border and the 
provincial border running from the Boma Plateau). Development 
experience can thus be easily transferred to other areas of the 
Southern Clay Plains. The definition takes into consideration 
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Figure 3.4. The Southern Clay Plains (9:235) 
administrative boundaries within which socio-economic development 
objectives would be pursued. 
For the purposes of this study it is not significant whether 
the JPA is defined as the narrow strip of land along both sides 
of the canal channel, or more broadly as the Jonglei Province, or 
most broadly as the Southern Clay Plains since the primary interest 
is on identification and selection of appropriate rural development 
strategies for the JPA. In this study, therefore, the JPA in its 
broad usage refers to the whole of the Southern Clay Plains; while 
for the purpose of initiation and implementation of rural develop­
ment programs the JPA is used to refer to Jonglel Province. 
Within Jonglel Province, field work for this study was 
conducted only in Bor and Kongor Districts. These districts were 
selected because they are where most of the pilot and other 
research and development studies are concentrated. These districts 
were the most accessible areas during the rainy season when field 
work for this study was conducted. The next two sections, which 
discuss the physical and social environment of socio-economic 
development in the JPA, refer mainly to these two districts. 
However, given the physical and social homogeneity of the region, 
the discussion applies to the whole of the Southern Clay Plains. 
The Physical Environment of the JPA For 
Soclo-Economlc Development 
The role of the physical environment in the process of economic 
development is increasingly being appreciated in economic literature. 
Georgescu-Roegen, for example, observes that . .the entire 
economic history of mankind proves beyond question that nature, 
too, plays an Important role In the economic process as well as 
in the formation of economic value" (38:13). This role Is clearly 
discernible at both extremes of the process of economic development. 
In technologically very backward societies survival critically 
depends on the often erratic whims of nature. On the other hand, 
in technologically very advanced societies the mounting problem 
of industrial pollution has reawakened scientific and social 
interest in the role of the physical environment in the process 
of economic development. 
A detailed description of the physical environment of the JPA 
is available in Volume 1 of the report of the Jonglei Investigation 
Team (1954). Apart from the effects of the 1960's floods on the 
ecology, it is unlikely that there have been major changes since 
the report was published. This section is therefore confined to 
discussion of the physical environment Insofar as it Impacts on 
identification and selection of rural development strategies for 
socio-economic development of the JPA. 
Land types 
The whole of the JPA is subject to varying levels of flooding 
during the rainy season (May to October). The floods are caused 
by heavy rains and the Nile's habit of overflowing its banks with 
heavy discharges that it brings from the Central African plateau 
during the same season. The excess water problem Is compounded by 
the extreme flatness of the land and the heavy impermeability of 
the soils. Small differences in relief, however, have tremendous 
effect on the ecology and livelihood of the inhabitants of the 
The Jonglei Investigation Team have divided land into five 
main types according to differences in relief and water regime. 
These land types, shown in Figure 3.5 are: (1) permanent water 
surfaces, consist of the River Nile, its tributaries and the many 
lakes that dot the swamps; (2) permanent swamps, along the Nile 
and tributaries, remain flooded all the year and are covered with 
heavy growth of papyrus and kindred vegetation; (3) flood plains, 
locally known as Toich, are areas inundated from the rivers for 
periods of four to six months every year; (4) intermediate lands, 
areas where flooding from the rivers is not likely, but which 
become flooded every year because of the heavy summer rains, the 
impermeability of the soils and lack of drainage; and (5) high lands, 
distinctly higher areas, some two meters above the other land types, 
within or beyond the flood plains. The high lands escape flooding 
from the rivers and have sufficiently permeable soils to drain 
quickly after the rains. The small differences in relief, together 
with the flood conditions, determine the type of natural vegetation 
and the utility of the land for grazing, agricultural, transportation 
and residential uses. 
Figure 3.5, Land classification in the 
JPA (53: Map El) 
Generally, the soils are alluvial clay and are considered to 
be among the best soils In the Sudan in terms of fertility (see 
Chapter II). They are, however, quite Impermeable In much of the 
area and have the characteristics of contracting and cracking when 
dry becoming very hardened. On the other hand, when wet, they 
expand and become very luu^y and difficult to work. 
Where the exchangeable bases in the structure of the clay are 
mainly composed of calcium, the soils generally possess a good 
tilth and are fertile. But where sodium takes the place of 
calcium, as may occur in the flood plains where river water has been 
evaporated from the soil, the soil becomes exceptionally lnq>ermeable 
and infertile (9:235). 
The above soil characteristics delineate suitable land for 
agriculture and limit it to the high lands and parts of intermediate 
lands In exceptionally dry years. However, after construction of 
the Jonglel Canal, much of the intermediate lands west of the canal 
will become drained and arable. 
Generally, temperature and rainfall have more effect on climate 
than any other factors. In the JPA, temperature variation is small, 
ranging from a mean of 81" F for the coolest month (January) to a 
mean of 91" F for the warmest month (May). On the other hand, 
rainfall is very erratic and is characterized by an equatorial 
double maximum intensity (53:6). Table 3.1 shows the erratic nature 
Table 3.1. Rainfall statistics for Bor Town in the Jonglel Projects Area (53:54) 
Month 
Average Standard deviation Extremes (mm) 
mm percent Minimum 
January 2 Not examined 18 Nil 
(1950) 
February 8 Not examined 60 Nil 
(1906) 
27 Not examined 107 Nil 
(1915) 
April 84 56 67 209 Nil 
(1907) (1911) 
May 12: 60 48 269 
(1918) (1924) 
120 53 44 249 33 
(1918) (1907) 
142 60 42 320 37 
(1932) (1935) 
135 63 47 310 39 
(1914) (1925) 
September 131 92 70 515 22 
(1917) (1903, 13, 27) 
97 57 59 265 17 
(1917) (1927) 
Noveaiber 24 Not examined 76 Nil 
(1931) 
December 7 Not examined 99 Nil 
(1918) 17 years 
903 237 26 1,663 448 
(1917) (1910) 
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of rainfall, as measured by the monthly standard deviation for Bor 
in the JPA. More recent illustrations of the erratic nature of 
rainfall are contained in ILACO's Annual Reports, published since 
1976. In 1980, for example, 365 millimeters (mm) of rainfall was 
recorded at Kongor for July, of which 185 am was in one single 
rainstorm. In Bor, 75 miles south of Kongor, only 105 mm was 
recorded for that July. 
The great annual variations in rainfall, and the even greater 
monthly variations, constitute the most important single environmental 
factor affecting the economy of the JPA. The climatic conditions 
have a very Important implication for agricultural development in 
the JPA. The heavy impermeability of the soils coupled with 
periods of intense heat and isolation, alternating in the rainy 
season with spells of severe rainfall, produce in the soil a rapid 
transition between a hard dry condition difficult to work and 
providing little moisture for plants, and a saturated state when 
plants suffer from water-logging. Drainage during rains and supple­
mentary irrigation between rains are thus two fundamental physical 
problems for JPA agriculture. 
Vegetation in relation to animal husbandry 
Except for Cyperus papyrus and related vegetation in the 
permanent swamps, the whole of the JPA is dominated by annual and 
perennial grasses. Tree growth is limited by the effects of 
excessive water and poor drainage during the rains, and is limited 
to high land areas, where its growth is further limited by human 
demands for construction and fuel. 
The various grass species and the conditions under which they 
grow are important to livestock and wildlife movements in the area. 
On the high lands, where drainage is good, most of the grasses are 
annuals. Setarla pallidfusca and Pennisetum ramosum are dominant 
on the heavy clay soils ; and Dactyloctenium aegyptlum. Cyndon 
dactylon and Eragrostlc spp are dominant on the more sandy clays. 
These grasses constitute a serious weed problem for crop production. 
They also provide excellent grazing during the rains, and although 
they later become woody and unpalatable, they are quickly grazed 
down by the heavy concentrations of livestock in the high lands 
when the rest of the region is flooded. 
On the Intermediate lands the dominant grasses are two annuals, 
Setarla incressata in the northern sector and Hyparrhenla rufa in 
the south. These grasses are flooded much of the time when they 
might provide valuable fodder. The latter, rufa. has the 
important property that if its dry growth is burnt off In the 
early part of the dry season while the ground still retains some 
moisture, the plant produces a valuable green regrowth that can 
be used by cattle for as long as water is available in the inter­
mediate lands. 
In the flood plains, the dominant grasses are Echinochloa 
pyramldalis, Oryza barthll and 0. punctata, which are dominant in 
the shallower areas. These grasses are inaccessible as fodder 
during their periods of growth because of river floods, and only 
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Echinochloa provides a valuable regrowth when burnt in the dry 
In the deep flooded areas, Enchlnochloa stagnlna and Vossta 
cuspldata are the dominant grasses. The former Is palatable to 
cattle even when it is fully mature after seeding, and is eaten 
unbumt when the water recedes from it. The latter is less 
palatable when dry and is of little use as fodder. 
The above grasses and the conditions of their growth are 
important in the transhumance of the inhabitants of the JPA. The 
transhumance in turn affects the amount of labor available for 
agricultural activities. 
The Social and Institutional Environment of 
Socio-Economic Development in the JPA 
The social life and institutions of the inhabitants of the JPA 
revolve around agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing, their 
chief means of subsistence. The many natural hazards connected 
with the physical environment of the JPA have provided a wealth 
of statistical information over many centuries, from which the 
inhabitants of the area have learned to spread the risk, of 
disastrous famines among the three occupations. Evans-Pritchard 
writing about the Nuer Tribe, emphasizes the dependence of their 
modes of livelihood on environmental conditions, and the 
necessity to engage in diversified productive activities. 
According to Evans-PrItchard: 
The necessity of a mixed economy follows from the 
ecological equilibrium. Rinderpest prevents complete 
dependence upon milk foods; climate prevents complete 
dependence on grain; and hydrologlcal variations prevent 
complete dependence on fish. These three elements to­
gether enable Nuer to live, and their seasonal distri­
bution determines Nuer modes of life at different periods 
of the year (32:92). 
Like the productive activities, the institutions within which 
these activities and other social and political activities are 
conducted are also Influenced by the physical environment. These 
institutions and socio-political relations are discussed in this 
section as they relate to failure and success elements that 
constrain or promote Increasing the cultivated area and agricultural 
output in the JPA. 
Agriculture 
The physical conditions of the region and the low technological 
level make agriculture a very laborious and demanding occupation. 
Agriculture therefore plays a less Important role in the lives of 
the people than does animal husbandry. According to Evans-Prltchard, 
the ecology gives a bias In favor of cattle husbandry (32:92). 
The heavy clay soils are not easy to work by muscle power, both 
when they are wet and when they are dry. Weeds grow very rapidly. 
Pests, diseases, droughts and floods can wipe out an entire 
season's work. Under these physical and technological conditions 
and with more palatable means of subsistence available in animal 
husbandry and fishing, agriculture has traditionally not been 
popular in the JPA, especially among the Dinka and Nuer people. 
Indeed, until very recently, agriculture was viewed as an occupation 
for those who had no cattle. 
It is, however, important to note in the context of social 
constraints on agriculture that the social bias in favor of cattle 
husbandry, itself a result of the environmental bias, will tend to 
work against agricultural development even if the physical environ­
ment should be changed. Social practices often lag behind changes in 
technology and physical environment. Furthermore, policymakers, 
like the inhabitants of the JFA, are overwhelmed by the difficult 
physical conditions of agriculture in the JPA.^ 
Cropping practices The principal staple all over the JPA 
is sorghum (Dura) in its many varieties. Risk is also spread among 
dura varieties and among plots in different locations. Family plots 
are often located both in the high lands and in the intermediate 
lands. If the year turns out to be exceptionally dry, the plot 
in the intermediate lands can not be a complete failure, as there 
will be sufficient moisture for some sorghum varieties. If it is a 
year of excessive flooding, the plot on the high lands will not be 
a total failure, as some varieties will resist the drought conditions. 
^ILACO consultants in the area, as indicated in personal 
interviews conducted by the author, appear to favor the "improvement 
approach" to rural development because of their own failures in pilot 
studies for the planned large scale Pengkou Plain Development Project. 
In turn, ILACO's findings and recommendations appear to be influencing 
officials of the Executive Organ to opt for the "improvement approach.' 
This approach, as shown later in this study, offers very little socio­
economic development to the JPA, and merely manages poverty and misery. 
Family plots are therefore scattered over long distances, a practice 
that Is necessary for survival, but consumes a great deal of labor. 
Mottin, on the plight of the African woman Illustrates the problem 
of scattered fields when she writes: 
We saw one woman who had walked a total of 640 kilo­
meters to bring back the harvest from one acre of land, 
thirty kilometers each trip, 40 trips of 16 kilometers 
each way, the field being 8 kilometers away from the 
village! (74:42). 
Other crops grown In the JPÂ include maize, groundnuts, sesame, 
various beans, pumpkins, and marrows. Some tobacco Is grown near 
the homestead In the summer and in the intermediate lands during 
the winter. Wild rice (Oryza barthil), a gourmet food in Europe 
and America, grows in the intermediate lands and flood plains, and 
during famines women go out to cut it for food. 
Settlement patterns Settlement patterns of villages In the 
JPA affect agricultural development directly. The present settle­
ment patterns are dictated by the hydrologlcal conditions and lack 
of slope. Permanent settlements and crop plots are concentrated 
on the few pieces of land in the high lands and intermediate lands. 
The settlements are in the form of independent households. The 
whole of the JPA, except for Shillukland, is dotted with widely 
scattered household units and fields. A "village" is sometimes as 
long as 30 kilometers. This settlement pattern makes provision of 
infrastructural services (schools, health, security, markets, 
extension, tractor pools, etc.) extremely difficult and expensive. 
The traditional settlement pattern will become obsolete once 
consCrucClon of Che canal Is completed, but If the countryside Is 
not restructured, the traditional settlement patterns will certainly 
be a major constraint to agricultural development. 
Land tenure A major aspect of the agrarian structure In the 
JPA Is communal land tenure. Communal tenure Is a form of land 
holding In which control over land Is exercised through a social 
group. In the JPA land Is held on a tribal, village, or family 
basis, and Individuals have rights In this land by virtue of their 
membership In the relevant social unit. Hence, title to land has a 
communal character and it is usufructuary, rather than absolute. 
The custodians of the land are the chiefs, the gods, and the 
ancestors. Legally, however, all land in the JPA is considered 
by the government as unsettled and unregistered. Since land is 
abundant and labor is scarce, and there has been no pressure from 
modem commercial agriculture in the past, the conflict between 
tribal and state ownership of land has hitherto not been a serious 
At present, under tribal tenure, individual ownership as such 
has not been institutionalized. Each tribe has exclusive right in 
its area. The structures of the various tribes under their 
respective Court Centers, are given in Appendix A in conjunction 
with procedures of explorative interviews conducted in the area 
for this study. Each tribe, sub-tribe, or clan is an economic 
unit with its own land, pastures and waters, and each has well 
defined areas over which it has grazing, cultivating and fishing 
rights. Boundaries exist between the areas of two adjoining tribes. 
Thus, there is no individual ownership of land, and the individual 
is regarded as a member of his tribe or community which owns the 
land. An individual's right to any piece of arable land is normally 
established through his own prior legitimate use of it, with 
acknowledgement of the conmunity, or by inheritance'of some 
established prior legitimate use. 
Communal ownership of land has implications for production, 
distribution and consumption. Evans-Pritchard argues that, seen 
from the outside, each Nuer community may be said to be consuming 
a common stock of food, and that from the same angle the whole 
community may be said to create that stock of food (32:92). Evans-
Prltchard thus argues that the economic unit extends far beyond 
the simple family: 
In a narrow sense the simple family might be called 
the economic unit, but ... it is not self-sufficient and 
the active participation of a wider group is often necessary, 
e.g., in building, fishing, and hunting. It is also clear 
that a single family can not herd its cattle in distant 
pastures and at the same time, herd the calves elsewhere, 
attend to the tiny calves in the Kraal, milk, chum, clean 
the Kraal, prepare dung for fuel, cook the food, and so on 
by Itself. Cooperation is found among neighbors who are 
also kinsmen. There is also much mutual assistance when 
cooperation is not essential to the performance of a task, 
e.g., in weeding and harvesting, for it is conventional to 
ask people for help, the obligation to assist being part of 
a general kinship relationship (32:91). 
The implication of traditional African communal land tenure 
structures for socio-economic development has been subject of 
considerable controversy. Jacoby, for example, in calling for 
institutional adjustments, observed that: 
Throughout Africa, the neglect of land under communal 
tenure arrangements has become an important problem, due 
to population increases and the introduction of a money 
economy and cash crops. There is no doubt that this 
neglect, particularly in pastoral areas, has blocked agri­
cultural progress and that traditional tenure systems have 
not been able to provide the necessary incentives for 
increased production. There is an urgent need for 
institutional adjustments to pave the way for progress 
(51:2), 
With respect to the JPA, Adam has enumerated several drawbacks of 
communal land tenure, including tenure uncertainty and incentives 
which he says are aggravated by lack of modem Inputs (1:81-87). 
Adam, therefore, calls for land reform as one of the means to economic 
development in the area. On the other hand, it has been argued that 
there is not sufficient evidence indicating that traditional communal 
systems of land tenure in Africa have in themselves proved to be so 
inflexible as to prevent adaptation to new conditions (98:28). 
Where laad Ir abundant, such r.s in the JPA, problems of tenure 
have often Included abuse of land by mining it without taking 
adequate conservation measures and cultural disruption of the 
indigenous communities. In East and West Africa, the pressures 
that have confronted communal farming have been introduction of 
cash crops, shortage of land in the face of a growing population. 
Introduction of new crops and new methods of cultivation, absence 
of male workers as a result of expansion of industrial and urban 
employment, and land alienation either in the form of large-scale 
concessions granted to nonlndlgenous persons for purposes of 
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commercial development (Gedaref in Sudan) or in the form of land 
acquired by permanent immigrant settlers. These forces have tended 
to disrupt traditional tenure systems. The increasing commercial 
value of land resulting from the cultivation of cash crops provides 
land holders with the incentive to turn their right over land to 
commercial advanta^. In some places, families of tribal chiefs 
have tried to change communal land into private holdings, and often 
this has led to establishment of large private estates. Commercial 
speculators have been known to engage in land-grabbing operations 
in areas undergoing change from communal tenure. Individualization 
of tenure, rack-renting of land, and absentee landlordism frequently 
result in areas where there is a transition from subsistence 
communal tenure to commercial agriculture, unless there are specific 
counter policies guiding the reorganization of agriculture. 
The relevant issue of land tenure in the JPA is then not 
whether communal tenure is per se an obstacle to agricultural 
development, but rather whether introduction of cash cropping, new 
crops and new methods of cultivation will not lead in the long run 
to abuses detrimental to land quality and the social and economic 
welfare of the indigenous tribal communities of the JPA. 
Although individualization of tenure, rack-renting of land 
and absentee landlordism, features that are now subjects of land 
reform in Asia and Latin America, are possible outcomes of the 
transition from subsistence to conmercial agriculture in the JPA, 
the foundations for cooperative development also already exist in 
the Institutions of communal land tenure, mutual aid, communal 
production, distribution and consumption. Each tribe In the charts 
of Appendix A Is already a cooperative or corporation that owns land 
and produces and consumes together. Only the contexts of subsistence 
and commercial agriculture differ. A relevant question for rural 
development strategy In the JPA is whether old forms of cooperation 
In subsistence production can be successfully adapted to new forms 
of production in a commercial environment. 
Animal husbandry 
The animals kept are mainly cattle. The Jonglel Investigation 
Team has estimated that in 1954 the Southern Dlnka (Bor and Kongor 
Districts) had 200,500 cattle, and 29,400 sheep and goats. Payne 
used official AFSED (Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development) 
livestock growth rates to upgrade these figures to 427,367 and 130,254, 
respectively, for 1976. Other estimates put the figure for cattle at 
almost half the 1976 Payne's update (84:14). Clearly, although 
cattle husbandry is the major economic activity in the JPA, there 
has never been a reliable livestock census in the area. 
The physical conditions of the JPA dictate a transhumant mode 
of life. During the dry season water and pastures become scarce and 
people, and livestock first move to the intermediate lands, and then 
to the flood plains, following the receding water and pastures. In 
the rainy season, the flood plains become flooded, the people and 
livestock move first to the intarmedlate lands, and when these too 
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become flooded they move to the high lands. As noted by Payne et al. : 
The annual transhumant migration of some of the people 
together with their livestock Is a rational response to 
the existing ecological situation. When asked why they 
remove their livestock from the village during the dry 
season, 83 percent of respondents stated that it was on 
account of the lack of feed and water (84:26). 
The annual cycle of transhumance of the Southern Dinka, including 
livestock and agricultural activities, is shorn in Figure 4.3. The 
transhumance has been repeated in the same form for centuries, and 
it has become an important part of the cultures of the inhabitants 
of the JPA. 
The high insurance value placed on livestock is probably 
responsible for what has been called "cattle psychology" among the 
people of the JPA. To the Dinka and Nuer, cattle are everything: 
Cattle provide milk and milk products for subsistence; their hides 
provide cover against cold and rain when the people are away in 
the cattle camps; the horns are made into spoons and dance 
trumpets; and the meat is eaten occasionally. Most of the social 
activities concern cattle. Cattle provide the traditional medium 
of exchange; with cattle a young man acquires his bride, with 
cattle the people make offerings to their gods and ancestors. 
Wealthy people show off their wealth, pride and generosity by 
spearing a fat cow, bull or ox at random from among other people's 
herd as a feast-gift to the community. The necessary compensation 
is usually made on the spot. 
The inhabitants of the JPA do not slaughter their cattle for 
meat, except in very severe famines and in religious ceremonies, or 
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in cases of pride-slaughter such as the one just related. Nor do 
they willingly sell their cattle for cash except in situations where 
there are no other alternatives such as for paying court fines, 
buying sorghum grain during famines, or paying the poll tax (recently 
branded as a colonial legacy and abolished; but reinstituted as the 
so-called "combined cow and hut tax"). 
It is clear from the above account that, although cattle wealth 
is considerable in the JPA, cultural constraints prevent their use 
for agricultural development, either as draught animals, or as 
capital that can be converted Into money to buy new inputs. 
Allocation of labor 
The allocation of labor is accomplished within the transhumant 
mode of life (Figure 4.3). The household's time is allocated to 
eight major activities as discussed below. 
Cattle care related tasks These activities consist of 
grazing of the cattle during the day, releasing the cattle in the 
mornings from pegs to which they are individually tethered over 
night, tethering them again in the evening after grazing, milking 
in the mornings and evenings, manufacture and maintenance of the 
ropes for tethering, and the general body and health care of the 
animals. 
Agriculture As discussed in the linear programming section 
of Chapter VI, agricultural activities consume considerable amounts 
of labor. In the past, work was done by women, with the men 
supervising and helping during the critical periods of land 
clearing, sowing and weeding, or whenever it became clear that the 
women could not complete the task in good time. This has almost 
totally changed now for married men who have become Increasingly 
Interested in agriculture. Unmarried young men still engage more 
in cattle than in cropping activities (62:62). 
Fishing and hunting Fishing is organized at several 
levels, and depends on the period of the year. There are individual, 
men, boys and women fishing parties. Wildlife hunting is organized 
by boys for small game and by men for large game. These two 
activities are done only occasionally and when there is need and 
natural conditions are favorable. 
Home construction and maintenance The necessary tasks here 
are rutting and transporting wood (sometimes from as far away as 
75 miles) and grass (rufa) from the intermediate lands. The former 
task is done by the men, and the latter by women and girls who also 
have the additional responsibility of plastering the walls with 
mud. Thatching of the roof normally is left to a hired expert. 
These activities are usually completed during the dry season when 
there is no agricultural work, and are therefore not competitive 
with agriculture. 
Home crafts The women make rope for construction from wild 
grasses and fibres, while the men make ropes for tethering the 
cattle. Other home crafts Include making dishes from gourds, spoons 
from horns and shells, pots and smoking pipes from anthills, and 
other household Items. 
Wage labor During the dry season, some men may decide 
to visit relatives In urban areas to solicit for cash and consumer 
goods on the basis of kinship, or, falling, look for wage labor. 
Some women also may go to urban centers during this period to brew 
"Marisa," a local beer, for cash. Often these men and women do 
not return to the village in good time to start land clearing and 
sowing In April and May. This type of seasonal wage labor clearly 
competes with subsistence agriculture. 
Court cases During the dry season and sometimes during 
the agricultural season, those who have court cases spend a great 
deal of their time at the tribal court centers (see Appendix A). 
Sometimes a household member or members spend months In litigation 
just to gain or prevent the loss of one cow. Court cases In 
consequence compete with agricultural activities, and there has 
been efforts recently to close the courts between May and October, 
the months of agricultural production. 
Leisure The residual time Is spent In "leisure," or rather 
In redundancy as there may be nothing to do. Leisure may take a 
great portion of the household's total annual available time 
particularly during the dry season when people and livestock are 
in the Intermediate lands and flood plains. Here, herdsmen are 
selected each day to graze the cattle, sometimes as far away from 
the cattle camp as 20 kilometers. The bulk of the people spend 
their time In the shade, or otherwise go fishing or hunting when 
conditions are right and the people feel like It. 
It Is clear from the above presentation of time allocation and 
from the migratory chart of Figure 4.3 that labor resources are not 
efficiently utilized within the subsistence system. About 5 months 
of the year are spent between the villages and the flood plains doing 
repetitive jobs. Work discipline Is informal and depends on tasks 
as they arise. The work environment of the subsistence economy 
contrasts sharply with that of the urban wage earner who must work 
an eight-hour six-day week all year. The hours worked by the 
urban worker also contrast sharply with the double digit figures 
of his counterpart in Europe during that region's early stages of 
industrialization. 
There is some indication In the foregoing presentation that 
there is plenty of unused, unusable or underutilized human 
capacity In the JPA. The extent to which labor constrains agri­
cultural production and goes unutilized during much of the year 
and the reasons for this are considered later in the linear 
programming section of Chapter VI. 

CHAPTER IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODELS 
Chapter IV is divided into four parts. Sections one and two 
present the "means-ends continuum" analytical framework as developed 
in the literature and as adapted to this study to achieve the first 
objective of the study. Key concepts used in the adaptation, such 
as strategy, rural development strategy and agrarian structure, 
are defined in these sections. Section three presents the basic 
linear programming model, which is used to supplement the "means-
ends continuum" analytical framework in pursuing the remaining 
objectives of the study. Section four discusses application of 
the linear programming model to the JFA including presentation and 
discussion of data used. 
The "Means-Ends Continuum" Analytical Framework 
The "means-ends continuum" analytical framework, developed 
in the literature on the theory of inquiry (45:13) is applied to 
the JPA in identifying and selecting appropriate rural development 
strategies for socio-economic development in the area. Once an 
appropriate rural development strategy is selected, the requisite 
agrarian structure and institutions (these terms are defined in 
the following pages) can be established either gradually or rapidly 
depending upon the desired and feasible tempo of development. 
Institutions which obstruct the process of socio-economic development 
can either be removed or modified; those that facilitate the process 
can be strengthened; while new ones can be discovered, Invented or 
adapted. 
The means-ends continuum framework is schematically illustrated 
in Figure 4.1. This diagram is an application of Tlmmons's concep­
tualization of the continuum. In this continuum, ends or goals 
perform a two-fold function in social inquiry. According to Adam: 
They serve to establish the norm from which the 
problematic situation may be determined 'as the gap between 
the norm and the present situation*. Ends also serve 'as 
criteria for evaluating particular means' to determine the 
extent to which the means yield consequences which narrow 
the gap or reduce the difference between the present and 
the desired situation (1:26). 
Within the logical framework of the means-ends continuum, Gittlnger 
argues that ". . .every Immediate goal or end becomes an end-ln-vlew 
in relation to a more ultimate goal until the basic ends are 
reached" (42:130). Each end-ln-vlew in Figure 4.1 can therefore be 
considered as a means to another end-ln-vlew until the ultimate 
goals of socio-economic development are reached at the top of the 
The term "socio-economic development" is Interpreted to include 
aspects of the process of economic and social change that were not 
covered by the concept of "economic development" in the sense that 
this latter term was used in the three decades following the Second 
World War. Social scientists used the concept of economic development 
during this period to describe the process as a quantitative growth 
in Incomes and per capita Gross National/Domestic Product. Although 
growth in incomes and per capita Income still remain dominant 
Figure 4.1. Schematic Illustration of the means-ends 
continuum model applied to agricultural 
development 
aspects In the process of development, other social, political 
and quality of life aspects relating to equity, widespread and 
continuing participation, political and social stability and 
environmental quality have been Incorporated into the definition 
of socio-economic development. Development, as Ahmed writes, 
should concern Itself with man: 
The most satisfying and acceptable answer (regarding 
the nature of development) is that development has to 
concern itself with man and not Just the growth of things 
which are mainly means. The whole process has to be 
geared to the satisfaction of needs beginning with basic 
ones of the poor who constitute the majority. At the 
same time this development has to go beyond the basic 
needs to ensure the humanizatlon of man by the satisfaction 
of his needs for expression, creativity and participation 
in decisions concerning his own destiny (5:1). 
Following Tlmmons (95), Gittinger (42), Adam (1), and 
Vlgues-Rolg (100), It is presumed that the basic ends that are common 
to all societies are life, liberty and opportunity.^ These goals 
are the ultimate ends of socio-economic development. They are 
broadly expressed in Sudan's Perspective Plan, 1977/78-1994/95 (24) 
and in the Southern Region's Six-Year Development Plan for Social 
and Economic Development, 1977/78-1982/83 (25). 
See the Magna Charter of 1215, the United States Declaration 
of Independence of 1776, and more recently, the Indian Constitution 
of 1949 (which secures to all citizens of India ". . .JUSTICE, 
social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, 
belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and opportunity"). 
Sudan's Permanent Constitution of 1973 affirms the rights of life, 
liberty and opportunity in Articles 2, 3, 19, 22, 23 and 26 of the 
Universal Declaration. Other important documents, where nations 
stated their ultimate ends for existence, have emphasized these 
ends In terms of human life, liberty and opportunity, sometimes 
expressed as "pursuit of happiness." 
Within the context of the means-ends continuum, agriculture 
development itself is an end as well as a means for attaining 
superior goals. As a means, agricultural development entails a 
deliberate and purposeful modification and/or complete overhaul in 
rural development strategies and agrarian structures and 
institutions. 
At the bottom of the ladder in the means-ends continuum schema 
of Figure 4.1 are rural development strategies. The term "strategy" 
Is traditionally a military category, but it Is sometimes used 
more broadly to cover non-military situations. The Encyclopedia 
Americana defines strategy as follows; 
Strategy in its general sense is the art and science 
of developing and employing the political, economic, 
psychological and military forces of a nation, during 
peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to 
national policies. ... In its military sense, strategy 
is the art and science of employing the armed forces 
of a nation to secure the objects of national policy by 
the application of force or the threat of force (30:772). 
The art and science of strategy has been found a useful analogy 
and has been incorporated into the vocabulary of social and economic 
development (83:52). This Incorporation is logical since most 
underdeveloped countries profess to having "declared war on poverty. 
Illiteracy and disease." This type of war (against underdevelopment), 
like all wars, must have its strategy and tactics if victory is to 
be achieved at minimum time and cost. In the context of the JPÂ, 
an appropriate rural development strategy constitutes the science 
and art of employing existing and potential physical, institutional 
and economic resources from within and from outside the area in 
order to obtain and secure the goals of regional and national 
Sudanese policy. Examples of rural development strategies from 
world experience are suggested in Figure 4.1. Two of these 
strategies, from Sudanese experience, are discussed in the remedial 
phase of this study in Chapter VII. 
Following "strategy" in the means-ends continuum schema comes 
"agrarian structure." This term is used to mean the institutional, 
service and human resource framework within which agricultural 
production takes place. This concept is similar to the following 
definition developed by the United Nations Department of Economic 
This term (agrarian structure) is here used to mean 
the institutional framework of agricultural production. 
It includes in the first place, land tenure, the legal 
or customary system under which land is owned; the distri­
bution of ownership of farm property between large estates 
and peasant farms or among peasant farms of various size; 
land tenancy, the system under which land is operated and 
its product divided between operator and owner; the 
organization of credit, production and marketing; the 
mechanism through which agriculture is financed; the 
burdens imposed on rural populations by governments in 
the form of taxation; and the services supplied by govern­
ments to rural populations, such as technical advice and 
educational facilities, health services, water supply and 
communications (98:5). 
In Figure 4.1, the various elements of agrarian structure are 
grouped under three categories, borrowed from Onoh's "Preconditions 
for Economic Development." These categories are social overhead 
services (SOS) infrastructure, the Institutional infrastructure 
and the human infrastructure. Hirschman defines the SOS 
Infrastructure te mean: 
. . .those basic services, without which primary, 
secondary, and tertiary productive activities can not 
function. In its broader sense it includes all public 
services from law and order through education and public 
health to transportation, communications, power and water 
supply, as well as such agricultural overhead capital as 
irrigation and drainage systems (496:83). 
In the JPA, the SOS infrastructure is at a very rudimentary stage of 
development. Much of the current development efforts by the Executive 
Organ and integrated rural development efforts by UNDP/ILACO are 
directed at construction of the SOS Infrastructure. 
The institutional infrastructure is composed of both state and 
market institutions. State institutions include the various 
departments of government including the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary as they impact upon control and regulation of 
agricultural production. Market (or state planning in nonmarket 
situations) Institutions include banking, credit and other financial 
organizations. 
Finally, under agrarian structure, the human infrastructure 
includes the various institutions for human capital formation in 
rural areas. These include formal and adult education, vocational 
training and the dissemination of agricultural Information through 
extension work. 
A particular agrarian structure is composed of institutions 
galvanized together over time by the rural development strategy 
pursued for the purposes of agricultural development. Institutions 
can be defined as a patterned way of life through which collective 
action controls, liberates and/or expands Individual action (16:21). 
Schotter formally defines a social institution as . a regularity 
In social behavior In specific recurrent situations, and Is either 
self-policed or policed by some external authority" (90:11). 
Tlmmons considers Institutions as among the most important means 
through which agricultural adjustment toward economic progress Is 
either obstructed or facilitated: 
Institutions constitute Important failure elements 
which slow up and at times obstruct agricultural adjust­
ment toward economic growth both within and outside the 
agricultural Industry. Likewise, in prospect, land 
institutions provide important potential means for 
implementing the achievement of agricultural adjustment 
toward economic growth. This means that the economist 
cannot ignore, hold constant, or assume away the 
institutions within which decisions are made and imple­
mented without losing relevance with the problems he 
seeks to remedy (94:174). 
Instrumental variables, unlike institutions which are more 
stable, are used to measure change and to adapt thé economy to 
small and frequent changes in what Tinbergen calls "other data," 
that Is, the features over which the policymaker exerts limited 
influence such as prices of Imports (93:3). Examples of Instruments 
relevant to agrarian institutions are given in Figure 4.1. 
The last class of means in the means-ends continuum schema 
are the targets. Like instruments, targets are usually quantitative 
(Figure 4.1) variables which Incorporate the immediate goals of 
the policymaker. Target variables can be either fixed or flexible. 
They are periodically revised according to the extent to which 
goals are realized and as hitherto unavailable information comes to 
light. 
Given the means-ends continuum model and assuming that the 
policymaker is operating in the short run in an agrarian situation 
in which the rural development strategy and its agrarian structure 
and institutions are well established, the problem of socio-economic 
development policy becomes quantitative in the sense that policy 
instruments are used to achieve specific socio-economic goals 
(usually stated in terms of predetermined targets). In the case 
of the JPA, where the agrarian structure and institutions are of a 
subsistence nature and centrally planned agrarian structures and 
institutions are either nonexistent or extremely weak, it would 
appear quite unlikely that policy instruments can be effective in 
stimulating socio-economic development without institutional, 
structural and strategic changes at a comprehensive level. As 
argued by Giles: 
. . .the use of instruments in changing tax rates. 
Interest rates, capital investment and wage rates, . . . 
assumes that the structures have been fashioned which 
permit the exercise of the instruments. In more developed 
countries instruments constitute the main policy means 
used for stimulating economic development. However, in 
the less developed countries, structures are not yet 
developed to provide the policymaker with the instruments 
which he may use in economic development (41:6). 
Giles underlines the major hypothesis underlying this study 
that at present, the fundamental issue of socio-economic development 
In the JPA is the identification, selection and development of an 
appropriate rural development strategy and formation of the requisite 
agrarian structure, institutions and instruments to bring about 
socio-economic development consistent with the aspirations of the 
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inhabitants and national goals. The "means-ends continuum" can be 
used as a framework for identifying and selecting rural development 
strategies appropriate for socio-economic development of the JPA. 
Developing the Means-Ends Continuum for Identifying and 
Selecting Rural Development Strategies in the JPA 
Tlmmons (94) applies the means-ends continuum framework to 
develop a model for analyzing agricultural development through 
modifying land tenure arrangements, one of the institutions In 
Figure 4.1. This study modifies and applies the Tlmmons framework 
to provide an analytical model for identifying and selecting rural 
development strategies for socio-economic development of the JPA. 
Figure 4.2 presents the analytical framework developed and used 
in this study. The concepts in Figure 4.2 have already been 
defined in conjunction with the means-ends continuum conceptual 
framework in the preceding section. 
In applying the means-ends continuum paradigm, Tlmmons identifies 
three main steps which constitute the analytical model. These steps, 
identified in Figure 4.2 are the delimiting phase, the diagnostic 
phase and the remedial phase. According to Tlmmons: 
Under the delimiting phase, goals are identified; 
the existing situation is stated; and the problematic gap 
between the goals sought and the existing situation is 
indicated. The diagnostic phase identifies and measures, 
insofar as possible, the failure elements and the success 
elements. The failure elements are those factors that 
cause the existing situation to differ from the desired 
goal. The success elements are the factors that have 
prevented the gap from being larger than it is. The 
(1) Ellalnatc failure elei 
(2) Discover and expand si 
actual and potential) 
Inatltutlonal change 
(3) Identify appropriate i 
strategies 
(4) Select most appropriai 
.2. Analytical framework for identifying, 
socio-economic development of the J?/ 
cting and implementing rural development stratcgi< 
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remedial phase consists of corrective action. This phase 
Includes two parts. Part one consists of the removal of 
failure elements that were Identified in the diagnostic 
phase. In part two, the success elements that were 
identified in the diagnostic phase are expanded. Also, 
in part two, new success elements are development (94:88). 
The analytical framework of Figure 4.2 provides a comprehensive 
analytical system within which the various conflicting Issues in 
identifying and selecting appropriate rural development strategies 
for the JPA, or any region, could be debated and resolved. It Is 
suggested that the current debate on the efficacy of the "improve­
ment" and "transformation" approaches in the JPA be conducted within 
the logical framework of Figure 4.2. If debate on appropriate rural 
development strategies is conducted within the framework of Figure 
4.2, it would proceed along the steps indicated. 
In step one, goals of socio-economic development are identified 
and stated unambiguously and the existing situation Is evaluated and 
compared with the stated goals to determine the problematic situation 
requiring solution. This step, termed the delimiting phase, is 
extremely Important because without specific goals and a clear 
grasp of the existing situation, it would be difficult to design 
rural development strategies that have a reasonable probability of 
success If Implemented. Step two, termed the diagnostic phase. 
Identifies failure elements that are responsible for the problematic 
situation and success elements that are responsible for the 
problematic situation not getting larger than It is. Step three, 
termed the remedial phase, seeks to eliminate the failure elements 
Identified In the diagnostic phase, and to expand and discover 
success elements. Rural development strategies that are consistent 
with eliminating the failure elements and expanding and discovering 
the success elements are also identified in the remedial phase. 
The most appropriate rural development strategy is selected from 
the "appropriate" strategies Identified in the remedial phase. 
Once an appropriate rural development strategy is selected, 
the remedial phase continues with formation and development of 
the requisite agrarian structure. As argued earlier, this study 
maintains the hypothesis that each rural development strategy maps 
or Implies a unique set of agrarian institutions which constitute 
the strategy's agrarian structure. Agrarian institutions and their 
instrumental variables constitute the necessary measures for 
achieving the goals developed and stated in the delimiting phase. 
Achievement of targets, which incorporate Immediate goals 
of the policymaker, completes the first round of analysis and 
implementation. However, since targets are usually achieved at 
varying levels of success, steps 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 4.2 are 
repeated over and over. During each repetition of analysis and 
program Implementation, consequences and unforeseen side-effects 
of the preceding action are incorporated. These repetitions imply 
that rural development strategies and the agrarian institutions 
which they generate are dynamic rather than static, since they 
can be modified during the course of analysis, planning and program 
Implementation. The framework of Figure 4.2 thus provides a 
potentially powerful and complete method of analysis and Imple­
mentation of rural development strategies for the JPA. 
The Delimiting Phase 
The delimiting phase of this study, contained in Chapter V, 
identifies the major physical, Institutional and economic resource 
situation of the Sudan in relation to the JPA in terms of the 
expected area's agricultural contribution to the national economy. 
Within this context of the potential contribution of the area to 
the national economy, the goals of socio-economic development for 
the JPA are stated. Results from linear programming models are 
used to provide a quantitative determination of the present state 
of development of JPA's potential contribution. The problematic 
situation is delineated as the difference between the stated goals 
and the existing situation in the JPA. 
Involving physical, institutional and economic aspects, the 
delimiting phase Is necessarily multldisclplinary in approach. 
This study recognizes the multldisclplinarity approach in planning, 
formulating and implementing development projects in the JPA. How­
ever, since the thrust of this study is to provide a framework for 
debating and resolving the Important issue of appropriate rural 
development strategies for the JPA, the presentation in the 
delimiting and subsequent phases Is intended as illustrative of 
application of the framework developed in this study for use by an 
interdisciplinary JPA team. 
The Diagnostic Phase 
Presented in Chapter VI, the diagnostic phase identifies and 
analyzes interrelationships among the physical. Institutional and 
economic resources of the JPÂ which have led to failure or success 
in achieving the goals Identified in the delimiting phase. As in 
the delimiting phase, the diagnostic phase is necessarily multi-
disciplinary. Physical and biological scientists are concerned 
with physical and biological possibilities. Anthropologists and 
sociologists are concerned with social and cultural aspects of 
institutions that Impede or promote socio-economic development. 
Similarly, political scientists and development administrators are 
concerned with prevailing political and administrative institutions 
as they impact upon socio-economic development. Economists are 
concerned with analyzing the efficiency of resource allocation 
and how particular agrarian structures. Institutions and rural 
development strategies allocate resources. 
Investigations of the efficiency of resource allocation in a 
"composite farm" of the JPA are made to complement the means-ends 
continuum model in Identifying resource constraints which restrict 
increasing agricultural output. These Investigations are concerned 
with identifying success and failure elements to achieving the 
stated goals. Similar investigations In other disciplines regarding 
failure and success elements are needed. 
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The Remedial Phase 
The remedial phase, presented In Chapter VII, is divided Into 
five parts. The first part discusses the "Improvement" and "trans­
formation" approaches to rural development strategy in relation to 
the failure and success elements developed In the diagnostic phase. 
Section two evaluates the strategy of integrated rural development 
(IRD), currently under Implementation In the JPA, as an illustration 
of how the improvement approach address the failure and success 
elements relating to rural development in the JPA. Section three 
discusses the proposed Pengkon Plain Development Project and the 
Jonglei Irrigation Project as transformation approaches to rural 
development in the JPA. Section four discusses the Gezlra and 
Gedaref rural development strategies as comparative experiences 
of the transformation approach in North-central and North-eastern 
Sudan. Finally, section five suggests planning elements upon which 
an appropriate rural development strategy for the JPA might be 
based. The fourth and last objective of this study is achieved 
in this section. 
The strategies in sections two, three and four are discussed 
under four criteria of success elements. These criteria relate 
to knowledge, capital generation. Incentives and the way in which 
a strategy defines the role of traditional society in relation to 
the stipulated new forms of modern agricultural production. These 
strategies are discussed in terms of how each of them promotes or 
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Impedes knowledge, capital generation, incentives and the manner 
in which each promotes transition of traditional subsistence 
production to sustained commercial production. In developing the 
first three of these criteria, Tinmtons argues that: 
Under certain assunçtlons we may specify that (1) 
incentives, (2) knowledge, and (3) capital are essential 
elements for development. If so, what are the land tenure 
institutions that tend to prevent these elements from 
encouraging development? Or, alternatively, what are the 
land tenure institutions that tend to make these elements 
generate development? (94:90) 
Whereas Timnons's study analyzes land tenure institutions, the 
criteria can be extended to analysis of rural development strategies, 
agrarian structures in general, or any specific agrarian institution 
as in the land tenure case considered by Timmons. 
Development of Linear Progranmilng Models 
In the context of this study, linear programming is used to 
supplement the "means-ends continuum" analytical framework. Results 
from linear programming models applied to the JPA are used in 
delimiting the problem of rural development in the JPA. The 
magnitudes of crop acreages in the optimal solutions, and of 
optimal incomes provide approximate measures of the existing 
situation in the JPA. These results, and those in range analyses 
of the linear programming models, are used also in the diagnostic 
phase as measure of the extent to which failure and success elements 
impede or promote achievement of rural development goals in the JPA. 
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Utility of linear programming to the JPA 
During the last few decades, linear programming has become a 
widely used technique for analysis and planning at both the micro 
and macro levels. The major advantage of linear programming is 
the ease with which it can handle different types of firm 
organization and management problems. This flexibility is achieved 
by carefully defining the objective and in manipulating the 
constraints. The constraints make it possible for the planner to 
impose any norms which may be necessary or desirable. Thus, the 
method allows one to examine a wide range of alternative adjustments 
and to analyse their consequences thoroughly and efficiently. As 
Beneke and Winterboer point out: "The principal advantage of linear 
programming as a planning method is not that it leads to one fool­
proof plan but that it provides a means for analysing a variety 
of alternative decisions" (12:4). This quality makes the method 
very suitable for the JPA where many alternative decisions will 
have to be considered and choices made at the onset regarding rural 
development strategies and the initiation and implementation of 
socio-economic development programs. 
Despite the Importance and usefulness of linear programming in 
solving maximization (minimization) problems in the real world, 
Dorfman, et al. caution that linear programming models are not 
necessarily strict representations of the economic situations with 
which they deal. Linear programming is subject to the restrictive 
assumptions of additlvlty, divisibility and finiteness of activities 
and resources, and the assumption of single-value expectations that 
the parameters of the model are known with certainty. Although 
these assumptions including their modifications and extensions 
have been discussed at length in the literature (26;46:12), never­
theless, it needs point out, as noted by Dorfman, et al. that 
strict descriptive faithfulness is an unreasonable demand to make 
of any conceptualization: "What we have a right to ask of a concep­
tual model is that it seizes on the strategic relationships that 
control the phenomenon it describes and that It thereby permits 
us to manipulate, that is, think about, the situation" (26:9). 
The basic linear programming model 
Linear programming is a mathematical technique used to maximize 
or minimize a linear objective function subject to a number of linear 
constraints. The maximization form of linear programming used in 
this study is expressed in the following three equations: 
Maximize : (1) 
Subject to: b^ Z a. .x. 
J i-1 ^ 
(2) 
(3) 
where Z - value of the program or solution, 
x^ - activity (process) 1, 
c^ - net contribution to Z by activity 1, 
bj - amount of resource j available, 
a.. - amount of resource j required by one unit 
^ of activity i, 
1 - 1 n 
j - 1 m. 
Equation (1) is the objective function which is to be maximized 
or minimized. Equation (2) expresses resource availability con­
straints, that is, resources are restricted to what are available. 
Equation (3) ensures that each activity enters the solution at a 
nonnegative level. A linear programming model thus has three 
quantitative components: an objective function to be maximized 
(minimized), alternative methods or activities for achieving the 
objective, and resource and/or other constraints. Modifications and 
extensions of the basic LP model have been developed and discussed 
in detail by economists Including Heady and Candler (46), Beneke 
and Wlnterboer (12), and Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow (26). 
The objective function In a linear programming model applied 
to farm planning, the objective function expresses the goal of the 
farm enterprise, that is, the variable which the farm manager intends 
to maximize or minimize. In maximization problems, several objective 
functions have been developed in the literature for various kinds 
of farming situations (47; 49; 85). However, these farming situations 
differ from the JPA, since in the former Inputs and outputs are 
bought and sold in the market ; while In the JPA, production is for 
subsistence consumption and most inputs are either owned or 
produced by the family farm. 
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Some attempts have been made to apply linear programming to 
subsistence economies by use of additional assumptions and proxy 
data. Asefa, for example, assumes that the farm manager first 
satisfies minimum subsistence requirements before selling the 
"surplus" (4). Delgado applies the simple linear programming 
model expressed In equations 1, 2 and 3 to a subsistence situation 
In Upper Volta (17). Delgado's simple formulation is applied In 
this study for analysis of a "composite farm" in the JPA. In 
this case the objective function to be maximized is agricultural 
output from the various farm activities, subject to family 
resource constraints. The price weights used are those prevailing 
in Bor Town during the period of analysis. 
Structure of the linear programming models and data requirements 
As noted earlier in this study, the economy of the JPA is 
exclusively of a subsistence nature. No financial services are 
available to the rural people, and other market Institutions are 
either nonexistent or very underdeveloped. Government services 
and central planning hardly reach the rural areas, except for 
rural towns such as Bor. Faim input-output data are extremely 
difficult to obtain and have never been collected in a systematic 
way. El Sammani and Hassan have made rough estimates of acreages 
and yields of a small sample of farms without any assessment of 
labor and other Inputs (29:19). Because of limited time and 
other resources, this study was unable to collect farm input-output 
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data directly from the cultivators. Proxy data from the Pengko Plain 
Pilot Project (PPP) are therefore used to reconstruct a "composite 
farm" in Bor and Kongor districts of the JPA. The PPP is wholly 
managed by the International Land Development Consultants (ILACO) 
under contract with the Government of the Netherlands through a 
bilateral agreement with the Government of the Sudan, Southern 
Region (see Chapter VII). 
The data used in the linear programming part of the study were 
collected at the PPP during October, November and December, 1980. 
Several qualifications are required in the use of these data. In 
the first place, observations are based on experimental trials 
and may thus be unrepresentative of the real world situation. 
Secondly, several gaps had to be filled with estimates by the author 
in consultation with PPP agronomists and other technical experts in 
the field. Nevertheless, the data used permitted application of 
the procedures and demonstrated the nature of results from their 
application as well as shedding some light on the major issues 
under investigation. 
Assumptions made about the "composite farm" A single-period 
linear programming model was developed to analyse the production 
activities of a "composite farm" in Bor and Kongor Districts. The 
following characterizations and assumptions pertain to the 
"composite farm". 
1. Household size. The farm household consists of 7 
members (28:10) who together contribute 4 labor-days per calendar 
day. The farm household daily labor contributions are weighted as 
follows (62:85): 
(a) 2 male adults (both between ages 15 and 60) each 
contribute one labor-day. 
(b) 1 female adult (aged between 15 and 60) contributes 
0.75 labor-day. 
(c) 2 children (both between ages 7 and 14) each contribute 
0.5 labor-day. 
(d) 1 child, under 7 years old, contributes no labor. 
(e) 1 aged dependent, over 60 years old, contributes 
0.25 labor-day. 
One labor-day, as assumed by the FFP, is equivalent to 4 hours.^ 
In addition, labor-days of 6 and 8 hours, respectively, are 
considered In the parametric application of the model. The three 
levels of labor supply are designated as B^, and B^, respectively. 
Bj^ is 224 labor-hours, B^ is 336 labor-hours, and B^ is 448 labor-
2. Livestock holdings. The livestock holdings are 10 head of 
cattle, each valued at LS 100.000 and earning an annual Income of 
LS 15.000; and 5 small ruminants (sheep and goats) each valued at 
LS 5.000 and earning an annual income of LS 1.500. It Is further 
assumed that livestock provides the only money capital available 
to the "composite household farm," and that no money capital is used 
in the cropping activities. The reason for these assumptions is to 
^From interview with managing director of the FFF. 
allow livestock to compete with crop production activities for 
labor, which Is the main scarce resource on the farm (17:109). An 
alternative assumption Is to adopt the PPP assumption that 57 percent 
of family labor Is devoted to agriculture and the remainder to live­
stock production (62:86). Both assumptions were used In the 
applications of the model. 
3. Technological packages. The farm household Is assumed to 
choose between four different technological packages as follows: 
(a) Traditional technology (as currently practiced In the 
arça, using mainly the hand hoe), here designated as T^^. The agri­
cultural Implements used In much of the JPA under hand-powered 
technology are either locally made or purchased In the local shops. 
These lnq)lements Include the maloda (hoe), axe, sickle, knife and 
planting stick. 
(b) Herbicide/fertilizer technology, T^ (the government 
Is assumed to provide 100 percent subsidy to the composite farm). 
The herbicides used at the PPP are Propanye (Stam F 34) for rice 
and Atrazine for dura. The fertilizer application most used is 
(50 Kg N + 20 Kg PgOg) per hectare (62:121). 
(c) Oxen technology, T^, Is also assumed to be subsidized 
by the government except for the oxen which the farmer has in his 
herd. An effective oxen-powered technology would require a plow, 
weeder, seeder, cart and two oxen. The present demonstration 
practices from which the data were drawn Include only a plow and 
two oxen. The data used under Tg are therefore from use of an 
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oxen-plow only. 
4. The agricultural calendar. The agricultural calendar starts 
in April/May when sustained rains begin, and it has been divided 
into fortnights (the data were collected each fortnight beginning 
Hay 1st between 1976 and 1980). A schematic summary of agricultural 
and livestock activities during the year is given in Figure 4.3. The 
livestock activities in this figure are from Payne et al. (84:26). 
5. The Ajj matrix. The A^^ matrix of the elements a^j of the 
"composite farm" is assumed to be the same as that of the PPP trials. 
This assumption may appear unduly unrealistic since the PF presumably 
has higher managerial inputs, but as stated earlier, this discrepancy 
does not significantly alter the conclusions of this study. The 
coefficients were constructed from data accumulated over a period of 
four years and it is the yearly averages that are used for the 
"composite farm." 
Activities, resource constraints and data requirements 
In the listing of activities and restraints that follow, the 
activities are designated by the letter "P" (for process), and the 
constraints by the letter "R" (for restraint). 
1. Crop production and growing activities. These activities 
include land preparation, sowing, first and second weeding, bird 
scaring and harvesting. The unit of activity in each case is one 
feddan (1 feddan - 1.038 acres). Labor requirements per unit of 
activity for the four cropping activities are given in Table 4.1. 
Crop yields and prices are given in Table 4.2. The activities are; 
1. LlvMtock b«gia to 
ratura to camp# adjacent 
village aa flood watara i 
(111 fully 
1. Weeding (S07 
up) Bird acarlng and 
barveatlng contlnuaa 
1. Land clearing i 
aowlng ruath 
•orghua (R05 
fully uaed up) 
2. Eaatward migra-
(R03 fully uaed 
Firing of leaa 
palatable graai 
camp# will be 
2. Migration 
1. Bffl'fliitllL.. 
2. Harveatlng (121 la 
Mi ïtitïirt •tinitti 
Figure 4.3. The agricultural calendar and annual 
transhumance In Kongor District, JFA 
Table 4.1. Summary of labor requirements for cropping activities 
under the various technologies 
Ruath sorghum Angul sorghum Maize Beans 
Fort­ Fort­
night night night 
(T,) 
1 80 17 32 1 80 2 80 
2 32 18 67.2 2 32 3 32 
3 67.2 21 75 3 67.2 4 67.2 
5 67.2 22 32 5 67.2 5 67.2 
9 75 9 60 6 75 
10 32 10 32 8 82 
Herbicide/fertilizer (T^) 
1 80 17 32 1 80 2 80 
2 32 18 57.1 2 32 3 32 
3 57.1 21 75 3 47 4 53.8 
5 57.1 22 32 5 47 5 53.8 
9 75 9 60 6 75 
10 32 10 32 8 82 
Oxen (T3) 
44 17 22 1 44 2 44 
2 22 18 37 2 22 3 22 
3 37 21 75 3 32 4 30 
5 37 22 32 5 32 5 30 
9 75 9 75 6 75 
10 32 10 32 8 82 
Table 4.2. Summary of crop yields in kilograms (Kg) of grain per feddan 
under the various technologies, and output prices in 
Sudanese Pound (LS) per Kg 
Yield in Kg/feddan Price 
Crop ^1 Ig ^3 LS/Kg 
Ruath sorghum 350 500 580 .11 
Angul sorghum 350 500 580 .11 
Maize 151 230 265 .12 
Beans 47 70 85 .20 
POl: Producing and growing vet season Ruath Dura (a sorghum 
variety). 
P02: Producing and growing dry season Angul Dura (a sorghum 
variety). 
P03: Producing and growing maize (com). 
P04: Producing and growing cowpeas. 
2. Livestock producing activities. These activities include 
milking, tethering, grazing, cowdung preparation (for fuel) 
and the general care of the animals. Average labor require­
ments per unit of activity for the livestock activities is 
given in Table 4.3. 
P05: Producing and raising cattle. The unit of 
activity is one head of livestock. 
P06: Producing and raising sheep and goats. The unit of 
activity is one small ruminant. 
3. List of nonlabor restraints. 
ROl: A restraint on financial capital. The unit of 
restraint is one Sudanese Found (LS. 1.000 = $2.00). 
R02: A restraint on land. The unit of restraint is one 
feddan. A figure of 30 feddans, an arbitrarily large 
quantity, is used. Although suitable "highland" In 
the flood conditions is scarse, land can be considered 
unlimited under present technologies, especially after 
construction of the canal as more suitable land will 
be opened up by the drainage effects of the canal. 
Table 4.3. Summary of labor requirements for the livestock 
activities® 
Fortnight Labor constraint Labor-hours Unit of activity 
no. code Cattle Small ruminant 
1 5.6 1.0 
2 5.0 1.4 
3 R#5 5.7 1.6 
4 R06 6.7 2.'3 
5 R07 8.5 2.7 
6 R08 6.7 2.4 
7 R09 6.7 2.4 
8 RIO 6.8 2.6 
9 Rll 7.3 2.7 
10 R12 7.4 2.8 
11 R13 7.8 2.9 
12 R14 5.5 1.5 
13 R15 6.0 1.0 
14 R16 6.0 1.0 
15 R17 6.0 1.0 
16 R18 6.0 1.0 
17 R19 6.0 1.0 
18 R20 6.0 1.0 
19 R21 6.0 1.0 
20 R22 6.0 1.0 
L-26 R23 42.0 7.0 
^hese data were derived from comparative experience (17) as it 
was impractical to collect primary data. The PPP assumes that 
43 percent of family labor Is allocated to livestock activities. 
The models are run also under the PPP assumption as a counter check 
of the method used to derive the above data. 
4. Labor restraints by fortnight, starting May 1st. 
restraint on labor fortnight 01 
restraint on fortnight 02 
R05: restraint fortnight 03 
R06; restraint fortnight 04 
R07: restraint labor fortnight 05 
restraint on labor fortnight 06 
R09: restraint on labor fortnight 07 
RIO: restraint on labor fortnight 08 
Rll: restraint on labor fortnight 09 
R12; restraint on labor in fortnight 10 
R13: restraint on labor in fortnight 11 
R14: restraint on labor in fortnight 12 
R15: restraint on labor in fortnight 13 
R16: restraint on labor fortnight 14 
R17: restraint on labor fortnight 15 
R18; restraint on labor fortnight 16 
R19: restraint on labor In fortnight 17 
R20: restraint on in fortnight 18 
R21: restraint on in fortnight 19 
R22: restraint on fortnight 20 
R23: restraint on labor fortnights 21 
season—no agricultural activities. There is 
sufficient labor for livestock, home maintenance and 
other household production activities). 
CHAPTER V. DELIMITING THE PROBLEMATIC SITUATION FOR RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE JONGLEI PROJECTS AREA 
In this chapter, the problem of rural development, and therefore 
of socio-economic development. In the JPA Is delimited. Section one 
states the context within which the goals for rural development are 
presented, while section two develops and states goals of rural 
development as expounded in official publications and In Interviews 
with Southern Sudanese officials. Section three presents the 
existing situation with respect to rural development in the JPA. 
Having presented the goals of rural development in the JPA and the 
existing state of natural resource development, the problematic 
situation for socio-economic development in the JPA is stated in 
the final section. 
Context for Rural Development Goals in the JPA 
Several observers have written flatteringly on the agricultural 
potential in the Southern Sudan. In 1952, for example, a British 
economic survey team concluded that "given the money, the technical 
proficiency, and the experts. Southern Sudan could easily become one 
of the richest areas in Africa" (92:157). More recently, David 
Hopper (50:201) observed that: 
The Southern half of the Sudan is potentially one of 
the richest farming regions in the world, with the soil, 
sunlight and water resources to produce enormous quantities 
of food — as much perhaps, as the entire world now pro­
duces! The water is useless today; the headwaters of the 
White Nile, blocked in their northward flow . . . spill 
out over the land to form great swamps. To unlock the 
promise of the Southern Sudan those swamps would have 
to be drained, a rural infrastructure put in place, and 
the nomadic cattle raisers of the region somehow turned 
Into sedentary farmers. The capital costL of such an 
undertaking would be as large as the promise . . . yet 
the potential Is real and untapped, and as world food 
shortages persist such a reserve can no longer be 
neglected. 
The factors that make Southern Sudan a major part of Sudan's 
potential to become the "Breadbasket of the Middle East" have 
already been discussed in Chapter II. In this chapter, the problem 
of socio-economic development in the JPÂ is delimited with the 
context of JPA's agricultural potential and the overall national 
context of goals, plans and objectives. 
Goals for Rural Development in the JPÂ 
The overall national means for achieving the ultimate ends of 
life, liberty and opportunity for all Sudanese citizens is trans­
formation of the country into the "Breadbasket of the Middle East" 
and a major granary of the world (71:33). To achieve these goals, 
the ends-in-view for the agricultural sector, as stated in Sudan's 
development plans (24; 25) are: (1) Improved productivity and use 
of resources, (2) a more equitable distribution of growth and the 
resulting gross value of agricultural output in terms of factor 
payments or earnings, (3) an accelerated increase in total agri­
cultural production to meet domestic and international market 
demands, and, as a consequence of achievement of the preceding ends, 
(4) an accelerated increase in per capita real income and quality 
of life for the agricultural population. 
As stated by Adam, some of the above goals are occasionally 
in conflict and sometimes complementary. This is particularly the 
case when these goals are related to the means through which they 
could be achieved, and if these means are scarce. For example, if 
the objective is to Improve productivity and use of resources, 
the scale of operation must be enlarged to allow investment of 
indivisible capital equipment and the use of modem agricultural 
techniques. On the other hand. If It is a more equitable distri­
bution of growth, incomes or wealth, the means of production must 
be redistributed and private accumulation restricted. Finally, 
given the efficiency and equity norms, if the end-in-view is to 
increase total agricultural output and maintain a sustained 
accelerated Increase in per capita real Income of the agricultural 
labor force, then labor productivity must be raised, the land base 
should be expanded where possible, and job opportunities should 
be provided to absorb surplus labor released from agriculture. 
Nevertheless, if agricultural development is identified to 
mean all of the above four goals in combination, the means-ends 
continuum framework could serve as a basis, as emphasized by 
Glttlnger (42:20) and Adam (1:27), to resolve the "conflict between 
ends-ln-vlew" where the extent to which each is emphasized and the 
criteria for balancing one end-in-view against another are the 
more ultimate ends-ln-vlew." 
Within the context of the preceding national goals for the 
agricultural sector, the specific goals for the JPA are In terms of 
expected contributions from Its agriculture to the general "bread­
basket" objective of the nation. To arrive at a realistic Identifi­
cation of these contributions. It Is necessary to determine the 
physical. Institutional and economic resources of the JPA. No 
systematic Investigation of these resources has yet been completed 
for the area, but such an assessment Is the subject and justification 
for the research and development studies of Appendix E to Chapter VII 
that are currently underway In the area. This assessment Is truly 
multIdIscIplInary. An estimate of the actual potentialities of the 
land In the JPA, for example. Is a technical appraisal that has to 
be made by agronomists, soil specialists, livestock specialists, 
and other related disciplines. The social and economic appraisal 
is being conducted by Sudan's Social and Economic Research Council. 
An economic appraisal remains to be conducted In terms of costs 
and time required to bring land Into operation, estimate of pro­
ductivity levels and production costs for different crops grown 
under different farm organization systems, and at least broad 
magnitudes of present and potential effective domestic and Inter­
national demand for the agricultural products of the area. 
Once the above interdisciplinary resource surveys are completed, 
the specific targets or objectives can be established for agri­
culture of the JPA. At the present, only broad targets for 
agriculture of the JPA can be proposed. These propositions are: 
1. To Increase agricultural, livestock, and fisheries pro­
duction In order to (a) satisfy subsistence and domestic market 
needs, (b) meet the expected and potential contribution of the JPA 
to the "breadbasket" objective with respect to agricultural exports, 
and (c) raise per capita Incomes and the quality of life for 
inhabitants of the area; 
2. Increase the efficiency of productive factors; 
3. Transfer new production factors and techniques. Including 
institutions and organizations. Into the JPA—this should be coupled 
with equity in access to these factors and techniques; and 
4. Provide employment opportunities to absorb surplus agri­
cultural labor that would likely result from the process of agri­
cultural transformation in the JPA. 
The above four propositions are used In this study as guide­
line targets in Identifying and selecting rural development 
strategies for the Jonglei Projects Area. These propositions are 
based on official publications (18; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25) and on 
results of interviews with officials of the Jonglei Development 
projects and the Southern Region (Appendix A). Most of the goals 
listed above recurred in interviews with the Chairman of the 
National Council for Development projects in the JPA, Commissioners 
(Governors) of Jonglei and Upper Nile provinces In the JPA and other 
high ranking officials of the Executive Organ and the two provinces. 
But what Is the natural and institutional resource situation within 
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which these goals are to be achieved? This question is answered 
in the next section where the existing situation is delimited. 
The Existing Situation With Respect to Rural 
Development in the JPA 
The agricultural potential in the JPA in relation to other 
regions of Sudan was evaluated in Chapter II. The existing 
situation in the JPA with respect to the state of development of 
physical and institutional resources was discussed In Chapter III. 
These discussions in Chapters II and III provide a general assessment 
of the existing situation in the JPA for delimiting the problematic 
situation for socio-economic development of the JPA. 
The existing state of development of the physical and 
institutional resources of the JPA Is further indicated by results 
of the linear programming models. In all, there are nine linear 
programming models corresponding to the three levels of technology 
(T^) and the three levels of household labor supply (Bj). These 
models are referred to as T^Bj (i, j - 1, 2, 3). T^^B^^, for example, 
refers to hand technology and a labor-day of 4 hours; T^B^ assumes 
a labor-day of six hours. The technologies and labor supply 
definitions and assumptions are discussed in Chapter IV. 
Table 5.1 shows optimal levels of income at various levels of 
technology and labor supply. In part 1 of the table, livestock 
activities were allowed to compete with cropping activities. The 
optimal livestock production is 10 head of cattle, each earning 
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an annual Income of LS 15; this Income has been deducted to get the 
Income from the cropping activities reported in the table. Fart 2 
reports optimal income from cropping activities with livestock 
activities excluded from the models. The models were run under the 
PPP assunq>tion that 57 percent of household labor is devoted to 
agricultural production, while the remaining 47 percent is 
allocated to labor activities (62:86). 
Table 5.1. Summary of optimal levels of income for all the models. 
Part 1 Part 2 
Sudanese pounds Sudanese pounds 
160 233 323 130 191 271 
275 402 559 195 287 407 
389 569 795 260 383 542 
Assuming that mean household labor supply for the "composite 
farm" is optimal Income from cropping activities under hand 
technology (T^) Is LS 275 in part 1 of Table 5.1 and LS 195 in 
part 2. The "composite farm" makes another LS 150 from livestock 
activities. Since the "composite household" is composed of 
7 members, these incomes translate to LS 60 and LS 40 per capita 
in parts 1 and 2, respectively. Sudan's per capita GDP was estimated 
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at LS 100 in 1980 (24:27). In terms of per capita production, the 
JPA lags behind the rest of the country by 40 to 50 percent. The 
developmental situation is even worse than that revealed by this 
study according to an ILÂCO report that estimates per capita 
production at LS 34 (65: Vol. 1, p. 18). 
The low income level in the JPA is taken as a proxy measure 
of the low level of development of the potential contribution of 
the area to the "breadbasket" objectives of the Sudan. Sudan plans 
to triple per capita GDP to LS 300 by 1995. Assuming per capita 
production to be LS 55 (the average between part 1 and part 2 in 
Figure 5.1), the JPA would need to increase per capita output by 
about 450 percent between 1980 and 1995 to catch up with Sudan's 
average development. It is doubtful that the Inhabitants of the 
JPA can mobilize sufficient capital resources from their low 
incomes to achieve this level of development by 1995. If develop­
ment is subsidized by outside resources as seems likely, it is 
also doubtful that the "improvement approach" is the most appropriate 
strategy that will enable the JPA to catch up with the rest of 
Sudan and realize its contribution to the breadbasket potential of 
Sudan. These arguments are fully developed In the next chapter on 
the diagnostic and remedial phases. 
The Problematic Situation for Rural 
Development in the JPA 
As discussed in Chapter III, drainage and water-logging and 
backward institutional and infrastructural resources are the major 
drawbacks to agricultural development in the JPA and in the 
Southern Clay Plains in general. However, from the point of view 
of water availability and soil quality, the JPA and the Southern 
Clay Plains offer great potential to the Southern Region and 
Sudan's "breadbasket" objectives, especially as the North-central 
and North-eastern growth areas run out of water. 
The problem of water-logging will be solved as the swamps will 
be drained (see the discussion on water resources in Chapter II), 
since Egypt and North Sudan growth areas will need the extra water, 
which ironically is not needed in the JPA. World food shortages 
will persist and even get worse in the years to come (99). The 
pressure and challenge to extract the vast agricultural potential 
in the JPA and Southern Clay Plains will be great and immediate 
on the national government, and especially on the Regional Government. 
For the process of socio-economic development through agri­
cultural development in the JPA to become viable and an integral 
part of national development, broad goals have been formulated and 
stated within the context of the overall national objectives for the 
agricultural sector. The existing situations in the Sudan and the 
JPA have been presented in Chapters II and III as preliminary 
evidence of the validity of the context within which these goals 
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have been stated. 
The problematic situation with respect to agricultural develop­
ment in the JPA can then be stated simply as the design and imple­
mentation of rural development strategies, agrarian structures and 
institutions on a scale adequate enough to achieve the regional 
and national goals as predicated on the potentialities of the area 
and the existing situation within and with respect to other regions 
of the Sudan. Based on results of the linear programming models 
and national goals, an approximate quantitative statement of the 
problematic gap for socio-economic development in the JPA is to 
raise per capita rural output from its level of LS 55 in 1980 to 
LS 300 by 1995. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE DIAGNOSTIC PHASE APPLIED TO THE JPA 
This chapter presents the diagnostic phase in which the JPA is 
analysed to determine the extent to which specific physical, 
economic and institutional elements contribute to failure or success 
in achieving the goals and, therefore, in eliminating the problematic 
situation delimited in the last chapter. Section one provides a 
conceptual framework for identifying physical, economic and 
institutional interrelationships used in the analysis. Section two 
identifies failure and success elements from the major physical and 
institutional characteristics of the JPA as discussed in Chapter III. 
Section three presents results and interpretation of the linear 
programming models to determine the extent to which the physical 
and Institutional elements Impact on farmer decision making. Results 
from parametric programming are used to evaluate the adequacy of the 
existing agrarian structure and the "improvement approach" as means 
to realizing the resource potential in the JPA and achieving the 
goals developed in the delimiting phase of the last chapter. The 
second objective of the study is achieved in this section. The 
last section summarizes failure and success elements to be used in 
the remedial phase in the next chapter to achieve the last two 
objectives of study. 
Conceptual Framework for the Diagnostic Phase 
The process of identifying, formulating and implementing appro­
priate rural development strategies for achieving desired socio-economic 
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goals and to eliminate the problematic situation requires expertise 
and data from many disciplines. The essence of such inter­
disciplinary research and development does not result from the 
contributions of separate disciplines acting singly, although the 
Individual contributions are important. The essence of inter­
disciplinary research and development involves cooperative and 
coordinative efforts among many disciplines. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the interrelatimships involved in 
interdisciplinary research aimed at formulating, developing and 
implementing rural development strategies for socio-economic develop­
ment of the JPA. The physical factors include the natural resource, 
biological, chemical and engineering disciplines. The economic 
factors include supply and demand, price weights, efficient 
allocation of resources, and socio-political factors related to 
socio-economic development including development strategies. The 
institutional factors include political, legal and social institutions, 
or methods which enable the physical and economic disciplines to 
interact in the process of iiormulating and implementing rural 
development strategies. 
The simplified conceptual illustration of Figure 6.1 suggests 
some of the important linkages among the physical, economic and 
institutional factors relevant to socio-economic development in the 
JPA. For illustrative purposes, the current research and development 
activities of the Executive Organ, Included as Appendix E, have 
been conceptualized into the framework of Figure 6.1. Furthermore, 
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Figure 6.1. Conceptual framework for identifying physical, 
economic and institutional interrelationships 
used in formulating rural development 
strategies for the JPA 
the conceptualization in Figure 6.1 can be used by the Executive 
Organ to identify more areas for research that are not Included 
In Appendix E but that may become necessary in future. 
The conceptual framework of Figure 6.1 can be used by an inter­
disciplinary research team to identify various constraints which 
restrict the cultivated area and agricultural output. These 
constraints can be used to Identify elements of the farming system 
that need to be eliminated and those that need to be strengthened. 
The accumulated information can be used In formulating appropriate 
rural development strategies for the area. 
Failure and Success Elements Identified 
in the Diagnostic Phase 
Within the "means-ends continuum" model, appropriate rural 
development strategies can be developed from failure and success 
elements identified in the diagnostic phase. Major failure and 
success elements affecting achievement of the goals developed in 
the delimiting phase are summarized under the physical, institu­
tional and economic categories of Figure 6.1. Boundaries between 
elements of these three categories are not absolute, and a measure 
of flexibility should be exercised in classifying some of the 
failure and success elements. 
Physical and technological 
As discussed in Chapter III, major physical and technological 
failure elements constraining agricultural development in the JPA 
Include: (1) flooding and water-logging, caused by lack of slope. 
Impermeable clay soils and heavy rains; (2) erratic and irregular 
patterns of rainfall, which cause rapid alternations between floods 
and droughts during the agricultural season; (3) Inadequate 
technology and Its primitive agricultural tools, all of which result 
in severe physical disincentives for crop husbandry; (4) long 
distances from seaports and large urban centers in Northern Sudan 
combining to shut off the JPA from national and international 
markets; and (5) a host of plant diseases and pests ranging from 
elephants to the little weavel bird. These failure elements, as 
shown in the linear progrananing analysis of the next section, 
effectively limit extension of the cultivated area and expansion 
of agricultural output. 
Some of the failure elements, such as floods, droughts, and 
pests frequently cau^e complete crop failure, and make subsistence 
based on agriculture unreliable and precarious. Moreover, traditional 
technology based on the hand-powered hoe, is completely Inadequate 
in the face of the severe physical constraints. Family labor gets 
quickly used up, and severe labor bottlenecks develop during peak 
periods of land preparation, weeding, bird scaring and harvesting. 
As a consequence of the failure elements, results of the LP models 
show that more than 50 percent of available labor is rendered 
redundant during the year (see Table 6.3). Use of new and 
"appropriate" technology such as oxen plowing would probably 
increase the cultivated area by about 50 percent, but this would 
only be to 3.1 or 5.4 feddans at the most (see Table 6.1). Use of 
herbicides would result in virtually no increase in the cultivated 
area, while it would likely reduce yields through inappropriate 
application. 
On the other hand, there are also plenty of success elements 
in the physical setting of the JPA that can be used in achieving 
the goals delimited In previous chapters. These success elements 
include: (1) tremendous amounts of land endowed with fertile 
soils; (2) abundance of water resources; (3) abundance of natural 
pastures; and (4) the Jonglei Canal, which when completed will 
provide a vital infrastructural resource for cheap transport in 
addition to its other uses for drainage and irrigation. 
An appropriate rural development strategy needs to include 
in its base the maintenance and expansion of existing success 
elements as well as development of new success elements. An 
example of maintenance of an existing success element is soil 
conservation practices to maintain and improve soil fertility; 
while an example of expanding existing success elements is to make 
full transportation use of the Jonglei Canal by developing 
adequate transport links between the northern end of the canal and 
transport systems to Northern Sudan, and between the southern end 
and transport systems to Eastern and Central Africa. Examples of 
new success elements Include: (1) drainage and storage of water, 
when it is not needed, for use in supplemental irrigation during 
the intermittent droughts; (2) Introduction of new forms of farm 
power to replace muscle power; (3) Irrigation during the long dry 
season from stored water from the rainy season, or from the canal 
itself; and (4) provision of drinking water and fodder during the 
long dry season in order to avoid transhumance. 
An appropriate rural development strategy for the JPA can 
then be identified from its association with existing and potential 
physical and technological failure elements. If development is 
physically not possible, if technology can not ameliorate the 
physical disincentives in the JPA, then clearly whatever social 
and economic incentives that might be offered farmers would most 
likely come to naught; and herein lies the interrelatedness among 
the physical, institutional and economic elements in the process 
of identifying and selecting rural development strategies. 
As results of linear programming show in the next section, 
economic incentives in the form of output and input prices are 
completely dominated by physical disincentives in the environment of 
production in the JPA. A rural development strategy based on 
elimination or modification of physical and technological failure 
elements, and on maintenance and expansion of existing and 
potential success elements provides the necessary physical 
incentives without which social and economic Incentives would be 
useless. 
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Social and institutional 
Under the social and Institutional environment, major failure 
elements Include: (1) communal land tenure, a major institutional 
constraint, as it provides no security of tenure to foster the 
necessary economic and social incentives that encourage land 
development; (2) the legal status of land in Southern Sudan, under 
which land is considered as unregistered and unsettled, constitutes 
an additional source of uncertainty to potential land developers; 
(3) traditional settlement patterns, consisting of scattered house­
holds and scattered family farm-plots, result in considerable 
waste of labor and make provision of infrestructurai services 
costly; (4) the annual transhumance of the Inhabltance of the JPÂ 
wastes considerable amounts of labor; (5) the high social status 
of cattle prevents their use as draught animals, or as capital that 
can be marketed and reinvested in crop and/or further livestock 
production; (6) absence of organized local markets, and absence of 
access to national and international markets encourage perpetuation 
of a subsistence mode of life; and (7) the high risk aversion of 
the people, a product of centuries of experience and pragmatism, 
makes them conservative in adopting new Innovations. 
Any process undergoing progressive change is often pregnant 
with potential failure elements, and this is especially the case 
when eliminating or modifying failure elements in the social and 
institutional environment. Communal tenure, for example, has 
been known to undergo fundamental changes in many parts of the 
world during the transition from subsistence to commercial agri­
culture. This transition has often been characterized by three 
potential failure elements in communal tenure; namely: (1) emergence 
of absentee landlordism; (2) rack-renting of land; (3) Individual­
ization of tenure and eventual concentration of land; and (4) eventual 
dispossession, commercialization and pauperization of the original 
communal land owners. These failure elements, which are potential 
in the present communal and subsistence economies of the JFA, have 
been the subject of land reform and revolution over the years in 
Asia and Latin America; while in the Gedaref area of Northern 
Sudan, they are presently emerging rapidly as a result of uncontrolled 
changes in communal tenure. An appropriate rural development strategy 
for the JPA, while eliminating or modifying failure elements in the 
social and institutional environment, should also seek to avoid 
emergence of potential failure elements that could be predicted 
from comparative experience. 
The social and institutional environment of the JPA is not 
composed of failure elements alone; there are success elements as 
well. Success elements within traditional institutions that could 
be developed and Incorporated Into a strategy designed to achieve 
the goals developed in the delimiting phase Include certain aspects 
of communal tenure and communal economic, political and administrative 
organizations of tribes and clans. Certain aspects of communal 
tenure, such as communal ownership, production, distribution and 
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consumption could provide endlgenous bases for development of 
modern group or cooperative farming. The social, political and 
administrative forms of communal organizations Into tribes and 
clans could Impede progress, since they are not based on efficiency 
criteria, and since they normally exclude or discriminate against 
nonmembers. Nevertheless, the communal organizational form Is a 
social reality that can not simply be wished or scrapped away; 
Instead, the charts of Appendix A could be adapted to provide 
structural forms for producer and marketing cooperatives. 
As with physical and technological elements, the preceding 
social and Institutional success and failure elements, both present 
and potential, are necessary factors in identifying and selecting 
an appropriate rural development strategy for the JPA. 
Economic 
Finally, failure and success elements In the economic environment 
have to be Incorporated in the design of strategy, since what Is 
physically and Institutional possible may not be economically 
feasible. Major failure elements in Che economic environment of the 
JPA Include: (1) subsistence production, insofar as it embodies low 
resource productivities, low incomes and consequently, low market 
demands and lack of division of labor; (2) subsistence consumption. 
Insofar as it fosters consplcious consumption and no accumulation 
of surplus; (3) low output price incentives to producers; (A) lack 
of access to modem inputs and high input price disincentives to 
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producers; (5) a local market that Is constricted by low incomes 
and low demands; and (6) high transport costs for goods moving in 
or out of the area. 
Some of the above failure elements sometimes impede agricultural 
development severely. Very low farm output prices, often resulting 
from price subsidies (bribes) to the politically vocal but often 
unproductive urban workers and often enforced by the police might 
of the state, sometimes result in huge unnecessary additional 
losses to farmers. In 1976, for example, local farmers around Bor, 
the capltol of Jonglel Province (JPA), sometimes had their farm 
produce confiscated, ended up spending more than 48 hours in jail 
and paying the prescribed fines for selling above the Local 
Government Council so-called "essential products" prices. 
There are also potential failure elements in the economic 
environment of the JPA. These pertain to the following consider­
ations: (1) the development policies of the nation, which favor 
urban areas, force the rural people to migrate to towns to solicit 
for cash and modem consumer goods, or to look for employment in 
their own right; and thus sometimes deprive rural agricultural 
production of labor during critical labor peak periods ; (2) the 
low level of incomes in rural JPA makes it unlikely that the 
inhabitants of the JPA can be able to generate adequate capital 
for self-sustaining development without initial and continued 
doses of outside interventions; and (3) as the JPA gets engulfed 
in commercial agriculture and in international trade relations, the 
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erratic whims of nature under the present subsistence agriculture 
may be replaced by erratic movements in crop commodity prices of 
international markets. 
Finally, there are also success elements in the economic 
environment of the JPA. The success elements Include (1) con­
siderable amounts of wealth in the form of stocks of cattle that 
could be converted into capital investment, and (2) presently 
redundant amounts of off-season labor that could be mobilized for 
productive activities. Potential success elements Include (1) 
opening up of the JPA by the Jonglel Canal and lowering of transport 
costs to national and international markets, and (2) presence of 
potential markets for JPA farm products in the Middle East. The 
Middle East provides a convenient potential market for rice, one 
of the crops that could be successfully grown in the JPA on a large 
scale. As an illustration of this market potential, Saudi Arabia 
purchased $270 million of rice from the United States of America 
in 1980, while Egypt purchased $155 million worth from the same source 
In 1977. 
Interpretation of Results of the 
Linear Programming Models 
This section presents interpretation of results of the linear 
programming models developed In Chapter IV. The analysis focuses 
on the extent to which failure elements in the physical, institu­
tional and economic environment of the JPA, as summarized In the 
135 
last section, impact on farmer decision making to constrain the 
cultivated area and agricultural output. Results of sensitivity 
analysis and parametric programming are used to assess the 
viability of the technologies considered. 
The models assume 1980 as the base year for prices. Param­
eterization of the objective function was conducted at 150, 200 
and 250 percent of base prices. No significant increases in 
acreage were observed as a result of the price increases. The 
main effect of a price Increase appears to be an Increase in income 
accompanied by a change in the composition of the crops in the 
optimal plan. These results only emphasize the severity of labor 
constraints during particular peak periods. One price level, 
supplemented by range analysis, is therefore considered sufficient 
for the three levels of parameterization in labor supply. 
Cropping activities 
Table 6.1a summarizes optimal farm plans for all the models 
with livestock activities Incorporated to compete with cropping 
activities. In the table, the cropped area Is twice the 
cultivated area because the same area is cultivated twice during 
the year. 
Assuming the same labor supply, B^, Table 6.1a reveals that 
there is no significant difference in optimal feddanage between 
hoe technology (T^^) and herbicide technology (T^). Adoption of 
herbicide technology Increases the cultivated area by only 0.2 
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Table 6.1a. Summary of optimal feddanage (acreage) under all the 
models T^^B^, with livestock activities incorporated 
Feddans 
^1 ^2 ^3 
Activity® ®1 =2 ®3 =1 ®2 ®2 ®3 
POl 2.0 3.5 4.9 2.0 3.5 4.9 2.0 3.5 5.1 
P02 2.1 3.6 5.1 2.1 3.6 5.1 2.1 3.6 5.2 
P03 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.8 3.9 
P04 
-
0.2 0.5 0.3 0.9 1.5 0.2 0.9 1.8 
cropped area 4.2 7.4 10.6 4.5 8.1 11.6 6.1 10.8 16.0 
Total culti­
vated area 2.1 3.7 5.3 2.3 4.1 5.8 3.1 5.4 8.0 
®See page 110 for crop codes 
feddan under B^ labor, by 0.4 feddan under Bg labor, and by 0.5 feddan 
under B^ labor. However, if labor supply is increased under the same 
technology, the cultivated area increases considerably. Under hoe 
technology, for example, the cultivated area increases by 1.6 feddans 
if the family work 6-hour labor-days (B^) instead of 4-hour labor-
days (Bj^); while it more than doubles if they work 8-hour labor-days. 
These results indicate that use of herbicides may alleviate labor 
shortages during weeding, but the technology does nothing to labor 
bottlenecks during land preparation, planting, bird scaring and 
harvesting. Introduction of herbicides in the JPA would thus not 
Increase the cultivated area by much. Moreover, it is possible that 
use of herbicides by traditional fanners could lower yields, at. 
least In the short run (58; 61; 63). 
Adoption of oxen technology (T^) Increases the optimal culti­
vated area under labor supply by 48 percent to 3.1 feddans. Under 
Bg and B^, the optimal cultivated area Increases to 5.4 and 8.0 
feddans, respectively. The use of oxen ploughs partially alleviates 
labor bottlenecks during land clearing, but weeding, bird scaring 
and harvesting continue to be major constraints to Increasing the 
cropped area and agricultural output. 
All the models were also run under ILACO's assumption that 57 
percent of household labor Is allocated to crop production, while 
the remaining 43 percent goes to livestock activities. The models 
were thus run under parameterization of the B^'s at 57 percent, 
with livestock activities excluded. Table 6.1b shows optimal farm 
plans under this procedure. 
Comparison of Tables 6.1a and 6.1b shows no major differences. 
The two tables serve as counter checks for the underlying assumptions. 
Generally, entries in Table 6.1b are smaller than the corresponding 
entries in Table 6.1a. The difference could be an indication that 
the composite household in the JFA allocates more than 57 percent 
of its labor to crop production, or it could be accounted for by 
underestimation of livestock labor requirements In Table 4.3. In 
other respects. Interpretation of Table 6.1b Is the same as that 
of Table 6.1a. 
Table 6.1b. Summary of optimal feddanage (acreage) under all the 
Feddana 
^1 ^2 ^3 
Activity® ®1 ®2 ®3 «1 ®2 ®3 ®1 ®2 ®3 
1.6 2.4 3.2 1.6 2.4 3.2 1.7 2.6 3.4 
P02 1,7 2.6 3.4 1.7 2.6 3.4 1.7 2.6 3.4 
P03 1.2 1.8 2.4 
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.8 
cropped area 3.6 5.5 7.2 4.0 6.0 8.0 5.5 8.3 11.0 
Total culti­
vated area 1.8 2.8 3.6 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.8 4.2 5.5 
®See page 110 for crop codes 
It Is interesting to note that the optimal farm plans for hoe 
technology under and B^ labor supplies are similar to results 
of a random sample of 12 farms that were surveyed in Kongor District 
in 1977 by El Sammani and Hassan (29:19). The cultivated area in 
this sample ranged from 0.8 feddan to 12 feddans. with an average 
of 2.5 feddans. The wide range in the size of farms possibly 
reflects differences in the length of the labor-day among farm 
households. A more general survey that was conducted by ILACO in 
Bor District (Gok) reports an average household farm of 0.96 hectare 
(2.4 feddans), a finding that is not different from that of 
El Sammani and Hassan. 
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The results in Table 6.1a show an optimal farm plan of 2.1 
feddans under hoe technology if the household works 4-hour days, 
and 5.3 feddans if It works 8-hour days. A labor-day of 6 hours 
appears to be more reasonable for the JPA, that is, the composite 
household works from 6:00 to 10:00 in the morning, and from 4:00 
to 6:00 in the evening. Under these assumptions, the optimal 
farm size in the JPA is 3.7 feddans. Under ILACO's assumption in 
Table 6.1b, optimal farm size is 2.8 feddans which is not much 
different from the empirical findings of ILACO and El Sammani and 
Hassan, and the same with ILACO's finding. 
If an optimal size of 3.7 feddans is assumed for the composite 
farm in the JPA, a shift to herbicide technology would increase 
optimal farm size (cultivated area) by only 11 percent, to 4.1 
feddans; while a shift to oxen technology would increase it by 
46 percent, to 5.4 feddans. Under maximum conditions of technology 
(Tj) and labor supply (B^), the optimal household farm size 
could be Increased to 8 feddans. This latter case means that for 
the traditional JPA farmer to bring 8 feddans under cultivation, 
the household would need to work 8 hours per day and, in addition, 
adopt oxen technology. 
Range analysis of the optimal farm plans 
Additional information with respect to interpretation of the 
optimal farm plans is afforded by range analysis. Range analysis 
provides useful Information regarding stability of optimal farm 
plans. It provides Insights Into the magnitudes of Income penalties 
which attach to departing from the optimum, either by producing 
more or less, and the range over which these penalties are effective. 
Table 6.2 summarizes results of Section IV of range analyses for 
models and T^Bj (j - 1, 2, 3). 
Table 6.2 shows that the optimal farm plan for each cropping 
activity is valid over a very wide range of prices and yields. The 
price of a sack (100 kilograms) of Ruath Sorghum grain in model 
T^B^, for example, can vary between LS 5.2 and LS 33.4 before 
changes in optimal feddanage can occur, assuming that the yield per 
feddan remains constant. The same optimal feddanage remains valid 
if the price remains constant while the yield varies between 165 
and 1,064 kilograms of grain per feddan. Below a price of LS 5.2 
per sack, or a yield of 165 kilograms per feddan, production of 
Ruath Sorghum drops to zero; while above the upper price (or yield) 
production increases by only 0.1 feddan. Empirically, the price 
of sorghum grain has varied between LS 5.0 and LS 40.0 between 1975 
and 1981 without noticeable increases in the cultivened area. Even 
during the course of the same year, farmers have been observed to 
sell their grain at very low prices, say LS 10.0 per sack to local 
merchants, during harvest and to buy it back at three times that 
price during the seasonal famine that occurs Just before the 
following harvest. There may be storage problems, nevertheless the 
large price differential should be sufficient incentive for farmers 
to Increase the cultivated area and to solve the storage problems. 
Table 6.2. Summary of results of range analysis on stability of 
optimal farm plans under models and T^Bj 
Increase in 
Price range Yield range feddans 
Cropping Price Optimal LS/Kg Kg/feddan at higher 
activity LS/Kg feddans Low High Low High price/yield 
Model TiBi 
POl 0 .110 2.965 0.052 0.334 165 1,064 0.100 
0. 110 2.147 0.052 0.383 165 1 ,218 0.100 
0, .120 0.100 0.063 0.255 79 321 1.900 
P04 0. 200 
- - - - - -
Model T1B2 
POl 0, .110 3.458 0.052 0.349 165 1 ,109 0.030 
0. ,110 3.640 0.052 0.400 165 1,274 0.020 
0, .120 0.007 0.063 0.255 79 321 3.460 
P04 0, .200 0.207 0.200 0.386 47 90 0.007 
Model T1B3 
POl 0, .110 4.865 0.052 0.465 165 1 .479 0.735 
0, .110 5.133 0.052 0.420 165 1 ,338 0.84 
P03 0. 120 
0. 200 0.474 0.200 0.819 47 192 4.12 
Model T3B1 
POl 0. 110 1.965 0.060 0.120 314 632 1.022 
P02 0, 110 2.147 0.060 0.122 314 643 0.84 
0. 120 1.790 0.067 0.189 147 417 0.314 
P04 0 .200 0.159 0.200 0.244 85 104 1.400 
Model T3B2 
0. 110 3.458 0.120 314 632 1.022 
0, .110 3.640 0.122 314 643 0.840 
0, .120 2.840 0.067 0.189 147 417 0.314 
P04 0. 200 0.930 0.200 0.244 85 104 1.379 
Model T3B3 
POl 0, .110 4.951 0.060 0.120 314 632 1.022 
P02 0, .110 5.133 0.122 314 643 0.840 
0, .120 3.894 0.067 0.189 147 417 0.314 
P04 0, .200 1.700 0.200 0.244 85 104 1.379 
The wide range In shadow prices or equivalent yields within 
which the optimal farm plans In Table 6.2 are valid Is more likely 
explained by the severity of labor bottlenecks during peak labor 
periods than any other factors. Maximum family labor supplies are 
quickly reached during land clearing, weeding, bird scaring and 
harvesting, and become fully constraining to extension of the 
cultivated area and Increased agricultural output irrespective 
of the level of price. The physical disincentives to increasing 
the cultivated dominate the economic Incentives. 
Labor activities 
A summary of labor that is used and that which goes unused 
during the year is given in Table 6.3 for hoe and oxen technology. 
Results for herbicide technology are similar to the ones presented 
in Table 6.3, and are therefore omitted. 
As shown in Table 6.3, the maximum amount of family labor that 
is available during the period Is fully used up in fortnights 1, 
3,5,9 and 19 in all the models. During fortnights 1 to 3, 
eastern migration from the Toich (see Figure 4.3), land preparation, 
sowing and first weeding are the major activities that exhaust 
family labor. Towards the end of fortnight 4 and during the whole 
of fortnight 5, second weeding is a major labor bottleneck. Bird 
scaring and harvesting of Ruath and Angul sorghum fully exhaust 
family labor during fortnights 9 and 19, respectively. Thus, the 
major labor bottlenecks to expanding the cultivated area occur 
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Table 6.3a. Summary of labor utilization and labor slack, 
models T^Bj 
Fort­ Labor supply Bj^ Labor supply B. Labor supply B 3 
night Used Slack Used Slack Used Slack 
01 
02 
224 
117 107 
336 
180 156 
448 
246 202 
Land prep-
and sowing 
03 
04 
224 
70 154 
336 
84 252 
448 
102 346 
Weeding 1 
05 224 336 448 — Weeding 2 
06 70 154 86 250 106 342 
07 73 151 71 265 70 378 
08 73 151 89 247 110 338 
09 224 336 448 Bird scar-
10 
11 
141 
82 
83 
142 
188 
82 
148 
254 
233 
82 
215 
366 
harvesting 
12 58 166 58 278 58 390 
13 58 166 58 278 58 390 
14 63 161 63 273 63 385 
15 132 92 180 156 227 221 
16 207 17 308 28 408 40 
17 63 161 63 273 63 385 
18 63 161 63 273 63 385 
19 224 336 448 Bird scar-
20 
21-26 
132 
441 
92 
903 
180 
441 
156 
1,575 
227 221 
2,247 
harvesting 
Percentage 
of total 51% 49% 44% 56% 41% 59% 
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Table 6.3b. Summary of labor utilization and labor slack, 
models 
Fort­ Labor supply Bj^ Labor supply Labor supply B, 
night Used Used Used Slack 
01 224 336 448 
02 142 82 232 104 332 126 
03 224 336 448 
04 75 149 98 238 121 327 
05 224 336 448 
06 82 142 140 196 198 250 
07 205 19 284 52 362 86 
08 142 82 238 98 335 113 
09 224 336 448 
10 141 83 188 148 236 212 
11 82 142 82 254 82 366 
12 58 166 58 278 58 390 
13 58 166 58 278 58 390 
14 63 161 63 273 63 385 
15 110 114 143 193 176 272 
16 142 82 198 138 253 195 
17 63 161 63 273 63 385 
18 63 161 63 273 63 385 
19 224 336 448 
20 132 92 179 157 227 221 
21-26 «X 903 441 1,575 441 2,247 
Percentage 
of total 54% 46% 48% 52% 46% 54% 
during 5 fortnights only, or 2 to 3 months of a calendar year. In 
much of the remaining 9 to 10 months, considerable amounts of labor 
go unutilized. 
Unless the family can hire labor or use labor-saving 
technologies, the optimal cultivated area can not be increased 
beyond the results given in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b. Hiring of labc<r 
is normally not practiced in the JPA. No family can afford to 
hire out labor during peak labor periods. However, mutual work 
parties for tasks such as land clearing and weeding are arranged 
whenever possible. Food and beer are served at such work parties. 
The mutual form of labor hiring is offsetting, since a family 
member is obligated, sooner or later, to reciprocate at a neighbor's 
work party. 
In terms of magnitudes of unused labor, 49 percent of family 
labor goes unutilized during the year under hoe technology and 
labor. If labor supply is increased to B^, the amount of slack 
labor increases to 56 percent; while under B^, almost 60 percent of 
the labor is redundant. Under oxen technology, the results are 
similar; 46 percent of family labor goes unused at B^^ labor supply. 
Increasing to 52 and 54 percent for B^ and B^ labor supplies, 
respectively. These results also indicate that there is a tendency 
for labor bottlenecks to get aggravated as labor supply and the 
cultivated area increase, since proportionately more labor goes 
into slack. 
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Shadow prices for labor acClvlCles that are fully used up in 
the optimal plans are given in Table 6.4. Shadow prices express 
the extent to which the value of the optimal plan would be reduced 
if the quantity of labor used in the optimal plan is reduced by one 
labor-hour. The shadow prices of labor activities that are not fully 
Table 6.4 Summary of shadow prices, in Sudanese pounds (LS) per 
labor-hour 
l3_ 
R03 0.109 0.254 0.363 0.370 0.370 0.500 0.321 0.321 0.321 
R05 0.125 0.125 0.252 0.225 0.225 0.382 0.436 0.436 0.436 
R07 0.270 0.141 0.141 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.551 0.551 0.551 
Rll 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.331 0.331 0.362 0.392 0.392 0.392 
R21 0.513 0.513 0.513 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.853 0.852 0.852 
Average 
price 0.258 0.258 0.308 0.347 0.347 0.448 0.510 0.510 0.510 
See page 112 for labor activity codes 
used up in the optimal are zero, and have not been included in 
the table. 
The labor that goes unused during the year in JPA type economies 
has traditionally been referred to as "surplus labor" in the literature 
on economic development (67; 54; 34). It has been further argued 
that if such surplus labor were withdrawn from agriculture, there 
would be no change in agricultural output (67). There may be no 
change In agricultural output in a labor surplus economy only if 
such labor Is withdrawn during labor slack periods and promptly 
reinstated during labor peak periods, assuming that there Is no 
change in the technology of agriculture. The shadow prices in 
Table 6.4 indicate that the value of the optimal plans would be 
reduced if any amount of labor were removed from agricultural pro­
duction during the 3 fortnights Indicated. 
The phenomenon of labor scarcity within labor abundance that 
characterizes the JPA is likely explained by the seasonal distri­
bution of work, the low level of technology, and the difficult 
physical conditions, all of which combine to make labor requirements 
per unit of activity very high, and result in labor bottlenecks 
during certain periods of the year. Of course, during other times, 
there are considerable amounts of slack labor that can be pro­
ductively employed elsewhere. 
Implications of the Linear Programming Results 
for the Improvement Approach 
The linear programming results support Evans-Pritchard's 
contention that the economies of the JPA have reached a low 
stationary equilibrium. Under present technologies, agrarian 
structures and institutions In the JPA the "composite farm" of the 
linear programming models can bring about 3.7 feddans (1.4 hectares) 
under cultivation at the optimum, assuming the household works days 
of 6 labor-hours. Clearly, the existing technologies and agrarian 
structures are inadequate means for realizing the resource potential 
in the JPA and achieving the goals identified in the delimiting 
phase of this study. 
The results are also important for the "improvement approach" 
as an appropriate rural development strategy for the JPA. The 
"iiq>rovement approach" advocates improvement in crop production 
within existing traditional subsistence production units and 
institutions through extension methods involving use of new 
inputs, such as fertilizers and herbicides, and introduction of new 
and "appropriate technology." The appropriate technologies 
recommended include oxen technology. As noted earlier, under mavlmnn 
conditions of technology (T^) and labor supply (B^), the composite 
farm could bring 8 feddans under cultivation. Under maximum 
conditions for the "improvement approach," the traditional JPA 
farmer would need to work 8 hour-days and In addition, adopt oxen 
technology. In light of this finding, policymakers will need to 
determine: (1) whether a household farm size of 8 feddans is an 
adequate target in terms of the objectives developed In the 
delimiting phase of this study; (2) whether traditional farmers in 
the JPA can be Induced to work 8-hour days; and (3) whether oxen-
farming can be successfully adopted by traditional farmers In the 
Although none of the above Issues can be definitively resolved 
by this study, the results appear to Indicate that the "Improvement 
approach" may not be the most appropriate strategy for the JPA. 
Using comparative Sudanese experience. It can be pointed out that, 
with respect to the first Issue, the average farm size Is about 
21 feddans In agricultural schemes such as the Gezlra and Rahad In 
Northern Sudan. With respect to the third Issue, experience warns 
that It will be extremely difficult for oxen farming to take root 
in the JPA. Oxen-farming was Introduced in the area about 30 years 
ago, and no farmer has adopted the technology to the present. As 
alluded to in the last section, social factors are largely responsible 
for lack of adoption. Moreover, oxen-farming is quite labor-
intensive, while labor is a scarce resource in the JPA. ILACO 
summarizes the social situation regarding the use of cattle as 
draught animals in the JPA as follows: 
Cattle have a high economic, social, religious and 
emotional value. As a result, some Dinka do not expect 
their cattle to do any work. Even carrying the pegs to 
which they are tethered, is not done by the cattle but 
by the children. This has, so far, prevented the exten­
sion of draught ploughing, a program that was started in 
Bor in the early fifties and since then has been re­
activated in the mid-seventies (57:8). 
The experience of extension workers is underlined by findings 
of this study. All respondents indicated during field work Interviews 
that they would not allow their cattle to plough the fields. A 
recurrent reason given for refusal to use cattle for draught purposes 
is that God did not give the Dinka cattle for that purpose. In a 
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recent 1980 report, ILACO indicates that the public are either 
apathetic or outrightly hostile to ILACO's oxen training program. 
ILACO complained that . .the social problems appear to be still 
a major constraint as the ox-trainer and his assistants are 
frequently abused on the road" (60:19). 
Summary of Failure and Success Elements 
The failure and success elements developed in this chapter are 
summarized in Table 6.5, which is presented as a suggested working 
sheet format for identifying appropriate rural development strategies 
for the JPA. The table can, of course, be expanded by an inter­
disciplinary research team charged with design of an appropriate 
rural development strategy for the JPA. Such a development strategy, 
as underlined in this and previous chapters, should neither be based 
on physical and technological failure and success elements alone; nor 
on social and institutional considerations alone; nor on economic 
criteria alone. The essence of an appropriate rural development 
strategy, implementation of which would result in achieving the 
goals developed in the delimiting phase of this study, hinges on the 
fusing of elements of Table 6.5 into a coherent and operationally 
feasible master plan. 
The failure and success elements In Table 6.5 are used in the 
remedial phase of the next chapter for further evaluation of the 
"improvement" and "transformation" approaches as appropriate rural 
Table 6.5. Summary of failure and success elements In the physical and technological, social 
and institutional, and economic environments of the JPA 
techno-
tutional 
Failure elements 
to be eliminated 
or modified 
1. Flooding and 
water-logging 
2. Erratic and 
irregular rain­
fall, and rainy 
season droughts 
3. Inadequate 
technology and 
primitive agri­
cultural tools 
4. Long distances 
from internation­
al and national 
5. Pests and 
plant diseases 
1. Scattered 
households 
2. Scattered 
family farms 
Success elements 
to be maintained 
and expanded 
1. Abundance of 
fertile lands 
2. The Jonglel 
Canal in its 
drainage use 
3. The Jonglel 
Canal in its 
irrigation use 
4. The Jonglel 
Canal In its 
transport use 
1. Traditional 
self-reliance 
as a possible 
basis for modem 
self-reliance 
Potential Failure 
elements to be 
avoided 
1. Exhaustion of 
soil fertility 
1. Emergence of 
absentee land­
lordism 
New Success 
elements to be 
Incorporated 
and developed 
1. Drainage of 
excess water and 
its use for irri­
gation during dry 
spells and during 
the dry season 
2. Introduction 
of new forms of 
farm power 
3. Provision of 
drinking water 
and fodder during 
the long dry 
4. Research and 
development 
Institute 
1. New forms in 
or modifications 
in tenure 
3. Communal tenure 
and legal status 
4. Transhumance 
5. Lack of adequate 
social overhead 
services (SOS) 
6. High social 
status of cattle 
7. High risk 
aversion among the 
population 
2. Traditional 
organizational 
forms as bases 
of modem 
cooperative 
structures 
3. Communal 
ownership of 
land, and com­
munal production, 
distribution and 
consunqptlon as 
bases for develop­
ment of modem pro­
ducer and marketing 
cooperatives 
2. Emergence of 
rack-renting of 
3. Emergence of 
individualization 
of tenure and 
eventual concen­
tration of land 
4. Break of tra­
ditional societies 
their dispossession 
of land and eventual 
pauperization into 
agricultural wage 
2. New spatial 
organization of 
households into 
more compact 
villages 
3. Development 
of new appro­
priate institu-
1. Subsistence pro­
duction and conspic­
uous consumption 
2. Low output price 
incentives 
3. Lack of access to 
modem inputs 
4. High input price 
disincentives 
5. A restricted market 
6. High transport 
1. Abundance of 
cattle wealth that 
could be used as 
investlble capital 
2. Considerable 
amounts of off­
season labor that 
could be mobilized 
for productive 
activities 
1. Possible future 
shortage of labor 
resulting from 
policies favoring 
urban areas 
2. Inadequate 
capacity to generate 
investlble capital 
3. Erratic behavior 
of commodity prices 
in international 
1. Lowering of 
transport costs 
from opening up 
of the JPA by the 
2. Presence of 
potential markets 
for JPA farm 
produce in the 
Middle East 
development strategies for the JPA. Comparative Sudanese rural 
development strategies are also evaluated In the next chapter 
In terms of how these failure elements have been addressed by 
these strategies. 
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CHAPTER VII. THE REMEDIAL PHASE RELATED TO IDENTIFICATKMI AND 
SELECTICW OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE JPA 
Chapter VII presents the remedial phase of this study for 
identifying and selecting rural development strategies for socio­
economic development of the JPA. Like the previous two phases, the 
remedial phase should be Interdisciplinary. However, since the 
primary purpose of this study is to develop an analytical framework 
for debating and resolving the relevant issues on development 
strategy, the remdial phase consists of a general procedural out­
line, with specific illustrations based on discussion of failure 
and success elements of the diagnostic phase and comparative 
Sudanese experience with rural development strategies in North-
central and North-eastern Sudan. 
The Improvement and Transformation Approaches to Rural 
Development in Relation to the Failure and Success 
Elements Developed in the Diagnostic Phase 
In order to relate the failure and success elements of Table 
6.5 to the improvement and transformation approaches to rural 
development in the JPA, it is necessary to recapitulate on these 
approaches. The Improvement approach holds that modernization of 
the present traditional subsistence agriculture in the JPA could be 
achieved within existing traditional subsistence production units 
and institutions. The Improvement approach thus avoids fundamental 
and drastic changes in traditional society, while at the same time 
it seeks to modernize traditional subsistence production into a 
commercial one. The transformation approach, on the other hand, 
embraces from the onset commercial agriculture production with a 
large export potential. The transformation approach thus calls 
for Immediate transformation of subsistence agriculture through 
mechanized or semi-mechanized agricultural schemes comparable in 
scope to those in North-central and North-eastern Sudan. 
Regarding how the two approaches address failure and success 
elements in Table 6.5, the approaches are probably not in conflict 
with respect to incorporation of the economic failure and success 
elements into operational plans. Both approaches call for 
provision of input and output price incentives to farmers; both 
require that farmers have access to modem Inputs; both seek 
lowering transport costs and extending the market; both seek ways 
to utilize the considerable amounts of cattle wealth and off-season 
agricultural labor in the JPA; and both aim at commercial production 
in place of the existing subsistence agriculture. However, the two 
approaches differ greatly with respect to means for overcoming the 
physical and technological, as well as the institutional and social, 
disincentives identified in Table 6.5. 
With respect to physical and technological disincentives, a 
basic technological package under the transformation approach 
would embrace drainage, irrigation and mechanization. Most of the 
physical and technological disincentives in Table 6.5 would be 
remedied by mechanized or semi-mechanized agricultural schemes in 
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the JPA. On the other hand, the improvement approach would seek 
to assist inhabitants of the JPA in flood control measures and 
provision of improved agricultural implements. There would be no 
consideration of Irrigated agriculture either during the dry 
season or on a supplemental basis during the wet season. Generally, 
the improvement approach does not offer specific technologies to 
overcome the considerable physical and technological failure 
elements in the JPA. Proponents of the improvement approach appear 
to place hopes in applied research to provide "technologies 
appropriate to the physical and social environment of the Jonglei 
Canal Area." It is argued that these technologies can not be 
specified at present, since they depend on results of future research. 
As argued earlier in the interpretation of results of the 
linear programming models, the principal failure elements limiting 
agricultural production in the JPA are physical and technological 
disincentives, which have made the existing agrarian structure 
inadequate and not viable for future development of the area. 
Improvement and "appropriate" technologies, such as oxen-farming, 
were found earlier to be of limited potential for Increasing the 
cultivated area. Until after "appropriate" technologies are specified 
and tested, programs based on the Improvement approach can not be 
counted upon to result in achievement of the goals developed in the 
delimiting phase of this study. In the meantime, construction 
and operation of the Jonglei Canal will result In major and 
sudden changes In the physical environment upon which the 
traditional economies of the area have depended for long. 
Finally, with respect to the social and Institutional failure 
elements of Table 6.5, the improvement approach has very little to 
offer since it is based on preservation and gradual modernization 
of traditional society. A development program based on the 
improvement approach would have no immediate plans for dealing 
with scattered households, scattered family farms and changes in 
communal tenure. Development programs based on the improvement 
approach would probably emphasize modernization of transhumance, 
provision of SOS infrastructure and new agricultural tools and 
other inputs. On the other hand, under the transformation approach 
the scattered households and scattered family farms would have to be 
regrouped and transhumance would be abolished or drastically modified 
in order to remove the social and institutional disincentives. 
Under the transformation approach, provision of SOS infra­
structure and new inputs complement heavy investments in the physical 
and social environments of the JPÂ. Under the improvement approach, 
emphasis is on provision of SOS and new agricultural inputs, pre­
sumably as means to effect Income transfers to rural areas, but 
there is little commitment to making heavy investments in the 
physical and social environment to justify the Income transfers 
and to make them productive. 
In subsequent sections, IRD programs currently under 
Implementation in the JFA and two planned large scale drainage and 
irrigation projects are discussed to Illustrate and amplify the 
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arguments made In this section regarding relation between failure 
and success elements In Table 6.5 and the Improvement and trans­
formation approaches. In addition, two comparative Sudanese 
experiences with the transformation approach are considered In order 
to highlight how the approach has addressed failure and success 
elements In areas similar to the JPA. 
The Strategy of Integrated Rural Development 
In Relation to the Remedial Phase 
The strategy of Integrated rural development, hereafter called 
IRD, has been under experimental Implementation In the JPA from 
1979. Since IRD is the only strategy under implementation in the 
area and since it represents the "improvement approach," it is 
worthwhile to relate it to the remedial phase of this study. The 
presentation that follows seeks to (1) provide background 
perspective on IRD; (2) provide a sample of definitions of IRD in 
order to Illustrate the vagueness of the strategy and the resulting 
difficulties encountered in its implementation; (3) relate formu­
lation and application of IRD in the JPA to some of the failure 
elements in Table 6.5; and (4) hypothesize on prospects of IRD In 
Background to the concept of IRD 
Integrated rural development is a recent addition to a long 
list of development strategies and ad hoc prescriptions that has 
characterized the literature. It is improbable tliau a social 
phenomenon can be relevantly appraised without prior appreciation 
and understanding of its historical setting and development. In 
order to assess the relevance of IRD to the JPA, it is necessary 
to discuss its background within the context of economic development 
theory and practice. 
Economic development Itself, as a formal branch of economics, 
is a post World War II development that was necessitated by needs 
and demands of former colonies to change the inherited and 
deteriorating conditions of their economies. But what kind of 
change? The process of economic development was assumed to be 
essentially one of 'modernizing' primitive societies into 
industrialized capitalist societies. Wilbert Moore summed up this 
concept of modernization when he observed that it denoted 
. . a total transformation of a traditional or pre-modem 
society into the type of technology and associated social 
organization that characterizes the advanced, economically 
prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of 
the Western World (72:89). 
Based on this assumption of modernization, an underdeveloped 
country (UDC) was conceptualized in terms of dualism, since 
traditional society could not be transformed at once. Duallstic 
and sectoral approaches to development dominated the two decades 
following nominal political independence of most UDCs. One sector 
still remained primitive, backward, subsistence-bound, traditional, 
rural, or informal; while the emerging sector was becoming modem. 
progressive, market-oriented, capitalist. Industrial, urban, or 
formal.^ According to this paradigm the world economy and Its 
development were viewed as schematically represented In 
Figure 7.1. 
UDC (Duallstlc Economy) MDC (Integrated Economy) 
"• Integrated 
Traditional Sector 
Figure 7.1. A schematic paradigmatic illustration of 
the world economy 
For extended discussion of duallstlc models see: W. A. Lewis 
(67); J. C. Fel and D. Ranis (34); D. W. Jorgenson (54); H. Mylnt 
(75); and more recently, Marwan Ghandour and Jurgen Muller (40). 
Economic development of a typical UDC, In the above schema, 
was defined as the process of growth of the modem sector and the 
decline and eventual elimination of the traditional sector. The 
process of development would naturally follow technological moderni­
zation based on post-Newtonian scientific principles (Rostow (87)). 
Once a Rostowian 'take-off, or Lewis's industrial capitalist class 
became dominant, compound Interest (Rostow (87)) took over, and the 
Great Ascent (Hellbroner (48)) was possible; total transformation of 
society would eventually lead to prosperity for all through a 
'trickle down' mechanism, as has been the case in the West. 
When on the one hand, the 'take-off did not happen in many 
UDCs, and the Great Ascent was fast becoming the Great Descent leading 
to a widening gap (Zimmerman (110)) between UDCs and MDCs; and on the 
other hand, the income gap between the modem sector and the 
traditional sector in many UDCs was also widening, social science 
was thrown in disarray. A long list of 'explanations' and 
'solutions' to the maladies mushroomed. 
On the side of explanations, one group of social scientists 
maintained that various noneconomic factors (traditional values, 
social and ritual obligations, etc.) enter into the entrepreneur's 
decision-making process and that these must be taken into account 
when dealing with nonlndustrlal situations in UDCs (Foster (35), 
Georgescu-Roegen (38), Yamey (108), etc.). Anthropologists and 
sociologists, therefore, set out to ascertain the soclo-cultural 
constraints to the acceptance of Western technology, management, and 
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organizational methods. 
Another group of theorists contended that peasants (the 
majority of UDC entrepreneurs) were rational people, who were no more 
tradition-bound than an Iowa farmer (Schultz (91), Mellor (69), 
Johnson (52), etc.). In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, Schultz 
described peasants as efficient and profit oriented, but he pointed 
out that traditional agriculture had reached an equilibrium state 
where further capital formation was relatively unprofitable. 
According to Schultz, the primary factor needed to change the low 
equilibrium trap in UDCs was investment by outside nonagricultural 
sources to provide new inputs that would be profitable for farmers to 
adopt. New agricultural Inputs were indeed produced (the Green 
Revolution),^ and farmers were provided with credit in order to 
obtain them. The Green Revolution, however, exacerbated the already 
widening gap between the modem and traditional sectors in UDCs. 
A third group of scientists argued that the problem in UDCs 
was neither that of noneconomlc factors entering UDC entrepreneur's 
^he Green Revolution refers to genetic developments in new 
strains of seeds that increased yields 2 to 3 times in rice, corn 
and wheat about 20 years ago. In most UDCs, the Green Revolution 
increased production substantially for large farmers with access 
to the complementary inputs of management, fertilizers, pesticides, 
herbicides, machines and water. However, small farmers without 
access to these resources were made worse off, as their output 
remained the same while output prices fell due to Increased pro­
duction by large farmers. In subsequent years, the World Bank 
designed aid programs to assist small farmers and the rural poor. 
Problems of the Green Revolution are discussed by Nicholas Wade, 
"Green Revolution (II): Problems of Adapting a Western Technology," 
in Science 186 (December, 1974);1186-1192. 
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decision-making process nor that of a low Income equilibrium trap. 
The third school warned that the structure of the world economy led 
to a dependency trap (Baran (8c), Frank and Cackroft (36), Rodney 
(86), etc.) in which MDCs exploit UDCs, and modern sectors in UDCs 
exploit traditional sectors, and that these exploitative relations 
would get worse over time. 
Many other explanations of development and underdevelopment 
are variations of the preceding three basic themes regarding causes 
of the poverty situations in UDCs. Explaining underdevelopment, 
however, although necessary, is not sufficient. The next relevant 
question was how to rid UDCs of underdevelopment. 
On the side of "solutions" there mushroomed as many strategies 
and packages of advice as there were advising "experts." A sample 
of development strategies compiled by Muhbub U1 Haq includes the 
following: (1) provide capital formation by mobilizing labor; 
(2) import-substitution Industries are the key to development; (3) 
place your faith in agricultural extension; (4) import-substitution 
is no good; export expansion is the answer; (5) agricultural 
extension is useless; only the incentive system will work; (6) put 
all your emphasis on education, particularly technical training; 
(7) industrialization is an illusion; rapid agricultural growth 
is the answer; (8) UDCs are going to be submerged by population 
explosion; give top priority to family planning; (9) break all 
dependency links with Western Industrial and financial capitalism. 
and Institute Independent self-reliant development; and (10) 
Integrated rural development is the only policy that can reach the 
poorest of the poor (97:15) 
The above prescriptions and many others appear to be based on 
statistically observed characteristics of UDCs that are Judged to 
cause poverty and underdevelopment. Professor Harvey Leibenmteln 
gives a comprehensive list of some 35 characteristics of a typical 
UDC under four headings: (1) economic, (2) basic characteristics in 
agriculture, (3) cultural and political, and (4) technological and 
miscellaneous (66:2). The choice of characteristics or group of 
characteristics upon which to base a development strategy probably 
depends on the technical training and disposition of the advising 
If IRO is viewed from the foregoing perspective, it can be 
argued that IRD was developed as a means to bridge the widening gap 
between traditional and modem sectors in UDCs; while the proposed 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) is a similar response to 
the widening gap between UDCs and MDCs. If this argument is valid, 
it can further be suggested that IRD may not be a development 
strategy, but rather a strategy for what Axlnn has called "misery 
management" (8a:75). Definitions of and experience with IRD appear 
to indicate that IRD can end up as a means for "misery management," 
unless it is implemented on a financially massive scale. 
^Items (9) and (10) were added to U1 Haq's list by the author. 
Some current definitions of IRD 
Most formulations of IRD strategy embody three basic features: 
(1) dissatisfaction with past theory and practice of economic 
development in UDCs; (2) targeting of a specific group, the rural 
poor, for development; and (3) comprehensiveness In approach, so that. 
It is said, multiple causes of poverty are attacked simultaneously. 
A sample of definitions, from international organizations and two 
from academics, illustrates these basic features of IRS strategy. 
1. One formulation of IRD is provided In a recent report of 
a FAO/SIDA/DSE Interregional Symposium on IRD. The symposium 
observed that: 
IRD is a radical concept. It is, in fact, an Ideology 
which carries implied criticism of existing institutions 
and socio-economic policies In the poor countries. It is 
multldlsclpllnary in approach and multisectoral in operation. 
Hence, it is hard to coiq>rehend and implement (33:9). 
Nevertheless, the report goes on to specifically define IRD as a 
policy to . .narrow the gap between urban-rural life and reduce 
disparity between various income groups." 
2. The World Food Conference (UFC), on the other hand, does 
not provide a formal definition of IRD. Instead, they leave the 
definition to individual countries, arguing that the concept of 
IRD is ". . .sufficiently flexible for countries to design 
operational strategies appropriate to their own circumstances." 
The Conference makes an analogy with water to underline the 
reported flexibility of IRD: "Like water, it has no shape or 
color and, therefore, fits into any socio-political frame, with 
or without adjustment" (33:10). The Conference therefore merely calls 
upon, invites, and urges governments to implement all the compre­
hensive programs that IRD entails. 
3. The definition of the World Bank is the one most frequently 
quoted and accepted by students and practitioners of IRD. The Bank's 
sector paper on rural development defines it as follows: 
Rural development is a growth strategy for a 
particular target population—the rural poor. It Involves 
extending the benefits of development to those whose 
future lies in the pursuit of a livelihood in rural areas. 
These include small-scale farmers, tenants and the landless 
(107:3). 
The World Bank definition, like other formulations of IRD, Is 
heavily distribution-oriented, though the bank is quick to point 
out that the strategy Is not viable unless employment and pro­
ductivity are raised as a result of the resource transfers to 
rural areas. 
4. L. Moore, in a report of advice on IRD to the Government of 
Pakistan, says that IRD is made up of many elements which link 
together In an interrelated manner. In programs that constitute 
IRD strategy: 
The sum of these elements . . . constitutes a synthesis 
of the concept as a whole. Although the idea of IRD may be 
approached from different sides. It is unitary in nature. 
The comprehensive approach to IRD grows out of the need to 
attack multiple causes of poverty and dualism found in 
rural areas. These causes Include high birth rates, under 
and unenq)loyment . . . (71c:55). 
5. Finally, Mosher, like Moore, provides a very comprehensive 
definition of rural development. According to Mosher, rural 
development is a trend in the technologies, organizations, activities, 
and values of society that: 
(1) increases the opportunities of all of its rural 
people for vigorous health, broadening mental 
horizons, increasing knowledge and skills, and 
expanding opportunities to participate both 
constructively and pleasurably in the activities 
of their cultures; 
(2) progressively provides more effective means for 
adjusting as peacefully as possible the conflicts 
and injustices that invariably arise as technology 
and other cultural changes take place; 
(3) maintains or progressively approaches an optimum 
balance between each rural person's opportunities 
for freely-chosen self expression and the corporate 
needs of the culture in which he lives ; and 
(4) increasingly brings all present and potential farm 
land into its most effective use—all without 
Irreparable damage to the Earth's ecosystem 
(73:10-11) 
As illustrated In the above sanyle of definitJ-^ns, most 
formulations of IRD are so comprehensive and so liberal as to 
almost border on Utopia. Before embracing IRD strategy, it is 
worthwhile for policymakers in an UDC to ponder the realism of IRD 
strategy, whether the nation can afford it (especially after the 
international initiators withdraw),^ and whether resources earmarked 
for IRD could not be better utilized under alternative rural 
development strategies. The income transfer and comprehensive 
IRD in the JPA was initiated and is financed by UNDP and other 
international organizations. Future UNDP assistance will depend on 
reports of an Evaluation Mission (18:66). It will also depend on 
international politics, including willingness of nations to contribute 
to organizations like UNDP. 
features of IRD raise serious problems for inq»lementatlon of IRD 
in the JPA. 
With respect to income transfers to rural areas, IRD appears 
to have little to offer in countries like Southern Sudan where the 
urban sector, almost as impoverished as the rural sector, has 
nothing or little to transfer. It is to be noted again that 100 
percent of the population in the JPA and 95 percent in Southern 
Sudan live in rural areas. Rural development in Southern Sudan is 
therefore almost synonomous with regional or national development. 
If international organizations and the Central Sudanese Government 
provide some resource transfers to rural JPA, it is doubtful 
whether use of such resources in IRD projects is an appropriate 
strategy for rural (national) development in the JPA. Unless 
operational plans incorporate failure elements in Table 6.5, such 
as resettlement of the population and changes in tenure arrangements, 
IRD in the JPA could likely end up being "management of misery." 
The comprehensive feature of IRD strategy makes its formulation 
into operational plans problematic. According to Crindie, an 
appropriate IRD operational plan would entail: 
. . .that credit on terms acceptable to the peasant 
population be made available to purchase improved seeds, 
fertilizer, insecticides, and basic farm implements; that 
extension agents be able to address the wide range of 
problems that arise in peasant production; that consumer 
credit be made available so that the peasants are not 
exploited by local merchants or crop purchasers during 
nonharvest seasons; that irrigation works be constructed 
to service small holdings; that government supported 
prices be offered for the crops produced; that roads. 
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storage facilities, and transportation be available to 
rural dwellers to allow access to markets; that schools 
and health facilities be available to improve the quality 
of life in rural areas; that rural industries and public 
works provide employment during idle seasons ; and that 
peasants be organized to participate effectively in the 
new programs (43:54). 
It Is difficult to comprehend the type of a single organization, 
short of a government or a Gezira type organization,^ that can 
perform all these functions. The administrative complexity of 
such an organization, the expenses involved, and the informational 
needs of the tasks are bound to be tremendous.^ Grlndle, for 
example, reports the commitments Involved for an IRD program under­
taken in Mexico from 1975 to 1978 to benefit thirty small regions 
with a total population of 1.5 million (about the size of the JPA). 
The total program financial outlay of $295 million was provided by 
the national government of Mexico ($178 million) and a loan from 
the World Bank ($110 million); while program beneficiaries were 
expected to contribute the remaining $7 million. When this 
program Is completed in 1982, it is projected to cost $1.2 billion 
(43:57). In contrast, the financial outlay for UNDP's Kongor IRD 
program for the first 4 years is only $9.4 million.^ 
^The Gezira Scheme is discussed shortly in this chapter. 
^For a recent critique of IRD strategy see Merllee S. Grlndle, 
"Anticipating Failure: The Implementation of Rural Development 
Programs," Public Policy 29 (No. 1, 1981):51-74. 
^UNDP's Kongor IRD program is discussed shortly in this section. 
IRD Strategy as an Improvement Approach in the JPA 
IRD strategy was introduced In the JPA in 1976 when the 
Executive Organ of the Jonglel Development Projects formulated its 
"Jonglel Area Development Program" and published it under the title 
"A Request for Funding of Development Projects In the Jonglel Area" 
(23). The Request for Funding was directed to foreign governments 
and international organizations that might be interested in funding 
any of the 13 research and development projects It contains. These 
13 projects are Included as Appendix E. IRD was included as Items 
11, 12, and 13 in the Request for Funding. 
The request for funding Itself, which is the basic Interim^ 
development strategy for the JPA, was prepared by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and their consultants. Acknowledging 
UNDP input into the document, the Commissioner of the Executive 
Organ wrote: 
The Commissioner, Jonglel Development Projects, 
wishes to acknowledge the very considerable assistance 
that he has received from the UNDP In the preparation of 
this request. In particular, he wishes to thank 
Mr. Charles H. La Muniere, Resident Representative, who 
has been mainly responsible for the compilation of this 
request. The UNDP funded consultant, Mr. Roger M. Berthelot, 
a Senior Technical Advisor from UNDP Headquarters in New York 
and Dr. Thayer Scudder of the California Institute of 
In an interview with H. E. Sayed Abel Aller, Vice President 
of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan and Chairman of the National 
Council for Development Projects in the Jonglel Area, the author 
learned that a "Master Plan" for development of the JPA would be 
formulated after December 1981 when results of current studies 
(Appendix E) in the area become available. 
Technology, together with the UNESCO funded consultant. 
Dr. I. G. Dunn, also provided advice and information 
(23:111). 
In 1979, the UNDP and the Government of the Netherlands 
expressed Interest in Item 13, "Integrated Rural Development in a 
Dinka District," in the Request for Funding. Subsequently, in 
April, 1979 the UNDP published their version of IRD: "Integrated 
Rural Development in the Kongor District, Jonglei Province, 
Southern Region (SUD/78/016)" (18). In August, 1979 the International 
Land Development Consultants (ILACO), acting for the Dutch Government 
published their version of IRD: "Kongor Integrated Rural Development 
Project, Project Plan" (55). 
The ILACO version of IRD in the JPA 
The ILACO document on IRD in Kongor District was formulated by 
a mission consisting of eight ILACO Dutch experts that conducted 
its business in the area between January 15, and February 15, 1979. 
According to ILACO, the objective of the Kongor Integrated Rural 
Development Project is to . .stimulate the development of the 
rural population around Kongor." To reach this objective ILACO lists 
several tasks which the project would be required to engage in: 
1. Assist in the development of crop husbandry and animal 
husbandry in order to change the subsistence economy 
into a market economy. This will require the following 
activities; (i) investigate the possibilities of and 
develop systems for improving the present traditional 
agriculture and animal husbandry practices of the Dinka 
and advice on flood control measures; (11) conduct 
applied research on ralnfed crops Including land 
preparation, cultivation, and harvesting methods, and 
of the new methods, proper utilization of rain water. 
and adequate drainage and flood protection techniques; 
(111) study aspects of farm management and the actual 
cost/benefit of the traditional methods; and of the 
new methods to be used; (Iv) study marketing aspects of 
agricultural produce and the possibility of the creation 
of cooperatives; (v) development of systems for training 
staff, farmers and laborers in applying modem agri­
cultural methods and techniques, and in farm management. 
2. Study the creation of new Job opportunities and encourage 
the constitution of community self-help projects. For 
this It Is necessary to gain insight Into employment, 
resettlement and related social aspects and to investigate 
ways and means of Improving rural life. This will Include: 
(1) public health facilities; (11) primary school facilities; 
(111) general adult education facilities; (iv) Improvement 
of rural water supplies, and (v) Improvement of communi­
cations (55:5). 
With respect to Immediate operational plans of IRD, ILACO 
argues that the major thrust of Kongor Integrated Rural Development 
in the initial phase (three years), should be in the area of animal 
husbandry: 
The Dlnka are reputed cattlemen, and livestock 
forms their main resource at present. It Is likely that 
any real economic development In the future will be 
generated by livestock Improvement. However, Inter­
ference in pastoral systems has proven to be difficult 
and a number of constraints have to be removed before 
a sizeable development can be expected. Food supplies 
(mainly dura) should be guaranteed; there should be 
enough market outlets to sell cattle; veterinary support 
should be greatly Improved, better grazing during the 
flood periods should be provided; and drinking water 
in the Intermediate lands should be secured for the dry 
season. The program for the first three years involves 
the Improvement of the veterinary infrastructure, building 
of haflrs, carrying out research on new forage species, 
ox-ploughing methods, and water manipulation through the 
budding system (55:c). 
For agricultural development, ILACO argues that crop production 
can be accoiq>llshed by enlarging the cultivated area, improving 
production per unit area, and by improving storage of crop produce. 
To achieve these improvements, ILACO recommends that agricultural 
extension services be established in the Kongor area to run a 
demonstration farm for improved farming practives, and then . .prom­
inent farmers are to be selected to serve as model farmers . . . they 
will in turn form small groups to which they convey their newly 
learned knowledge" (55;c). 
ILACO estimated IRD project costs for Phase I at LS 3.37 million 
($6.74 million), of which almost 90 percent was to be contributed by 
the Government of the Netherlands and the remainder by Sudan. 
The UNDP version of IRD in the JPA 
The UNDP document on IRD in Kongor District describes the 
objectives of IRD strategy in almost the same terms used in the 
sample of definitions of IRD in this chapter. According to the 
document, the long term objective of IRD in the area is provision 
of ". . .some of the means and institutional framework within 
which the Dinka in the Kongor District of Jonglei Province can 
(a) mobilize resources to improve their livestock, agricultural 
and fishing economies and develop their educational, health and 
social services; in order to (b) foster a development process 
adapted to the ecological and sociological realities of the area; 
and thereby (c) facilitate the process of change and smooth 
transformation and modernization of their economies and social 
life" (18:20). 
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It is argued that the above formulation of IRD makes the 
project . .unitary in concept, but with nultisectoral development 
objectives." Furthermore, UNDP observes that it is unlikely that 
the above long-term objectives can be achieved, at a minimum, in less 
than ten years. The project is therefore phased. The immediate 
objectives during Phase I (4 years) cover animal husbandry, agri­
culture, fisheries, SOS infrastructure and introduction of new 
and appropriate technology. A detail of these objectives is given 
in Appendix F. 
UNDP estimated the costs of the IRD project in Kongor District 
during Phase I at about $9.4 million, contributed by UNDP ($4.9 
million), UNDCF ($2 million), Dutch Bilateral Aid ($1 million), and 
the remainder by Sudan. 
The UNDP version of a Kongor Integrated Rural Development 
Project was the one finally approved by Sudan Government. Imple­
mentation of its Phase I started in October, 1979, and is expected 
to end in September, 1983. The ILACO version will probably be 
modified and implemented in Bor District, immediately south of 
Kongor. ILACO is actually already Involved in Bor District, 
managing the Pengkou Pilot Project and conducting rural studies 
aimed at implementing IRD in Bor (Gok). 
Prospects for IRD strategy in the JPA 
It is probably too early to write quantitatively on IRD In the 
JPA since Implementation has just begun. Nevertheless, the "means-
ends continuum" model and the delimiting, diagnostic and remedial 
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phases of this study are applied here to shed some important Insights 
on prospects for IRD implementation in the JFA. 
In terms of the "means-ends continuum" model, it is not clear 
what type of agrarian structure the Executive Organ aims to 
establish in the JPÂ. In order to determine the type of agrarian 
structure in the JFA, it is necessary that goals (or ends) of socio­
economic development be clear and specific; but this is not the 
case in either UNDP's or ILACO's versions of IRD presented in this 
section. Generally, according to either version, IRD in Kongor 
District seeks to provide some of the means for the Dinka . .to 
improve their livestock, agricultural and fishing economies." 
Specificity and clarity of objectives (ends) is necessary in 
the "means-ends continuum" model because formulation of unique 
appropriate development strategies (and their respective agrarian 
structures, institutions and instruments), depends on the ends 
sought, the magnitude of the problematic gap and failure and 
success elements that account for that gap. If, however, the 
objective of IRD is merely to "improve . . then a good number 
of strategies, agrarian structures, institutions and instruments 
may be appropriate and sufficient. Including the present agrarian 
structure in the area. 
Indeed, there appears to be an implicit assumption in both 
UNDP's and ILACO's versions of IRD that the stipulated "lnq>rovements" 
could be made without fundamental changes in the traditional agrarian 
structure. Hence, it is deemed sufficient to ". . .stimulate the 
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development of the rural population around Kongor." In terms of 
the "means-ends continuum" model, a relevant question is; stimulate 
development of the rural population around Kongor using what 
"Instruments"? The traditional agrarian structure that Is in 
place in the JPA has evolved over the centuries in response to a 
rural strategy of subsistence; and, as shown by results of linear 
programming, it is unlikely that it can be stimulated appreciably 
using the modem instruments of agricultural extension that are 
suggested by IRD strategists. Having glossed over the question 
of goals for socio-economic development in the JPA under the 
rubric of "improvements," IRD strategy, as formulated in the JPA, 
does not address the greater Issues of changes in the traditional 
agrarian structure, such as in communal tenure, reshaping of 
settlements, etc. (see Table 6.5), except in passing or as Issues 
of remote concern.^ An appropriate rural development strategy 
must be based on elimination of failure elements and expansion and 
discovery of success elements such as the ones listed in Table 6.5. 
Another consideration regards the philosophical basis of IRD. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, IRD evolved as a strategy to 
bridge the gap between traditional (rural) sectors and modern 
^In earlier formulations of development strategy, the Executive 
Organ considered resettlement, and there was a Resettlement Unit 
established for that purpose. Two large-scale drainage and irri­
gation schemes were also considered for Kongor and Bor Districts 
(see Fig. 7.2 and Fig. 7.3). However, since the intellectual and 
practical invasion of the area by IRD strategy, these ideas and 
projects have been quietly forgotten and shelved. The irrigation 
canal that was to run parallel to the main canal appears to have been 
cancelled, as the author learned from the French company (C.C.I.) that 
is digging the main canal. 
sectors in UDCs; and this, ipso facto, implies income transfers 
to rural areas. The magnitude of the transfers involved In the case 
of the JPA (less than $10 million over 4 years) can at best cover 
administrative costs of Implementing agencies, plus maybe a 
school, well, health clinic, or a dyke built here or there, and 
inaugurated with the usual fanfare. The likely impact of IRD under 
these circumstances will likely be employment of some local urban 
elite and international experts and consultants, and some degree of 
"misery management" for the "target population." Approximately 40 
percent of UNDP's contribution to Kongor IRD project, for example, 
is earmarked to be paid out to foreign experts in the form of 
salaries, travel, incentive stipends and consultancy fees (18:68). 
The Executive Organ for Development Projects in the JPA has almost 
become an employment agency. It was learned during field interviews 
that the Executive Organ Headquarters at Lang-Baar in Bor employed 
139 officials and workers in September, 1980. Of these, 30 were 
drivers and assistant drivers, while another 30 were doing devious 
jobs as messengers, cooks, assistant cooks, housekeepers, Kaffirs 
and compound laborers. Most of the remaining 69 spend their time 
between Bor, Juba and Khartoum on "official duties" in expensive 
hotels and earning traveling allowance all paid for by the Executive 
Organ. In general, the work of the Executive Organ at Lang-Baar 
appeared to have little relation to rural areas. 
The preceding considerations make it likely that IRD in the 
JPA runs the risk of being too general in scope and too thinly 
spread to gather moss of any consequence. Despite exhortations 
that IRD must be self-reliant and self-sustaining, there do not 
seem fo be technologies to make this possible. There is even no 
revenue aspect incorporated into IRD plans in either the UNDP or 
ILACO versions, and IRD can hardly be expected to be self-reliant 
and self-sustaining if it generates no revenue to the implementing 
agency(les). 
IRD strategists in the JPA seem to cling to the hope that 
somehow "appropriate" technology will pop out of applied research 
soon or in due course. Ox-plowing, the prospective "appropriate" 
technology that could assist muscle power in the JPA has already 
been discussed in the linear programming section of the diagnostic 
phase of this study, and its future wide use in the JPA does not 
appear promising. Similarly, the use of herbicides and fertilizers 
is unlikely to be viable in the JPA without concomitant provision 
of complementary Inputs (management, machines, etc.) and elimination 
of major physical, institutional and economic disincentives (failure 
elements) such as in Table 6.1. One would tend to agree with 
Ruttan that: 
. . .the absence of any well-defined rural or 
comnunity development technologies around which professional 
capacity or resources can be organized or institutionalized 
casts considerable doubt on the viability of integrated 
rural development efforts (88:16). 
Finally, the fact that IRD in the JPA is formulated outside 
the broader framework of the national development goal of turning 
the country into a "Breadbasket of the Middle East" places the JPA 
in a rather peripheral position with respect to national priorities 
and allocations. The dominant form of modem agricultural develop­
ment in the Sudan is of the Gezlra-Rahad model. Government 
interest and finances will most likely be concentrated in these 
types of projects in the future because they generate revenue and 
foreign currency, which Sudan badly needs. It is quite unlikely 
that IRD projects can generate even 10 percent of outlays for 
schemes such as the Rahad whose total outlay Is estimated at $400 
million. 
Unless IRD becomes the dominant mode of agricultural develop­
ment in the Sudan, designated IRD regions are likely to end up as 
labor-reserve hinterlands for schemes such as the Gezira and Rahad. 
They will also probably continue to attract some attention from 
international organizations and academics interested in social 
experimentations "in the real world." Eric J. Miller, for example, 
writing about an IRD project in Mexico in which he was Involved, 
expresses the value of IRD projects for social experimentation as 
follows: 
With or without the benefit of my advice, the program 
was expanding rapidly. By the end of 1975, about 5,000 
communities all over the country had received or were in 
the process of receiving investments under the program, 
and with some there had been contact for two and a half 
years. We had here a large-scale natural experience in 
which it was possible to generate and begin to test 
hypotheses (70:73). 
The Pengko Plain Development Project and Jonglei 
Irrigation Project as Transformation 
Approaches in the JPA 
Background to the transformation approach in the JPA 
The economic and social life of the people of thu JPA, the 
Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anyuak and Murle has not changed significantly 
since the intrusion of colonialism in the country nearly a century 
ago. Only when there has been talk about construction of the 
Jonglei Canal has there been serious concern about social and 
economic development in the area. 
The first serious talk about socio-economic development of 
the JPA surfaced in the 1940s when the Egyptian Ministry of Works 
first submitted to the Government of Sudan proposals for digging 
the Jonglei Canal. The Colonial Governor General of the Sudan 
appointed the Jonglei Investigation Team (JIT) to study the 
effects of the proposed canal project on local interests and to 
reconmend remedial measures. 
The terms of reference of the Jonglei Investigation Team 
were later specified as follows (53;v): 
1. To estimate how much riverian pastures, and other 
assets of vital concern to the people of Sudan, would 
be lost as a result of the altered regime of the Nile, 
and to assess the extent of the remedial measures 
required; 
2. To find out what natural alternatives would be avail­
able and where these are lacking what remedial schemes 
could be applied; and 
3. To assess the cost in money and water of such remedial 
measures. 
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The JIT published their findings and recommendations in 1954 
In four volumes and a Summary Report (53). Although JIT's 
recomnendations were formulated in terms of what has been termed 
the "improvement approach" in this study, the team appreciated the 
necessity and eventuality of the "transformation approach" in the 
JPA when they concluded as follows: "We do not think that a 
complete change in economy and mode of life should be excluded 
from our recommendations If it is economically essential, provided 
the people are given technical and educational assistance" (53:575). 
None of these recommendations were implementsd since the canal was 
never dug. Nevertheless, the work performed by the JIT provided 
an important benchmark for subsequent research and development 
activities in the JPA, including the 100,000 feddan Jonglei 
Irrigation Project to be discussed shortly. 
A related work, although more general since it covered the 
whole of the Southern Region, is the Report of the Southern 
Development Investigation Team published in 1955 (92). This docu­
ment also stands out as another important pre-independence research 
and development activity which recommended the transformation 
approach in the JPA. 
When the Sudan attained independence from Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium rule on January 1, 1956, the Southern Sudan had already 
become engulfed in a protracted war of liberation (1955-1972) waged 
by the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Guerrilla 
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AnyaNya National Armed Forces (ANAF). Neglect of Southern Sudan 
by the colonial regime and what Southern Sudanese saw as imminent 
domination by Northern Sudanese in an independent Sudan led to a 
pre-independence mutiny by the Southern Corps at Torit in August 
1955. This mutiny was the beginning of the 17-year war. For 
background information on the causes, consequences and end of the 
war see (6; 13; 14; 31; 81; 82). 
During the war period there was neither talk nor much effort 
at socio-economic development in the JPA. The state of development 
in the JPA by the end of the war in 1972, and indeed at the 
present time, is summarized by the Executive Organ in the following 
At present (1979) there is very little in the 
Jonglei Canal area in terms of development Inputs. 
Except for the Pengko Plain Project, there is actually 
nothing in the area of agricultural development. The 
same is true of the livestock sector; being limited 
to the dry season visits of vaccination teams operating 
from Bor or Malakal. True, many schools, dispensaries 
and bore-holes, etc., have been added following the 
conclusion of the Addis Ababa Accord (ending the war), 
however, all these services suffer from one form of 
inadequacy or the other. In fact, they are all in 
bad shape (21:46). 
Serious talk and concern with socio-economic development in 
the JPA surfaced again when the Egyptians again proposed the canal 
project, especially after its construction was approved. As 
mentioned in Chapter I, the President of the Danocratic Republic 
of the Sudan issued orders establishing the NC-JPA and its Executive 
Organ. In order that the NC-JPA accomplishes its main objectives. 
Its powers were widened to Include the discharge of the following 
functions: 
1) Formulation of Integrated policies for the social and 
economic development In the Project Area, the supervision 
of their execution and the promotion of studies related 
to the effects of the Project on the livelihood and 
conditions created by the Project in the area; 
2) The implementation of the projects in accordance with the 
social and economic development policies of the Nation; 
3) Preparation and approval of the execution of programs 
and the related funds earmarked for the agricultural, 
industrial, settlement and social services projects; 
4) Making administrative rules and procedures and establishing 
the functions of the Executive Organ; 
5) The ascertainment of the relations of production pertaining 
to agricultural, industrial and other development schemes; 
6) Determining areas of and securing aids, grants and 
technical assistance donated to the Executive Organ 
(22:5). 
In pursuing the preceding objectives and functions, the 
Executive Organ has formulated the Research and Development Program 
in the Jonglei Area of Appendix E, which contains both improvement 
transformation approach projects. These research and development 
activities are considered to be pre-investment. According to the 
Executive Organ . .the eventual aim will be to use data obtained 
from these surveys and studies to formulate plans for a type of 
development that will ensure orderly change and gradual but total 
transformation and modernization of economic and social life of 
the Region" (23:9). 
The Jonglel Irrigation project 
A major transformation approach project Included In Appendix E 
Is a large Irrigation project (200,000-240,000 feddans) known as 
the Jonglel Irrigation Project (JIP) to become operational once 
the canal Is completed (56). The proposed site of the JIP Is near 
the Intake of the old canal version just north of Jonglel Village 
(see Figure 7.2). 
A pilot project, the Jonglel Pilot Scheme (JPS), Item 6 of 
Appendix E, Is planned In order to study major aspects relevant to 
the establishment of the JIP. Late In 1974, the Governments of 
the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands agreed to cooperate in conducting studies for the 
establishment of the pilot scheme. The International Land Develop­
ment Consultants (ILACO) of the Netherlands were invited to carry 
out these studies. An ILACO team of investigators conducted field 
work in the area and submitted a preliminary report to the Executive 
Organ in June 1976. 
Not much planning appears to be continuing with respect to the 
Jonglel Pilot Scheme. The canal has since been realigned (see 
Figure 3.3). The Executive Organ is uncertain as to whether to 
conduct new studies for establishment of both the JIP and its 
pilot scheme. Moreover, there are tendencies among policymakers 
and expatriate advisors to avoid transformation approach projects 
in the JPA; instead, more emphasis appears to be placed on 
integrated rural development projects designed to improve 
Figure 7.2. The proposed Jonglei Irrigation Project 
and Jonglei Pilot Scheme (56:19) 
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traditional agriculture by means of so-called "appropriate 
technologies." The future of JIP is therefore uncertain. Never­
theless, the planned JIP addresses most of the major failure 
elements in Table 6.5. The objectives of the JIP Scheme Study 
include: <1) construction of irrigation and drainage canals; (2) 
conduct of applied research into both rainfed and irrigated crops, 
and testing of land preparation, cultivation and harvesting methods; 
(3) development of systems for training staff, farmers and laborers 
in applying modem agricultural methods and techniques, and in farm 
management ; (4) gaining of insight into aspects of employment, 
resettlement and related social aspects; (5) provision of various 
social services (health, education, community development, etc.); 
and (6) investigation of possibilities for improving the present 
traditional agriculture and animal husbandry (56:lx). 
The Pengkon plain development project 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Southern 
Region, has also been active In the JPA since the end of the war 
in 1972. The Ministry has made continued attempts to improve 
traditional agriculture by means of the improvement approach 
through introduction of new farming techniques, tools, seeds, etc. 
However, the impact of these efforts has been marginal. A major 
thrust was made in introducing oxen plowing as an "appropriate 
technology" in the region. A new post for an Inspector General 
for Oxen Plowing was created in the Ministry in 1974/75. None of 
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these subsidized oxen plows (LS 15 or $30 per plow) has ever 
been purchased in the JPA. All of the 300 oxen plows sent to 
Malakal by the Ministry in 1977 have been in storage ever since, 
according to the Inspector of Agriculture for the Province. The 
reasons given for the poor adoption rate of oxen farming range 
from lack of interest on the part of the JPA farmer because of 
alleged traditional values about cattle to lack of qualified 
trainers, demonstration farms and extension staff.^ 
A major undertaking by the Regional Ministry of Agriculture 
in the field of large-scale farming in the JPA is the Pengo Plain 
Development Project (PPDP). The Pengko Plain, which takes its 
name from the former Village of Pengko, where the JIT conducted 
extensive field experiments in the 1950s, is part of the Eastern 
Plain. The Eastern Plain is the area bounded by the Bahr el Jebel, 
White Nile and Sobat Rivers in Upper Nile and Jonglei Provinces 
(see Figure 3.4). The Pengko Plain covers approximately 1,500,000 
feddans (600,000 hectares) in the Southern reaches of the Eastern 
Plain (Figure 7.3). 
The Pengko Plain Development Project was identified as early 
as 1954 by the Southern Development Investigation Team. In their 
assessment, the Team wrote the following about the PPW: 
^From results of interviews with connissioners and inspectors 
of agriculture In Jonglei and Upper Nile Provinces. 
Figure 7.3. The Pengko Plain Development Project Area and 
the Geimerza-Pengkon Main Canal (65) 
The most economical way in which Irrigation water can 
be used is to supplement rainfall rather than to irrigate 
in areas of low rainfall. It would follow . . . that the 
best place for the waters of the Nile to be used for irri­
gation would be in the Southern Provinces where, at Juja, 
for instance, 1,000 cubic meters of water would produce crops 
on 0.57 feddan, compared with 0.27 in the Gezira . . . (In 
the Southern Provinces) the physical potential exists for 
schemes of Gezira magnitude (2 million feddans), and since 
the waters of the Nile are limited, this potential should 
be borne in mind when devising plans for the use of the Nile 
waters. One potential large-scale scheme is on the Eastern 
Plain where a main canal leaving the Bahr el Jebel at 
Gemneiza could command millions of feddans north of 
Fengko (92:24). 
In late 1974, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture revived the 
PPDP in order to complement its improvement approach to rural 
development in the area. According to ILACO, which was asked for 
technical advice on study of the development potential of the 
Pengko Plain,". . .faster development for more Dinka is possible, if 
the Improvement of traditional agriculture and livestock production 
is complemented by a large modern project to be started in the 
Pengko Plain" (65:3). A team of three ILACO investigators conducted 
limited field work, and recommended that further studies were 
necessary. Subsequently, an agreement was reached between the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, 
and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands about 
cooperation in these more detailed studies. ILACO was invited to 
carry out the detailed studies, and another team of ILACO 
investigators worked in the field from February to May 1975. The 
Team published their results and recommendations in three volumes 
titled "Pre-feaslblllty Report" (65). The ILACO conclusions and 
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recommendations about development potential of the Pengko Plain 
was very favorable: 
Our studies reveal that the Pengko Plain contains 
good opportunities for agricultural development. We 
recommend to establish as soon as possible a pilot project 
near Bor, with a sub-station in the Pengko Plain. ... We 
hope that an early implementation of the Bor Pilot Project 
will contribute to the development of the Bor area, and 
large-scale development in the Pengko Plain in the near 
fugure (65:i). 
The ILACO Team made elaborate drainage and irrigation designs 
for the PPDP as a large-scale Irrigation project (see Figure 7.4). 
In drawing up their recommendations for large-scale production in 
the Pengko Plain, the ILACO Team based their studies on an 
organization model of highly mechanized, centrally managed, 
large-scale farm that would provide employment for up to 13,000 
permanent workers and up to 5,000 seasonal workers (65:42). 
The Pilot Project phase of the PPDP has already been 
implemented. The Pengko Pilot Project (PPP) was established three 
kilometers from Bor in 1975 as a miniature of the PPDP to 
investigate the many problems that are likely to be encountered 
by large-scale farming in the area. Since 1975, the PPP has 
conducted research into these problems including creeping flood 
characteristics, drainage, irrigation, depth and speed of soil 
tillage, choice of crop varieties and periods of planting, 
maintenance and build-up of soil fertility, weed control, pest 
control and methods of harvesting. 
A more detailed feasibility study of the PPDP was scheduled 
Figure 7.4. Drainage and Irrigation Design for the Pengko Plain Development 
Project (65) 
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to begin In 1979, but had not been started by DeceWier, 1980. 
During field work interviews for this study, ILACO reported that 
the final results and recommendations of five years of PPP investi­
gations were to be published in 1981/83. ILACO, however, appears 
to be drifting away from their commitment to large-scale farming in 
the Pengko Plain and towards improvement of traditional agriculture 
through the improvement approach and conventional extension 
services (62:123). However, government officials in Southern Sudan 
appear to be hopeful that construction of the Gemmelza-Pengko Main 
Canal, initially scheduled to begin In 1981, will be started in the 
future. In an Interview with the President of the Autonomous 
Southern Region, the author learned that plans for the PPDP for 
at least 100,000 feddans were still active under the transformation 
approach. 
The preceding background information and discussion of develop­
ment efforts in terms of the Improvement and transformation 
approaches in the JPA point to the need for a coherent and determined 
rural development strategy for the area. Policymakers and advisors 
realize the need for large scale agricultural projects in the area. 
The Regional Ministry of Agriculture calls for "more advanced systems 
of agriculture" in its policy declarations (25:1), and according to 
ILACO "improvement of traditional agriculture and livestock pro­
duction mist be complemented by a large modem project (65:3). 
However, when difficulties of large scale farming are encountered 
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there Is considerable vacillation regarding the wisdom of the 
transformation approach for the area. In a candid retreat from its 
commitment to the PPDP and large scale farming in the JPA, ILACO 
recently reported that "the feasibility study for large scale pro­
duction will be carried on but the recommendations of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan are more directed towards a rural development 
project" (62:123). 
Transformation approach projects such as the PPDP and JIP 
are costly and difficult to Implement since they call for large 
overhead outlays and for fundamental changes in traditional society. 
However, to overcome the physical, institutional and economic 
disincentives in the JPA, as discussed in this study and summarized 
in Table 6.5, the transformation approach may be necessary in the 
future. The tendency for decision making to gravitate towards the 
improvement approach and IRD projects is understandable since any 
resource transfer activity to rural areas under this approach can 
be considered as an improvement. On the other hand, resource 
transfers to rural areas under the transformation approach must be 
justified on grounds of economic profitability and revenue 
generation to the government. 
The Gezira and Gedaref as Comparative Experience of 
Transformation Approach in North-Central 
and North-Eastern Growth Areas 
The utility of the "means-ends continuum" model for identifying 
rural development strategies appropriate to the JPA is illustrated in 
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this section by discussing selected rural development strategies 
that are of comparable experience and are under implementation 
elsewhere. There is no suggestion here that any of these strategies 
should or can be imported for socio-economic development in the JPA. 
The aim of the selection is to illustrate how each of these 
strategies has generated its particular agrarian structure, 
institutions, instruments and targets as means for achieving 
specified goals. Conversely, as suggested in Chapter IV, develop­
ment of a particular rural development strategy is dependent upon 
the specific goals sought, the problematic gap between these goals 
and the existing situation, and the failure and success elements, 
both actual and potential, that account for the problematic gap. 
At present, the principal policy issues in the JPA are 
identification, selection and implementation of an appropriate 
rural development strategy in order for the area to make the 
transition from subsistence production to sustained production and 
socio-economic development. Such a transition has been made and 
is being made elsewhere in Africa and the world. The selection 
of rural development strategies in this section therefore seeks 
to relate how the transition has been made or is being made, and 
to relate it to identification and selection of rural development 
strategies in the JPA through the "means-ends continuum" model. 
The Gedaref and Gezira rural development strategies are 
selected for the purposes of this study because of proximity in 
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Issues and geography, both areas being in the Sudan. Various 
aspects of these strategies have been discussed extensively else­
where.^ The discussions that follow will therefore be confined 
to how the expressed goals, the problematic situation and major 
failure and success elements in the physical, institutional and 
economic environments have shaped the rural development strategy, 
and what Impact the strategy has had or is having on traditional 
The Cedaref rural development strategy 
The agrarian structure that has evolved in Cedaref District in 
the Central Clay Plains of Central and Eastern Sudan is an example 
of how a development strategy has led to disruption of traditional 
society, and destruction of the soil resource. The Cedaref strategy 
is based on mechanized rainfed agriculture under leasehold of land 
to private individuals who are able or enabled by the government to 
afford the large capital investments. 
The strategy was conceived during the early years of World War 
II. Its primary goal was to satisfy the increased demand for sorghum 
For the Cezira, see for example, A. Caitskell (37); a critical 
view is given by Tony Bamett (11). For Gedaref, see Farah Hassan 
Adam and El-Tayeb El-Amin Mohanned (3). 
grain to feed British armies in East and North Africa (3:2). The 
Inability of traditional subsistence agriculture, from which 
grain had been extracted, to cope with increased war demands 
delineated the problematic situation. Mechanization of agri­
cultural production was suggested as the remedial alternative that 
would ensure adequate and reliable grain supply for the war effort. 
Large mechanized crop production schemes (MCPS) under state 
management were established. Labor requirements were met by 
recruitment from displaced peasantry in the towns. 
After the war, it soon became clear that the MCPS could not be 
run profitably under state capitalism. A system of participating 
cultivators was therefore introduced as an agrarian reform 
measure. Under the new system, government management was responsible 
for plowing and sowing the fields, while the cultivator weeded and 
harvested the crop. Profits were divided equally between the two 
partners, with the cultivator paying 10 percent of his share in 
State-sharecropper capitalism, however, was an unstable and 
unhappy marriage based on seasonal love. The annual weddings proved 
to be costly. Neither government management nor sharecroppers had 
an ultimate stake in agricultural development; since for the former, 
salaries and therefore livelihood were only remotely related to 
efficiency; while the latter could easily and quickly fall out of 
love and not recontract if alternative more renumerative employment 
could be found. According to Adam and Mohammed, the schemes failed 
for the following reasons: 
(1) Production was seasonal and the sharecroppers had to 
look for alternative employment during off-season and there 
was often uncertainty as to which of the sharecroppers would 
come back the following year; (2) sharecroppers or government 
did not construct permanent settlements because of these 
uncertainties; (3) scarcity and inefficient management of 
capital; (4) high administrative costs—all these factors 
caused government to run the schemes at a loss (3:3). 
The MCPS could not be run at a loss indefinitely. In 1959, the 
government abolished state-sharecropper capitalism all together. 
Instead, a system of leasehold to private individuals was 
Instituted. Under the new system land allotments were made through 
"native" land allotment boards to partnerships, to individuals in 
the locality who could purchase mechanized equipment and to 
Sudanese from other areas on an 8-year lease at a nominal rent of 
one piastre per feddan ($0,019 per acre). One lease was set at 1000 
feddans and, according to Adam and Mohammed, a capital of LS 2,000 
to 2,500 has usually been necessary to farm it. With efficient 
operation, net profits of over LS 5,000 in one season have been 
possible under the leasehold system. 
The 8-year lease was certainly an improvement over the one-year 
lease but still . .the inadequacy of legal provisions to 
ensure better management of land and the fixation of rents below 
the economic level acted as incentives for lessees to mine the 
soil through unplanned extensive use of the land" (3:5). Paced with 
a rapidly deteriorating soil quality, the government established the 
198 
Mechanized Farming Corporation (M.F.C.) in 1968, and . .entrusted 
It with the responsibility of disposal of ralnlands in an attempt to 
cure some of the insufficiencies of the 'leasehold' system" (3:6). 
Under the M.F.C., the size and period of lease were increased to 
1,500 feddans and 25 years, respectively, by 1970. 
At the beginning of the present Six-year Plan (1977/78 to 1982/ 
83), the private mining of land in Gedaref district was broadened to 
include participation by foreign capital as well. According to Adam 
and Mohammed: 
Future plans for development of ralnfed mechanized 
agriculture advocate an "open door" policy with respect 
to the 'flow' of foreign capital into mechanized farming. 
The Six-year Plan for the M.F.C. gives absolute priority 
to private investment (foreign and/or domestic) for the 
horizontal expansion of mechanized ralnfed schemes into 
new areas, while the role of the government subsector is 
perceived only in the sphere of consolidating and iiq>rovlng 
the existing situation in infrastructure through the sale 
of "package deals" of technological inputs and facilities 
with high capital Intensity and of low public profit­
ability. . . . Cut of a total net area of 5 million feddans 
that 'shall' be allotted and developed during the Six-
year Plan period, about 1.5 million feddans have already 
been conceded to large foreign agricultural concerns (3:8). 
In terms of the "means-ends continuum" model, the preceding 
brief presentation shows how the prevailing and emerging agrarian 
structure in the Gedaref area is being generated by a rural 
development strategy that is based on extensive mining of the soil 
resource and exploitation of displaced labor from traditional 
society. The initial aim of the strategy has been slightly changed 
to become that of making large profits in the shortest time possible. 
The institutions that have evolved, (such as state farms, state-
sharecropper capitalism, private leasehold tenure, seasonal employ­
ment arrangements, etc.) and the policy Instruments that have been 
used from time to time (such as changes in size and period of 
tenure, government loans, extension of leasehold to international 
capital, wage rates, etc.) have all been designed to enhance the 
primary goal of making quick profits. 
The Gedaref strategy has sought to eliminate or modify failure 
elements, or to expand success elements to the extent possible 
only when they impeded or promoted the primary goal of private 
local and international capital. Not much consideration is given 
to failure and success elements in the physical environment and 
in the institutional and economic environment of traditional 
society unless these elements are directly related to the strategic 
goal of making quick profits. The soil resource, for exanq)le, is 
completely forsaken. Since agricultural production is temporary 
from the point of view of both the leaseholder who moves to a new 
area every five years, and the seasonal agricultural labor, the 
situation of extensive soil mining that prevails can only be 
expected. Soil mining will likely aggravate desertification in 
the region since Gedaref boarders the Sahara Desert. 
In the context that the soil resource and the indigenous 
sedentary and nomadic communities of the region are neglected and 
abused, it can be said that the Gedaref model is not a rural 
development strategy, but rather, a natural resource mining 
operation. Nevertheless, the procès of Identifying and selecting 
appropriate rural development strategies for the JPA can benefit 
from the experience of Gedaref. 
More specifically, an appropriate rural development strategy 
for the JPA would need to avoid four major Insufficiencies and 
excesses of the Gedaref strategy. 
1. Emergence of absentee leaseholdlsm, rack-renting and 
eventual concentration of land. Experience with the Gedaref strategy 
shows that the majority of the leases are allocated to ". . .big 
merchants, big owners of animal wealth, businessmen and pensioners 
of the military and civilian bureaucracies." Moreover, those with 
limited capital who acquire leases ". . .resort to big farmers and/or 
merchants to finance such schemes on their behalf." The emergence 
of a class of absentee leaseholders, rent-racketeers and eventual 
landlords Is evident In the Gedaref area. This trend of concentration 
of the means of production In land In few hands has been known to 
Impede agricultural development In Asia and Latin America, and Is 
the subject of land reform and revolutions at present In these regions. 
2. Transfer of agricultural surplus Into unproductive Invest­
ments and consplclous consumption. The types of Investors who obtain 
leases, as above, ". . .manage to drain a substantial proportion of 
surplus production into unproductive uses, leaving only a 
negligible fraction for reinvestment into productivity activity." 
According to a study by El Amin among the leaseholders of Hablla area 
in the Gedaref area ". . .56 percent of the total accrued economic 
surplus is Invested in trade; 25 percent in real estate and/or 
nonproductive activities like weddings and circumcision festivals; 
while only 19 percent is reinvested in agriculture" (71b:20). The 
Gedaref strategy thus serves neither agricultural nor Industrial 
development. 
3. Neglect and mining of the soil resource. The preceding 
insufficiencies and abuses constitute mining and eventual exhaustion 
of the soil. In effect, the Gedaref strategy falsely assumes that 
land is abundant and therefore inexhaustible. Leaseholders, out of 
private and against social interest, find it cheaper to move to new 
areas Instead of conserving and developing the soil resource in 
the same area. Adam and Mohamed see deteriorating soil quality as 
a major constraint on capital accumulation In the long term. 
According to the authors: 
The process of capital accumulation Is further restricted 
by severe exhaustion and undermining of the natural resources 
made possible by the "unplanned" extensive use of the land and 
the instability of the farming system, allowing the scheme 
operators to shift to new locations every five years on the 
average (3:20). 
4. Neglect and immlserizatlon of traditional society. The basic 
aim of socio-economic development, as expounded in Sudan's develop­
ment plans, should be people and their needs (24; 25). The primary 
goal of an appropriate rural development strategy, as developed in 
this study from this official assumption, is therefore to enable the 
people of the JPA to make the transition from subsistence production 
to sustained production and socio-economic development in their 
own benefit and that of the region and nation. However, as observed 
by Adam and Mohamed, the impact of the Gedaref strategy has been 
. .Intervening with the customary land and water rights of the 
'traditional' communities and forcing both the nomad and the 
sedentary 'subsistence' cultivator out of his 'homeland' Into an 
uncertain market of wage enqiloyment" (3:9). 
A major policy implication of the Gedaref strategy with respect 
to traditional society is to transform it into a labor reserve 
hinterland, for surely the strategy Is Invlable without imniserlzation 
of traditional society. According to Adam and Mohammed: 
The deterioration in the production and living conditions 
of the 'subsistence' communities made possible by the expansion 
of mechanized agriculture on a massive scale has . . . ensured 
a readily available flow of labor more than adequate to cater 
for the seasonal needs of mechanized schemes . . . the majority 
of the workers are unskilled seasonal immigrants withdrawn 
largely from the nomadic and sedentary village communities 
inhabiting the Central Clay Plains region, and are paid variable 
daily wage rates, commonly set on miserable levels depending 
on the type of the agricultural task performed, the age and 
sex conq)ositlon of the work force and the general conditions 
of supply and demand for labor (3:21). 
In relation to what to do with traditional society, the IRD 
and Gedaref strategies can be viewed as polar opposltes. While IRD 
strategy seeks to preserve traditional society, making only 
marginal changes and Improvements (what has been referred to in 
this study as misery management), the Gedaref strategy seeks to 
destroy traditional society, and to utilize the resulting misery 
for enrichment of local and international leaseholders. 
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The Gezlra rural development strategy 
The Gezlra model Is an example of a unique way failure and 
success elements in the physical, social and economic environments 
of an area have been successfully forged together into a rural 
development strategy that has produced the largest farm on earth 
under one management. The JPA, as well as other regions in Sudan 
and Africa, have a great deal to learn from experience of the 
Gezlra strategy. 
Galtskell traces development of the Gezlra scheme to the 
beginning of this century. The Gezlra model, like Gedaref of the 
previous section, evolved from a necessity to satisfy external 
economic demands during the colonial period. Specifically, the 
Gezlra Scheme was a response to demand by the Lancashire Cotton 
Industry which, until the beginning of the twentieth century, had 
monopolized world cotton trade, but was increasingly becoming 
threatened by growing competition from the United States, Germany 
and to some extent China. These areas were competing with Lancashire 
In both the output and input markets. 
The Sudan, then under British occupation, was found to provide 
excellent conditions for safe and cheap extraction of raw cotton 
In the Gezlra, the "Island" between the White and Blue Nile Rivers 
south of Khartoum. According to Bamett, ". . .the only way to 
solve the problem of Lancashire was by creating a safe and dependable 
supply of long staple cotton . . . from an area in which Britain 
would have a virtual monopoly of purchase" (10:188). 
In their fight to push through Parliament the huge loan (3 million 
pounds, Sterling) needed to finance construction of the Sennar Dam 
for irrigation of the Gezira, the Lancashire Members of Parliament 
were unambiguous in expressing the plight of Lancashire and the 
concomitant necessity to develop the Gezlra. One member summed up 
consensus of the argument as follows: 
Experiments have abundantly proved that the Sudan is not 
only the finest cotton growing country in the whole of fhe 
British Empire, but, what is more important, that it can grow 
that sort of cotton Lancashire requires. This is a subject 
of vital Importance to the textile north, and it is essential 
that the millions engaged in and dependent on the cotton 
Industry should no longer be at the mercy of bad seasons in 
India or North America. If the shortage of raw materials 
is to be prevented, Lancashire must be placed above the 
hazards of speculation and climate. This loan will develop 
the resources of the Sudan under British guidance in a way 
which will ensure the more permanent prosperity of the 
cotton industry (11:5). 
The loan was approved and the rest is history. After the 
interruption caused by World War I, the Sennar Dam was con^leted in 
1925, and the Gezira Scheme finally got under way. 
Unlike Gedaref, which is based on crude mining of the soil, the 
technology of the Gezlra strategy relies on complex irrigation 
and rotation systems. The strategy evolved from realization that 
the severity of some of the failure elements in the physical, social 
and economic environment of the Gezlra area could not permit the 
British commercial companies to effectively take advantage of the 
area's success elements to achieve the primary aim of cheap cotton 
for Lancashire. Accordingly, a system of tripartite "partnership 
farming" was organized among the government as "sponsor," the 
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Lancashire private companies as "management," and the indigenous 
population as "tenants." The underlying argument is that there are 
certain services (remedial measures) that one of the partners can 
deliver effectively, but which one or both of the other partners 
can not afford. 
Under the partnership, responsibilities in the joint farming 
were defined in a legal contract. The government's function has 
been to construct dams and build irrigation canals, and to undertake 
research. The tenant has been responsible for providing the labor 
necessary during sowing and harvesting and for the general care of 
the crop(s). Management has been charged with preparation of land, 
supervision, marketing, and the provision of economic, technical 
and social services such as erection of agricultural buildings 
Including housing and storage facilities, the provision of credit 
and other inputs, the ginning of cotton, etc. 
When implementation of the strategy started, each tenancy was 
set at 30 feddans (31.1 acres). One-third of this was planted 
with cotton, another third with tenant family food crops, and the 
remaining third was left fallow to "rest." In 1933/34, tenancy size 
was increased to 40 feddans (41.5 acres), with one-quarter of this 
allocated to cotton, one-quarter to food crops and one-half left 
fallow. Tenancy size has dropped over the years and presently ranges 
between 20 and 40 feddans (20.8 and 41.5 acres); this has probably been 
due to the following reasons: death of operators, which In practice 
resulted in parcellatlon, although the unit of land was not legally 
to be passed on as Inheritance; the break-up of many partnerships 
Into units operated by farmers singly; the desire by farmers to give 
pieces of land to relatives whom it was desired to keep in the 
village; and the desire to avoid hiring labor and therefore the 
relinquishing of part of the land (89:384). 
The shares of the product among the three partners, although 
varying over time, have maintained the general initial pattern of 
distribution. Between 1924 and 1950 the farmers got the whole of 
food and fodder (dura, lubia, vegetables, etc.), while proceeds of 
the cotton crop were divided Into 40, 40, and 20 percent to the 
government, the tenant, and the managing company, respectively. 
With the dawn of independence for the Sudan in the early 1950s, 
the management component of the partnership was nationalized, and 
the functions of the Lancashire companies were taken over by a 
government parastal, the Sudan Gezlra Board. The division of the 
net cotton proceeds was revised to be 42 percent for the government, 
12 percent for the Board, and 46 percent for the tenants. At 
present, the tenants as a group receive 50 percent of the net cotton 
and cotton seed proceeds, while the Government and the Board receive 
38 and 10 percent, respectively. The remaining 2 percent is 
allocated to the Social Development Department of the Sudan Gezlra 
Board for financing adult education, provision of piped drinking 
water, housing, entertainment, veterinary services, social research 
in the scheme, etc. The tenant's share includes a 2 percent that 
goes to Local Government Councils within the irrigated area as 
contribution to health and educational facilities in the region. 
The share of the Board goes to meet its administrative costs, and 
any surpluses are transferred to the Government as contributions 
to research and development. 
In general outline, the preceding presentation is what has 
been described as the Gezira model of rural development. There 
are many issues that could not be covered, as they are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
In terms of the remedial phase of this study, some contributions 
of the experience from the Gezira model to the process of identifying 
and selecting rural development strategies for the JFA relate to 
the following considerations: (1) the technological innovations by 
which the strategy ameliorates physical and teclinological 
disincentives, which, as discussed in the linear programming section 
of the diagnostic phase, dominate social and economic Incentives 
in the JPA; (2) the way in which the strategy defines the role of 
traditional society in relation to the stipulated new forms of 
modem agricultural production; (3) the extent to which the strategy 
enhances generation of capital and knowledge for sustained socio­
economic development and, hence, a test for the viability of the 
strategy: and (4) the extent to which the str «-egy promotes class 
differentiation among and within management and tenantry insofar as 
this impacts on economic and social incentives. 
1. Amelioration of physical disincentives. The major physical 
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disincentives to sustained agricultural production in the Gezlra 
area include insufficiency and unreliability of the rains and the 
difficult tillage conditions of the heavy clay soils. Specific 
technological innovations aimed at ameliorating these failure 
elements, and that are principal aspects of the Gezlra model, are 
irrigation and mechanization of difficult agricultural tasks, such 
as land preparation and first weeding, that would restrict extension 
of the cultivated if they were performed wholly by hand. Given the 
low levels of incomes and knowledge in the Gezlra, these 
technological innovations could not be adopted by traditional 
farmers without outside assistance. The traditional society simply 
could not generate sufficient capital to finance construction of 
dams and irrigation networks. Government intervention to remove or 
modify principal physical disincentives is therefore a necessary 
condition in the Gezira-type model. Furthermore, once dams and 
Irrigation networks are put in place, their efficient management and 
provision of other complementary inputs become necessary. 
2. Role of traditional society. The definition of the role 
of traditional society in the new forms of production, and the under­
lying assumptions on which such definition is based are extremely 
important in the process of transition of traditional society from 
subsistence production to sustained production. This is well 
Illustrated in the Gedaref strategy which defines traditional 
society as a reserve for agriculture wage labor. It is also well 
Illustrated In the Gezlra model which defines traditional society 
(tenantry) as partners In the new forms of production, albeit a 
very junior partner. 
The junior status of the tenantry in the Gezlra Scheme, which 
accounts for the continued alienation of the tenants In the pro­
duction process, has Its basis in the colonial origins of the 
partnership. According to Bamett, the organization of the initial 
Gezlra partnership was based on the "theory of the organization of 
native labor," which defined such labor as primitive and in need 
of control for its efficient utilization in production. Bamett 
lists three assumptions underlying this theory: 
First, native labor Is by its nature recalcitrant, 
and therefore requires authoritarian treatments; second, 
native labor lacks initiative, and therefore requires 
' very detailed directives and Instructions; and third, 
native labor can within limits, be Improved, and the 
'civilizing' function of authoritarian methods in some 
way ligltimizes those methods (10:200-201). 
The operational form of the Gezlra strategy was therefore 
". . .Inevitably based on control rather than on communication." The 
Lancashire companies and after them the Gezlra Board became the 
effective managers in the partnership, determining the use of 
factors of production including land, capital, water, and even labor. 
The tenant became relegated to a position where his labor ". . .is 
to be controlled and manipulated" to achieve the goal of cheap 
cotton for Lancashire, and now capital revenue and export earnings 
for the Government. 
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3. Generation of capital, employment and knowledge. As discussed 
In the delimiting phase of this study, the Gezlra Scheme and its 
prototypes are central to Sudan's agriculture and national econony 
in generating capital, employment and applied research. These 
contributions are well-documented in the literature. Sayigh, for 
example, summarizes the contributions of the Gezlra to the Sudanese 
economy as follows: 
According to a study by IBRD made in 1966, it is estimated 
that 66 percent of long staple cotton, 47 percent of beans, 
. . .and 12 percent of maize (dura) in the country are grown 
on Gezlra land. The Scheme also provides some 30 percent of 
government revenues (if export fees are included) and 35 per­
cent of export earnings . . . about 7 percent of net domestic 
product is directly attributed to the Scheme, while Indirectly 
imputable contribution amounts to about 30 percent (89:386). 
The Regional Government in Southern Sudan at present has no 
significant sources of revenues, depending as it does on annual 
remittances from the Central Government. In so far as the JPA is 
one of the major potential contributors to Regional development 
(see the delimiting phase), the Gezlra model clearly commends 
itself as a means for generating government revenue. The Regional 
Government in the Autonomous Southern Sudan can not continue to be 
viable for long unless there are schemes in the Southern Region 
that can generate adequate revenues for Regional Government 
administration, and for sustained socio-economic development of 
the Southern Region. 
4. Class differentiation and incentives. The relations among 
the partners in the Gezlra Scheme are still characterized by the 
initial assumptions from its colonial beginnings. Management still 
remains a distinct class and retains decision making powers on 
behalf of the tenants whose function Is still assumed to be correct 
execution of orders. In addition to being a burden on the capital 
formation capacity of the Scheme, the monopolization of all 
managerial functions by the government robs the tenants of Initiative 
to Increase production and of the educative role of the production 
process. Dualism Is therefore maintained, since the tenant Is 
systematically denied the opportunity of internalizing the various 
aspects of modem production techniques including decision making 
procedures. 
A second form of class differentiation arises within the 
tenantry Itself. The tendency of the partnership system in the 
Gezira to lead to creation of . .conditions for the rise of 
a group of differentiated tenants," has been noted by several authors 
on the Gezira. Adam, for example, reports that: 
Almost more than two-thirds of the tenants are poor, 
operating a cotton tenancy of five feddans and less, one-
third of the tenants are medium operating a cotton tenancy 
that varies in size between ten and twenty feddans; while 
only 2 percent of the tenants are rich, supervising one or 
more cotton tenancies equal to or greater than twenty feddans 
In size. . . . The rich tenants receive almost half of the 
Income from cotton without contributing to manual work, and 
the medium and the poor groups of tenants obtain two-fifths 
of cotton's Income offering a part of their labor to meet 
about a quarter of the total manual labor requirement of 
cotton, while agricultural wage-labor, both permanent-
resident and seasonal-migratory performs almost three 
quarters of the total cotton manual labor tasks, but 
receives only one-tenth of the cotton returns (2:10). 
Bamett suggests that differentiation among the tenantry was 
brought about and is maintained by the credit Institutions in the 
Gezlra. Initially, the planners of the Gezlra Scheme assumed that 
a tenancy could be worked by family labor alone; but it has always 
been necessary to hire labor from within and outside the Scheme 
during peak labor periods, such as weeding and harvesting. On the 
other hand. Income from a tenancy has often not been sufficient to 
cover the costs of hired labor. Consequently, the majority of the 
tenants resort to borrowing in excess of the cash advances made 
to them by the Board in order to pay for the hired labor. The 
resulting credit gap has attracted a small group of rich tenants 
and other nontenant entrepreneurs who provide credit to poor 
tenants at exorbitant Interest rates. Bamett sees the credit 
system as contributing and maintaining the state of under­
development in the Gezlra. He argues that: 
The credit arrangements at the village level are vital 
to the reproduction of the overall structure. The tenant 
dependent upon his tenancy is able to live on his low 
income only because he can get credit. Therefore, the cotton 
which he produces can be sold at a low price. In order to 
remain viable, in order to subsist, he has to depend upon 
credit. . . . The tenant is highly dependent on purchasing 
food and consumer goods from the shops because the Scheme 
within which he works has removed from him, to a very 
considerable degree, the possibility of complete production 
for his own subsistence and that of his family. Thus, in 
effect, the continued operation of the Gezlra Scheme depends 
upon the willingness of the lenders to lend, and their 
ability to spend their profits for the purchase of 
imported goods (10:197). 
The preceding sample of insufficiencies and successes of the 
Gezlra strategy are not necessary aspects of the model's operation. 
Essentially, the Gezlra model is a sharing arrangement in which the 
three partners (Government, management and tenants) share in the 
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provision of inputs and in the distribution of outputs. The 
insufficiencies in capital creation, incentives, class differentiation 
and definition of traditional society, for example, could and would 
need to be avoided by a rural development strategy that sought to 
emulate the Gezira experience. Avoidance of such failure elements, 
as above, depends on specification of clear goals, development of the 
problematic situation and definition of the relations among the three 
partners. Including the assumptions on which such definitions are 
Suggested Planning Elements Upon Which An 
Appropriate Rural Development Strategy 
For the JPA Might Be Based 
It has been emphasized throughout this study that identification 
and selection of an appropriate rural development strategy for the 
JFA Is necessarily interdisciplinary in approach. An inter­
disciplinary planning team is best suited to formulating a specific 
rural development strategy for the JPA. This section explores 
possible contents of an appropriate rural development strategy for 
As discussed in Chapter IV, an appropriate rural development 
strategy for the JPA is the science and art whereby the Executive 
Organ could employ the existing and potential physical. Institutional 
and economic resources from within and from outside the JPA in order 
to secure stated goals of regional and national policy. As a science, 
such strategy can benefit from application of the "means-ends 
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continuum" model by incorporating its results, such as the existing 
and potential failure and success elements developed in Table 6.1. 
As an art, an appropriate rural development strategy evolves and 
matures through sustained application. As new failure elements 
are encountered and remedied or modified, and as new success elements 
are identified and taken advantage of, the strategy grows and matures. 
The science and art of rural development strategy could also 
benefit from comparative experience, such as the ones discussed in 
this chapter under IRD, Gedaref and Gezira. However, farming models 
are unique spatially and temporally. Whereas lessons can be learned 
from comparative experience, the exact form of the model can not be 
imported in total. The art component of rural development strategy, 
evolving from practice, can not be universal even If the science 
component may be universal, and hence, the nontransferability of 
successful farming models across societies and times. The non-
importabllity of farming models is best summarized by Moras who 
relates the following story: 
An Asian educated in the West recently had dinner with 
Mao Tse-Tung after having spent a week studying the agri­
cultural system of China. Moa asked the visitor what was 
the primary lesson he had drawn from his examination. The 
visitor said he had been tremendously impreaeed by all aspects 
of Chinese farming and urged Mao to make some of his farm 
experts available to advise other countries Lliat were not 
doing so well. At this point, Mao looked very pained and 
said he was very disturbed if this was the major impression 
the guest had retained. Needless to say, this troubled the 
guest and asked Mao what his primary lnq*ression should have 
been. Mao replied that there were no easy solutions, that 
the coiq>lex system the Chinese use had evolved over many 
years and had entailed many mistakes. Mao said it would 
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be wrong to attempt to apply the Chinese approach elsewhere, 
and that the only thing that was repllcable from the Chinese 
experience was the slow, painful, dialectical process of 
experimentation that the Chinese had pursued over a number 
of years (72b). 
Against the foregoing background, a rural development strategy 
aimed at achieving the objectives developed in the delimiting phase 
for the JPA, and based on success and failure elements as developed 
in the diagnostic phase and summarized in Table 6.5, would likely 
seek to incorporate the following planning elements in its basis: 
1. Development of drainage and irrigation, since it is unlikely 
that any rural development strategy implemented in the JPA can result 
in significant development unless the physical disincentives to 
farming caused by the frequent dangers to crops from floods and 
droughts are removed or drastically reduced; 
2. Introduction of specific mechanical power technology that 
is adaptable to the area; that takes into account the physical, 
institutional and economic elements in the environment of the JPA; 
and that can effectively provide physical incentives for 
development on the magnitude stated in the delimiting phase; 
3. Establishment of at least one training and research 
Institute in the JPA to provide systematic and continuing means 
for identifying new failure and success elements, and discovering 
ways to remedy the failure elements or expand the success elements; 
4. Introduction of new forms of tenure and firm organization 
consistent with demands of modem sustained production, but not 
disruptive of traditional society in a major way; 
5. Spatial reorganization of the countryside into more compact 
villages than the present dispersed pattern of homesteads and farm 
6. Full use of the Jonglel Canal, especially in Its transpor­
tation role, so as to link the JPA with external and national markets; 
7. Development of at least one export crop, such as rice, and 
search for potential external markets; 
8. Efficient channels for provision of modem farm supplies 
and complementary public services in order to prevent emergence 
of class differentiation as happened in the Gezira and Gedaref; 
9. Self-reliance and efficient use of local resources, 
including abolition of or extensive modification in the annual 
transhumance; 
10. Provision of economic incentives with respect to output 
and input prices, once major physical disincentives are removed 
or adequately modified. 
Some of the above planning elements could be incorporated 
into development programs based on either the Improvement or the 
transformation approach. However, as shown in this study, the 
most critical planning elements (items 1, 2, 4 and 5) that could 
ensure sustained socio-economic development of the JPA, appear to 
be consistent with the transformation approach. Development programs 
based on the improvement approach, such as UNDP's and ILACO's IRD 
Projects, do not Incorporate these four planning elements. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that the improvement approach can be relied upon 
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to lead to achievement of the goals development in the delimiting 
phase of this study. 
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CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The central objective of this study is to develop an analytical 
framework and procedures for identifying and selecting appropriate 
rural development strategies for the Jonglei Projects Area (JPA) in 
the Southern Region of the Sudan. 
The question of appropriate rural development strategies for 
the JPA became a major policy issue in the Sudan when Egypt first 
proposed construction of the Jonglei canal in the 1940s, and again 
after 1974 when Egypt and Sudan reached final agreement to construct 
the canal. In both instances, the question of socio-economic 
development In the JPA was viewed mainly from a localized 
perspective of how to compensate and protect the inhabitants of the 
JPA from adverse effects resulting from construction and operation 
of the canal. 
In this study, socio-economic development in the JPA is 
discussed within the context of the national economy and national 
goals. The Sudan Is among a small number of countries in the world 
that still has vast agricultural production potential estimated at 
more than 200 million feddans suitable for agricultural use. It is 
on the basis of this potential that the Sudan has declared a 
national objective to become the "Breadbasket of the Middle East" 
and a major granary of the world. Identification of an appropriate 
rural development strategy for the JPA is viewed from the 
perspective of this potential and national goal. This interpretation 
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of the national context and possible extent of socio-economic 
development in the JPA is consistent with the mandate of the 
National Council for Development Projects in the Jonglei Canal 
Area, which calls for planning and Implementation of integrated 
economic and social development projects in the area and derivation 
of maximum benefit from the condominiums created by the Canal 
Project for providing new living conditions to the inhabitants of 
the Jonglei Canal Area (22:5). 
Chapter II develops the justification for considering socio­
economic development in the JPA within national priorities and not 
as a local problem of compensation for adverse effects of the canal. 
Sudan's breadbasket potential is presented and discussed, and the 
JPA is identified among regions with the greatest agricultural 
potential. A major finding of this chapter is that the growth 
areas of North-central and North-eastern Sudan will run out of 
irrigation water as early as 1983/84. If Sudan is to realize the 
objective of becoming the "Breadbasket of the Middle East," modem 
agricultural schemes must in the future be established in areas that 
can support ralnfed agriculture. 
The JPA, delineated in Chapter III to include the whole of 
the Southern Clay Plains, is the most suitable region in the Sudan 
for large-scale ralnfed agriculture. The relevance of the Jonglei 
Canal to the Dlnka, Nuer, Shllluk, Anyuak and Murle people of the 
JPA is therefore not that the canal interferes with their 
traditional ways of life, but rather that it (1) opens up hitherto 
dormant opportunities for socio-economic development in the JPA 
and (2) provides real opportunities for regional and national 
integration of the area. This study, therefore, concluded that 
current planning by the Executive Council of the National Council 
for Development Projects in the Jonglel Canal Area, that emphasizes 
Integrated Rural Development projects aimed at marginal improve­
ments in the traditional subsistence economies of the JPA, is 
inadequate and neither in the long-term interests of the inhabitants 
of the JPA nor those of the nation. 
The preceding considerations suggest that formulation and 
development of an appropriate rural development strategy for the 
JPA is the most Important policy issue for the National Council 
for Development projects in the Jonglel Canal Area. Chapter IV of 
this study proceeds with development of an analytical framework 
and procedures for identifying and selecting appropriate rural 
development strategies. A preliminary application of these methods 
to the JPA is made in the following three chapters of this study. 
However, as argued in this study. Identification and selection of 
rural development strategies is necessarily interdisciplinary, 
and formation of an interdisciplinary team for this purpose is 
strongly recommended in this study. 
The analytical framework developed in this study suggests 
that conclusions and recommendations from Its application be 
presented together. The diagnostic phase of the study Incorporates 
conclusions, while the delimiting and remedial phases suggest 
recommendations. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, restates 
the objectives of this study and summarizes the conclusions and 
recomnendatlons as they relate to each objective. 
The objectives of the study are; 
1. To provide a framework for examining rural development 
strategies for socio-economic development of the Jonglei Projects 
Area (JPA) by focusing on: (a) the goals of socio-economic develop­
ment in the JPA as they relate to national goals; and (b) the 
resource potential of the JPA in terms of the area's contribution 
to regional and national goals; 
2. To ascertain the adequacy of the existing agrarian structure 
and rural development strategies in the JPA as means to realizing 
the resource potential and achieving the goals referred to in the 
preceding objective; 
3. To evaluate alternative rural development strategies, from 
within Sudan's experience, that may be adapted in the JPA; and 
4. To suggest planning elements upon which an appropriate rural 
development strategy for the JPA might be based. 
An analytical model based on the "means-ends continuum" 
conceptual framework, is developed and discussed in Chapter XV to 
achieve the first objective. The model Is an adaptation and 
generalization of a model developed by Tionons (94). This model, 
schematically presented In Figure 4.2, consists of three main steps. 
The first step, termed the problem delimiting phase and applied 
to the JPA in Chapter V, develops and states specific goals for 
rural development and Identifies the existing situation of socio­
economic development In the area. The difference between the 
stated goals and the existing situation constitutes the problematic 
situation upon which development policy focuses. 
The second step, termed the diagnostic phase and applied to 
the JPA in Chapter VI, identifies and analyses (1) failure elements 
that are responsible for the problematic situation, and (2) success 
elements that are responsible for the problematic situation not 
getting any larger. New success elements and potential failure 
elements are also Identified in the diagnostic phase to the extent 
possible. Within the diagnostic phase linear programming models 
and procedures are developed for application to the JPA to 
supplement the "means-ends continuum" analytical framework in 
pursuing the goals of this study. 
The third step, termed the remedial phase and applied to the 
JPA In Chapter VII, identifies rural development strategies that 
are consistent with eliminating the failure elements and 
expanding the success elements identified in the diagnostic phase. 
A major hypothesis is made in the remedial phase to link identifi­
cation and selection of rural development strategies to their 
implementation. This hypothesis is that a particular rural 
development strategy maps or implies a unique set of agrarian 
institutions that constitutes the strategy's agrarian structure. 
Furthermore, agrarian Institutions and their instrumental variables 
are necessary means for achieving goals of rural development. The 
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remedial phase therefore Includes development and institution of 
agrarian structures that correspond to the particular development 
strategy that is Identified and selected. 
The second objective is discussed In Chapter VI. A conceptual 
framework is provided in Figure 6.1 for use by an interdisciplinary 
team to identify physical, institutional and economic failure 
elements which restrict the cultivated area and agricultural output 
in the JPA. Results of linear programming models are interpreted 
to determine the extent to which the failure elements impact on 
farmer decision making, and to evaluate the adequacy of the 
existing agrarian structure and the strategy of improving 
traditional agriculture as means for achieving the goals developed 
in the delimiting phase. 
Results from the linear programming models appear to support 
Evans Pritchard's contention that the economies of the JPA have 
reached a low stationary equilibrium. Under existing technologies 
and agrarian structure in the JPA, optimal cultivated area for 
the "coiiq>oslte" farm is 2.1 feddans if household members work 
4-hour days, and 3.7 feddans if they work 6-hour days. These 
results are supported by empirical results of an average household 
farm size of 2.5 feddans found by 21 Sanmumi and Hassan (29:19), 
and 2.8 feddans by an ILACO farm survey team (62:92). Furthermore, 
optimal farm plans for each cropping activity are valid over a 
wide range of prices and/or yields. The low optimal cultivated 
area and its insensltlvlty to increases in prices and/or yields are 
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taken as proxy measures of the severity of labor bottlenecks 
during peak periods, and as an Indication of the Inadequacy of the 
existing technologies and agrarian structure as means of realizing 
the resource potential In the JPA. 
Results of the linear programing models also show that rural 
development through the "Improvement approach" Is unlikely to lead 
to achievement of the goals developed in the delimiting phase. 
The "Improvement approach" holds that modernization of present 
traditional subsistence agriculture could be achieved within existing 
production units and institutions through introduction of new and 
"appropriate" technologies. The basic technologies of the improve­
ment approach, according to UNDP's and ILACO's versions of 
integrated rural development project in Kongor District (18; 55), 
include oxen farming and the use of herbicides and fertilizers. 
A shift from traditional farming to herbicide technology would 
increase optimal cultivated area by only 0.2 feddan if household 
members work 4-hour days, and by 0.4 feddan if they work 6-hour days. 
Adoption of oxen technology would increase optimal cultivated 
area by 1 feddan and by 1.7 feddans if the household works 4 and 6-
hour days, respectively. The conclusion, drawn from results of 
application of linear progranming to the JPA, that oxen technology 
is not appropriate to the JPA is reinforced by results of interviews 
that show that the inhabitants of the JPA are unlikely to adopt 
oxen farming. 
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The third objective Is discussed In Chapter VII. Integrated 
rural development projects in the JPA and the Gezlra and Gedaref 
models in North-central and North-eastern Sudan are evaluated as 
alternative rural development strategies for the JPA. A general 
conclusion Is reached that none of these strategies could be 
adopted In total to the JPA. However, experience from these 
strategies could benefit Identification, selection and Implemen­
tation of appropriate rural development strategies In the JPA. 
The Gedaref strategy is discussed to Illustrate how a rural 
development strategy has led to disruption and Immiserization 
of traditional society and destruction of the soil resource. The 
process of identifying and selecting appropriate rural development 
strategies for the JPA can benefit from experience of the Gedaref 
strategy by avoiding four major insufficiencies and excesses of 
this strategy. These insufficiencies and excesses are: (1) 
emergence of absentee leaseholdism, rack-renting of land and eventual 
concentration of the means of production in land in few hands; 
(2) transfer of agricultural surplus into unproductive investments 
and conspicuous consumption; (3) neglect, mining and eventual 
exhaustion of the soil resource by national and international 
leaseholders who find it cheaper to move to new areas rather than 
to conserve and develop the soil resource in the same area; and 
(4) neglect and imnlserization of traditional society for the 
benefit of local and international leaseholders. 
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The Gezlra Is discussed in order to evaluate the unique way 
failure and success elements in the physical, social and economic 
environment of the Gezlra Region have been successfully forged 
together into a rural development strategy that has produced the 
largest farm on earth under one management. The study identifies 
four issues from experience of the Gezlra that are relevant to 
identification gJid selection of rural development strategies for 
the JPA. These Issues concern the following aspects of the Gezlra 
strategy: (1) the technological innovations by irtilch the strategy 
ameliorates physical and technological disincentives; (2) the 
way in which the strategy defines the role of traditional society 
in relation to the stipulated new forms of modem agricultural 
production; (3) the extent to which the strategy enhances 
generation of capital and knowledge for sustained socio-economic 
development; and (4) the extent to which the strategy promotes 
class differentiation among and within management and tenantry. 
Finally, the fourth objective is discussed in the last 
section of Chapter VII. No specific rural development strategy is 
recommended for the JPA. A specific recommendation of a rural 
development strategy would result from work of an interdisciplinary 
team applying the methodology and procedures developed in this 
study. Nevertheless, the study suggests ten planning elements that 
could form a basis for an appropriate rural development strategy 
aimed at achieving the objectives developed in the delimiting phase. 
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These planning elements are based on the success and failure elements 
developed In the diagnostic phase and comparative Sudanese experience 
discussed under the Gezira, Gedaref and IRD Strategies. 
The study ends with the conclusion that development programs 
based on the "improvement approach," such as IRD projects currently 
under implementation in the JPA, will likely end up merely 
containing and managing poverty and misery in the area, unless 
they incorporate four of the ten planning elements suggested in 
this study. These four basic elements are: (1) development of 
modem drainage and irrigation works, since it is unlikely that any 
rural development strategy liiq>lemented in the JPA can result in 
significant development until the physical disincentives to farming 
caused by the frequent dangers to crops from floods and droughts 
are removed, or drastically modified; (2) introduction of specific 
mechanical technology; that takes into account the physical, 
institutional and economic elements in the environment of the JPA; 
and that can effectively provide the physical incentives to 
production on which success of economic and social Incentives 
depends; (3) introduction of new forms of tenure and firm organi­
zation consistent with demands of modem sustained production and 
having their bases in traditional forms of organization; and (4) 
spatial reorganization of the countryside into more coiq>act villages 
than the present dispersed pattem of homesteads that dot the JPA. 
As argued in this study, the preceding planning elements are 
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more consistent with the transformation than with the Improvement 
approach. It is therefore recommended that the Executive Organ 
of the National Council for Development Projects in the Jonglei 
Canal Area and the Southern Sudan Regional Ministry of Agriculture 
maintain active Interest in "transformation approach" projects, 
such as the Jonglei Irrigation Project and the Pengkon Plain 
Development Project. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
Many qualifications have been made regarding the quality of 
the data used in the linear programming models. The data are 
experimental data obtained from the Pengkon Pilot Project, and the 
"composite farm" used in this study was constructed from these 
data. This procedure and the data were considered appropriate 
and sufficient for the methodological purposes of this study. 
Nevertheless, better data, in the sense of an actual farm survey, 
could be obtained to check the linear programming results used 
in this study. Other methods, such as production function 
analysis could also be used in place of the linear programming 
models. 
The most appropriate use of the analytical framework and 
procedures developed in Chapter IV of this study could be made by 
an interdisciplinary team composed of teams of scientists from the 
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physical, chemical, engineering, biological and social sciences. 
Each team would develop analytical models for researching problems 
in their respective fields, and the resulting data used by the 
whole team to develop an appropriate rural development strategy for 
This study does not provide specific or general recommendations 
as to how an appropriate rural development strategy might be 
implemented, evaluated and monitored as a continuing process for 
development of the region as part of the national economy. Like 
the case of the linear programming models within the diagnostic 
phase, action or Implementation models are needed in the remedial 
phase of Figure 4.2. This study lacked the time and resources 
to develop and apply these latter models to the JFA. 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLING PROCEDURES AND INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN THE JPA 
Explorative interviews were conducted to provide perspective 
for this study. Results of the interviews are summarized in 
Chapter I of this study. 
Two groups of respondents were interviewed. The first group 
comprised officials of the National Council for Development 
Projects in the Jonglei Canal Area and its Executive Organ, 
expatriate advisors and researchers in the JPA and regional and 
provincial authorities. The second group was the rural people 
in Kongor and Bor Districts. 
The objectives of the interviews were to elicit reactions 
regarding the following Issues: (1) objectives and extent of 
rural development in the JPA; (2) the political commitment in 
Southern Sudan to Implement fundamental changes in the political, 
social and economic institutions of the JPA; (3) the state of 
readiness of the rural people to participate in change and their 
expectation of such change; (4) people's expectations with respect 
to government's role in rural development; (5) the types of 
technologies that could be adapted in the area; (6) how new 
technologies could be financed; and (7) the type of farm firm 
organization that could be adapted in the JPA. 
With respect to the first group of respondents, the format 
was to interview according to echelons of responsibility starting 
with the chairman of the National Council for Development Projects 
In the Jonglel Canal Area down to the district executive officer 
and agricultural officer. Expatriate advisors interviewed were those 
of ILACO's Pengkon Pilot Project and thoje associated with the 
Executive Council. 
With respect to the second group, respondents were selected 
from tribal and clan organizations as shown in Figures À.1 to 
A.12 of this Appendix for Kongor and Bor Districts of the JPA. 
Each of these figures represents tribal organizations and Chieftancles 
in each Court Center. The name of the Court Center and Court 
President (Head Chief) are given in the top box In each figure. 
Sub-tribes and their chiefs make up the rest of the chart. The 
number of taxpayers (male adults, 18 years and over) are included 
In parentheses under each Chieftaincy. The total population of each 
Court Center or Chieftaincy Is derived by multiplying the nun^er of 
taxpayers by a factor of 7. Using this procedure, the population of 
Kongor District would be about 137,000, while that of Bor District 
would be about 111,000. 
Interviews were conducted In seven of the 12 Court Centers In 
the two Districts. These were Werkak, Kongor, Wangkulei, Pallau, 
Maar, Jalle and Baal-dlt. Two of the other Court Centers, Duk 
Fadlet and Duk Fawiel were Inaccessible by ..oad due to floods. 
There was no time to visit Anyidl, Makuac, and Kolnyang. In each 
Court Center, the President, all his chiefs and five elders from each 
clan were interviewed. The interview was then opened up to others 
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in the form of discussion. In Kongor and Uekak Court Centers 
about 1,000 people attended these meetings; In Wangkulel, about 
750; In Pallau, about 300; In Maar, abont 400, In Jalle, about 
400; and In Baal-dlt, about 500. 
President : Manyok Nonykwer Mabur 
(Nc. of P.V,»: 2.881) 
Figure A.l. Duk-Padiet tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglei Province, 
Puk-Favlel Court Centre 
President: Leek Deng Kalual 
(2.977) 
Figure A.2. Dt^-Fawlel tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jçnglel Province, 
Pagueng Clan 
President: AJang i 
(2.209) 
Figure A.3. Werkak tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglel Province, 
Figure A.4. Kongor tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, 
Jonglel Province, Sudan 
Figure A.5. Wangkulei tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglel 
Province, Sudan 
President: Ceu Uarabek Ayuel 
Figure A.6. Paliau tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglei Province, 
President: AJaang Najok AJaang 
AkongCok Tribe 
Kanyok AJang Majok 
AJulup-Thony Tribe 
Figure A.7. Maar tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglel Province, Sudan 
Pagol Clan Deng AJak Clan 
Figure A.8. Jalle tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglel Province, 
Figure A.9. Baal-dlt tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jongle1 Province, 
Figure A.10. Makuac tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jongle1 Province, 
Sudan 
Thony Tribe 
Figure A.11. Anyldl tribal and clan organizations, Rongor District, Jonglel Province, 
Figure A.12. Kolnyang tribal and clan organizations, Kongor District, Jonglel 
Province, Sudan 
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APPENDIX B. TABLE OF WEIGHTS 
Units of area 
1 square meter 
1 square kilometer 
1 feddan 
Units of length 
1 kilometer 
Units of money 
LS 1.000 (Sudanese 
Units of volume 
1 cubic meter 
Units of weight 
1 kilogram (Kg.) 
1 metric ton (1,000 Kg.) 
D MEASURES 
- 10.76 square feet 
- 0.386 square mile 
- 248 acres 
- 238 feddans 
- 4,200 square meters 
- 0.420 hectare 
- 1.038 acre 
- 1.09 yards 
- 0.621 mile 
- $2.00 (U.S.) 
- 35.31 cubic feet 
- 1.308 cubic yards 
" 0.000811 acre feet 
- 2.205 lb. 
- 0.984 long ton (2,240 lb.) 
APPENDIX C. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AFC Agricultural Production Corporation 
BM^ Billion Cubic Meters of Water 
DSE German Foundation for International Development 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ILACO International Land Development Consultants 
IRD Integrated Rural Development 
JIF Jonglel Irrigation Project 
JIT Jonglel Investigation Team 
JPA Jonglel Projects Area 
Kg Kilogram 
LS Sudanese Pound 
MCPS Mechanized Crop Production Schemes 
MDC More Developed Countries 
MFC Mechanized Farming Corporation 
NC-JPA National Council for Development Projects in the 
Jonglel Canal Area 
NIEO New International Economic Order 
FPDP Pengkon Plain Development Project 
PPP Pengkon Pilot Project 
SIDA Swedish International Development Authority 
SOS Social Overhead Services 
T^ Hand Technology 
Tg Herbicide/Fertilizer Technology 
T^ Oxen Technology 
UDC Underdeveloped Countries 
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
UFC World Food Conference 
APPENDIX D. TEXT OF THE 1959 MILE WATERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 
(103:24-28) 
ITranalation' • Traduction*) 
No. 6519 AGREEMENT' BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN AND THE UNITED 
ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE FULL UTILIZATION OF THE NILE WATERS. SIGNED 
AT CAIRO. ON 8 NOVEMBER 195» 
As the River Nile needs projects, for its full control and for increasing its yield for the full utiliza­
tion of its waters by the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic on technical working 
arrangements other than those now applied: 
And as these works require for their execution and administration, full agreement and co-operation 
between the two Republics in order to regulate their benefits and utilize the Nile waten in a manner 
which secures the present and future requirements of the two countries: 
And as the Nile waters Agreement concluded in 1929* provided only for the partial use of the Nile 
waters and did not extent to include a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have 
agreed on the following: 
THE PRESENT ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
1. That the amount of the Nile waters used by the United Arab Republic until this Agreement is 
signed shall be her acquired right before obtaining the benefits of the Nile Control Projects and the 
projects which will increase its yield and which projects are referred to in this Agreement; The total 
of this acquired right is 48 Milliards of cubic meters per year as measured at Aswan. 
2. That the amount of the waters used at present by the Republic of Sudan shall be her acquired 
rlRhl before oblaininR I he hi nrfits of the projects refi-rri-H to above. The total amount of this acquired 
right is 4 Milliards of cubic meters per year as measured us Aswan. 
THK NILE CONTROL PROJECTS AND THE DIVISION 
OF THEIR BENEFITS BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS 
1. In order to regulate the River waters and control their flow into the sea, the two Republics 
agree that the United Arab Republic constructs the Sudd el Aali at Aswan as the first link of a series 
of projects on the Nile for over year storage. 
2. In order tii enable the Sudan to utilize its share of the water, the two Republics agree that the |{<-|iul>lic of Sudan shall l onslrurt the Kiist-ires Diini on the Itlue Nile and any other works which the 
Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the utilization of ita share. 
I Translation by the fiovrrnmrnt of the United Arab Republic. 
2. TrailufI ion ilu Gouverncmciit de la ltf|Hiblii|iir aralM- unie 
3. Came into force on 12 December 1959, in accordance with article?. 
4. Ix"ague of Nations. Tnaly Serieê, Vol. XCIII, p. 43. 
262 
The iH'l boncru from thr Sudd el Aali Kp«prvoir shall bit cnkuUled on the busis of the averan» 
nitlurtil Kivcr yield of wall r at Aswan in Ihu yi-ars of ihi* ri-nlury, whirh i* mliinuWd at aboul 84 
Milliard* of rubir mclerst per year. The ai-<|uirvd rÎKhU of Ihu two KepuMic* referred to in Article 
"First" as measured at Aswan, and the averm^ P "f losses of over-year stwruKe of the Sudd El Aali 
Keservoir shall Ih* ileilui teil from this yii'lil, and the lialaiire shall he the not iM-nefit which shall be 
divided IMM ween the two Uepublics. 
4. The net benefit from the Sudd el Aali Reservoir mentioned in the previous item, shall be divided 
between I he Iwo Kepublirs at I he ralioof MVi for I he Sudan and 7'/j for the United Arab Republic so 
loHK as the averaRe river yield remains in future within the limits of the avernRe yield referred to in 
the previous paragraph. This means that, if the average yield remains the same as the average of the 
previous years of this century which is estimated at 84 Milliards, and if the losses of over-year storage 
remain equal to the present estimate of 10 Milliards, the net benefit of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir 
shall he 22 Milliards of which the share of the Republic of the Sudan shall be 14 V: Milliards and the 
share of I hi Uiiileil Arab I (i publie shall be 7Vi Milliards. Hy uildinK these shares to their acquired 
riKhts. the total share from the net yield of the Nile after the full operation of the Sudd cl Aali Reser­
voir shall be 18'/: Milliards for the Republic of the Sudan and 55Vt Milliards for the United Arab 
Republic. 
But if the average yield increases, the resulting net benefit from this increase shall be divided 
between the two Republics, in equàl shares. 
5. As the net benefit from the Sudd el Aali (referred to in item 3 ArtiMe Second) is calculated on 
the basis of the average natural yield of the river at Aswan in the years of this century after the de 
ilui'tion therefrom of the aiquireil rights of the two Republics and the ilverage losses of over year 
storage at the Sudd cl Aali Reservoir, it is agreed that this net benefit shall be the subject of revision 
by the two parties at reasonable intervals to be agreed upon after starting the full operation of the 
Sudd cl Aali Reservoir. 
6. The United Arab Republic agrees to pay to the Sudan Republic 16 Mil!:* Egyptian Pounds as 
full compensation for the damage resulting to the Sudanese existing prcuerties as a result of the 
storage in the Sudd el Aali Reservoir up to a reduced level of 182 meters' (survey datum). The 
payment of this compensation shall be affected in accordance with the annexed agreement between 
the two parties. 
7. The Republic of the Sudan undertake to arrange before July 1963, the final transfer the 
population of Haifa and all other Sudanese inhabitants whose lands shall be submerged by the stored 
8. It is understood that when the Sudd el Aali is fully operated for over year storage, the United 
Arab Republic will not require storing any water at Gebel Aulia Dam. And the two contracting 
parties will in due course, discuss all matters related to this renunciation. 
PROJECTS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LOST 
WATERS IN THE NILE BASIN 
In view of the fact that at present, considerable volumes of the Nile &Min Water* are ioat in the 
swamps of Bahr El Jebel. Bahr El Zeraf, Bahr el Ghazal and the Sobat River, and a* it is e**ential that 
efforts should be exerted in order to prevent these losses and to increase the yield of the River for us* 
in agricultural expansion in the two Republics, the two Republics agree to the following: 
1. The Republic of the Sudan in agreement with the United Arab Republic shall construct project* 
for the increase of the River yield by preventing losses of waters of the Nile Basin in the swamp* of 
Bahr El Jebel, Bahr el Zeraf, Bahr el Gahzal and its tributaries, the Sobat River and its tributaries 
and the White Nile Basin. The net yield of these project* ahall be divided equally between the two 
Republics and each of them shall also contribute equally to the coat*. 
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The Republic of the Sudan ihall finance the above-mentioned project# out of it* own funds mad the 
United Arab Republic shall pay its share in the costs in the same ratio of 50* allotted for her in tk« 
yield of these projects. 
2. If the United Arab Republic, on account of the progress in its planned agricultural expansion 
should find it necessary to start on any of the increase of the Nile yield projects, referred tain the 
previous paragraph, after its approval by the two Governments and at a time when the Sudan 
Republic does not need such project, the United Arab Republic shall notify the Sudan Republic of the 
time convenient for the former to start the execution of the project. And each of the two Republics 
shall, within two years after such notification, present a date-phased programme for the utilisation of 
its share of the waters by the project, and each of the said programmes shall bind the two parties. The 
United Arab Republic shall at the expiry of the two years, start the execution of the projects, at its 
own expense. And when the Republic of Sudan is ready to utilize its shsre according to the agreed 
programme. It shall pay to the United Arab Republic s share of sll the expenses in the same ratio as 
the Sudan's share in benefit is to the total benefit of the project; provided that the share <d either 
Republic shall not exceed one half of the total benefit of the project 
TECHNICAL CO OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS 
1. In order to ensure the technical co-operation between the Governments of the two Republics, to 
continue the rescsrch and study necessary for the Nile control projects and the increase of its yield 
and to continue the hydrological survey of its upper reaches, the two Republics agree that 
immediately after the signing of this Agreement a Permanent Joint Technical Commission shall be 
formed of an equal number of members ^m both parties; and its functions shall be: 
a) The drawing of the basic outlines of projects for the increase of the Nile yield, and for the super­
vision of the studies necessary for the finalising of projects, before presentation of the same to the 
Governments of the two Republics for approval. 
b) The supervision of the execution of the projects approved by the two Governments. 
c) The drawing up of the working arrangements for any works to be constructed on the Nile, within 
the boundaries of the Sudan, and also for those to be constructed outside the boundaries of the Sudan, 
by agreement with the authorities concerned in the countries in which such works are constructed. 
d) The supiTfvision of the application of all the working arrangements mentioned in (c) above in 
connection with works constructed within the boundaries of Sudan and also in connection with the 
Sudd el Aali Reservoir and Aswan Dam, through official engineers delegated for the purpose by the 
two Republics; and the supervision of the working of the upper Nile projects, ss provided in the 
agreements concluded with the countries in which such projects are constructed. 
el As it is probable that a series of low years may occur, and a succession of low levels in the Sudd el 
Aali Reservoir may result to such an extent as not to permit in any one year the drawing of the full 
requirements of the two Republics, the Technical Commission is charged with the task of devising a 
fair arrangement for the two Republics to follow. And the recommendations of the Commission shall 
be presented to the two Governments for approval. 
2. In order to enable the Commission to exercise the functions enumerated in the above item, and 
in order to ensure the continustion of the Nile gauging and to keep observstions on all its upper 
reaches, these duties shall be carried out under the technical supervision of the Commission by the 
engineers of the Sudan Republic, and the engineers of the United Arab Republic in the Sudan and in 
the United Arab Republic and in Uganda. 
3. The two Governments shall form the Joint Technical Commission, by a joint decree, and shall 
provide it with its necessary funds from their budgets. The Commission may. according to the 
r, {|uircmcnt« of work, hold its meetings in Cairo or in Khartoum. The Commission shall, subject to 
the approval of the two Governments, lay down regulations for the organisation of its meetings and 
its technical, administrative and financial activities. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. If il bccomo* ni CI «tsiiry to hold nny n<-Kiilinllon.i rnnrrrniiiK Ih»- Nilf w*l« rm. with any rj|MrMn 
state, outside the boundaries of the two Republics, the Governments of the Sudan Republic and the 
United Arab Republic shall apee on a unified view after the subject is studied by the said Technical 
Commissiuii. Thf said unified view shall be the banis of any ni giitiation* by the Commission with the 
said states. 
If tho result in an «Kri-i-mi-nt to ronNtrurl any works on thi- rivi-r, uuUiHv the 
boundiiricsi of the twu Kcpublics, the Joint IVchnical Cummissioti nhall after cunsullinK the authorities 
in thi! Govcrnnu-ntsi of the S kite* concur ncd. draw all the tcrhniral execution details and the working 
and maintenance arrangements. And the Commission shall, after the sanction of the same by the 
Governments concerned, supervise the carrying out of the said technical agreements. 
Z. As the riparian slates, other than the two Republics, claim a share in the Nile waters, the two 
Republics have agreed that they shall jointly consider and reach one unified view regarding the said 
claims. And if the said consideration results in the acceptance of allotting an amount of the Nile water 
to one or the other of the said slates, the accepted amount shall be deducted from the shares of the 
two Republic!! in e<|ual parts, us calculaled at Aswan. 
The Technical Commission mentioned in this agreement shall make the necessary arrangements 
with the stales concerned, in order to ensure that their water consumption shall not exceed the 
amounts agreed upon. 
As the benefiting of the two Republics from their appointed shares in the net benefit of the Sudd 
el Aali Reservoir shall not start before the construction and the full utilization of the Reservoir, the 
Iwo parties shall agree on their agricultural expansion programmes in the transitional period from 
now up to the completion of the Sudd el Aali, without prejudice to their present water requirements. 
This agreement shall come into force after its sanction by the two contracting parties, provided 
lhal either party shall notify the other party of the dale of its sanction, through the diplomatic 
channels. 
Annex (1) and Annex (2. A and B) attached to this Agreement shall be considered as an integral 
part of this Agreement 
Written in Cairo in two Arabic original copies this 7th day of Gumada El Oula 1379, the 8th day of 
November 1989. 
TRANSITION AI, PERIOD BEFORE BENEFITING 
FROM THE COMPLETE SUDD EL AALI RESERVOIR 
Eighth 
For the Republic 
of Sudan; 
(Siffned) Lew# Mohamed TALAAT FARID (SigwdlZakana MOHIE EL DIN 
For the United Arab 
Republic: 
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ANNEX 1 
A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR THE WATER LOAN REQUIRED 
BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBUC 
The Republic of the Sudan agrees in principle to give a water loan from the Sudan's share in the 
Sudd el Aali waters, to the United Arab Republic, in order to enable the latter to proceed with her 
planned programmes for Agricultural Expansion. 
The request of the United Arab Republic for this loan shall be made after it revtaea its programmes 
within five years from the date of the signing of this agreement And if the revision by United Arab 
Republic reveals her need (or this loan, the Republic of the Sudan shall give it out of its own share a 
loan not exceeding one and a half Milliards, provided that the utfHamWon of this loan shall cease in 
November, 1977. 
ANNEX2 
A 
To the H*ad of th« Delegation of tke RepubUe of Sudan 
With rcfprcnre to Article (Second) paragraph 6 of the Agreement signed this day, concerning the 
full utilization of the River Nile Waters, compensation amounting to 15 Million Egyptian Pounds in 
sterling or in a third currency agreed upon by the two parties, and calculated on the basis of a fixed 
rate of $2.87156 to the Egyptian Pound, shall be paid by the Government of the United Arab Republic, 
as agreed upon, in instalments in the following manner 
£3 million on the first of January, 1960 
£4 million on the first of January. 1961 
£ 4 million on the first of January, 1962 
£4 million on the first of J anuary, 1963 
I shall be grateful if you confirm your agreement to the above. 
With highest consideration. 
Head of the United Arab Republic Delegation: 
(%n«(f) Zakaria MOHIE EL DIN 
To the Head of United Arab RepubHe Delegation 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated today and stipulating the following: 
{See Annex t,A\ 
I have the honour to confirm the agreement of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan to the 
contents of the «aid letter. 
With highest (.-onsideralion. 
Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Sudan: 
(Signed) Lewa Mohammed talaat Mid 
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APPENDIX E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE JPA AS CONTAINED 
IN THE REQUEST FOR FUNDING (23; Table 1, pp. 1-3) 
Tentative estimates of 
Project title External 
US$ 
Internal 
LS 
Present status 
1. A Mathematical Model 
of Hydrologie Simula­
tion of the Nile 
System in the Sudan 
450,000 57,000 Requires formulation 
and funding 
2. Soil Survey and Land 
Suitability Classifi­
cation in the Jonglel 
250,000 118,000 Phase 1 operational; 
requires funding 
3. Swamp Ecology Survey 
in the Jonglel Area 
4. Range Ecology Survey 
in the Jonglei Area 
5. Wildlife Survey in 
the Jonglel Area 
6. Jonglei Pilot Scheme 
7. Livestock Projects: 
a) An aerial survey 
of the Livestock 
Population of the 
Jonglel Area 
b) A Coomrehenslve 
Animal Health 
Control Program 
c) Livestock Pro­
duction Investi­
gations, 1977 
d) Establishment of 
a Buffalo Breeding 
250,000 
120,000 
2,748,000 
161,000 
75,000 
20,000 
260,500 
80,000 5,000 
48,000 11,000 
Phase 1 operational; 
requires funding 
Requires formulâtion 
and funding 
Requires formulation 
and funding 
Operational; partially 
Operational; requires 
funding 
Operational; requires 
funding 
Operational; requires 
funding 
539,200 105,000 Requires funding 
APPENDIX E. (Continued) 
Tentative estimâtes of 
Project title USS 
Internal Present status 
e) Pilot studies on 
the control of 
flood water on 
the range in order 
to improve live­
stock feed supplies 
f) The provision of 
water supplies for 
livestock on the 
intermediate 
grazings 
g) Pilot studies on 
the provision of 
fodder supplies for 
livestock during 
the wet season 
500,000 90,000 
340,000 65,000 
Total for live­
stock projects 1,952,200 366,000 
8. Fisheries Development 
in the Sudd Region 1,400,000 319,000 
9. Economic and Social 100,000 80,000 
Research Council 
a) Geographic 
b) Demographic 
c) Anthropological 
and sociological 
d) Socio-legal aspects 
e) Medical and social 
f) Assessment of the 
attitude of the 
g) Service facilities 
in the area 
h) A cost/benefit 
analysis of the 
Jonglel Project 
Requires formulation 
and funding 
Requires formulation 
and funding 
Requires formulation 
and funding 
Requires formulation 
and funding 
Operational; further 
funding required 
APPENDIX E. (Continued) 
Tentative estimates of 
Project title 
10. Ministry of 
Health Epidemic-
logical Survey 
11. Integrated Rural 
Development in a 
Shllluk District 
12. Integrated Rural 
Development 
In a Nuer District 
13. Integrated Rural 
Development In a 
Dlnka District 
External Internal 
US| LS Present status 
Operational; ao 
funding required 
3,000,000 525,000 Will be formulated 
in 1977/78 
3,000,000 525,000 Will be formulated 
in 1977/78 
3,000,000 525,000 Will be formulated 
in 1977/78 
Grand Total 16,702,400 3,051,500 
(Estimates of cost) 
APPENDIX F. OBJECTIVES OF KONGOR INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT, JPA: UNDP VERSKW (18:21) 
Immediate objectives: 
1. It is unlikely that the above stated overall development 
objective can be achieved, at a minimum, in less than 10 years. 
The project will therefore be phased. The immediate objectives 
required to achieve these objectives may be classified as 
(a) The activities listed in paragraphs 2 and 3, concerned 
with the completion of a topographical survey of the Kongor 
district and the improvement and modernization of the 
existing transhumant livestock system, will be commenced 
and directly implemented by the project during Phase I. 
(b) A number of supportive activities closely related to the 
project's main 'thrust' or logistical needs %d.ll also be 
commenced and directly iuqilemented during Phase I. These 
activities are designated by the word 'supportive' in 
brackets. 
(c) The remaining activities listed, while essential for the 
overall socio-economic development for the district, will 
be funded to a limited extent by the project but will 
mainly be implemented by other cooperating aid agencies 
or by the appropriate government organization. 
The organization of an aerial topographical survey of Kongor 
It Is considered that It Is essential to give this objective 
priority, not only to ensure proper planning from the commence­
ment of project activities but also to provide the basic data 
for the organization of a flood control program in the district. 
The Improvement and modernization of the existing transhumant 
livestock system with a consequent Increase in the commercial 
offtake of beef cattle 
This will be accomplished through the following activities: 
(a) Increasing total livestock numbers in the project area by: 
(I) improving radically the control of animal disease 
and internal and external parasites; 
(II) providing adequate water supplies on the intermediate 
grazlngs during the dry season; 
(ill) Increasing the availability of food supplies on the 
highland area during the wet season; and 
(iv) reducing the percentage of infertile mature females 
in the herds. 
(b) Improving the nutrition and hence the productivity of all 
livestock by: 
(I) improving the availability and quality of food 
supplies on highland areas during the wet season; 
(II) introducing controlled grazing systems both at the 
villages and at the cattle camps; and 
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(ill) providing mineral foods where investigations 
demonstrate that lack of them is a constraint on 
productivity. 
(c) Improving the genetic production potential of the livestock, 
initially by selection within the present breed and 
ultimately by the introduction of exotic genes using the 
mechanism of cross breeding. 
(d) Organizing training at all levels at a Community Farm (CF) 
that will form one part of a Center for the Introduction 
of New Tectoology (CINT) to be established by the project. 
(e) Planning an Infrastructure for the proper marketing of 
animals, hides, and skins. Details will be elaborated 
when the investigations of the Project Development Unit 
(IBRD) into livestock marketing have been completed. 
(f) Planning a credit system that can be utilized to support 
new Investment in production and marketing. 
4. The improvement of the agricultural basis of the people's economy 
This will be accomplished through the following activities: 
(a) The conduct of an agronomic Investigational program. As 
Dutch Bilateral Aid will assist in the funding of this 
sector It has been proposed by UNDP that the agronomic 
investigational program should be conducted at the Pengko 
Plains Station during Phase I of the Project while CINT 
facilities at Kongor are being organised and constructed. 
(b) Extension work and training In agronomic techniques; the 
use of new hand tools, etc., organized from the CIMT. 
The agronomic Investigational program would include the 
following activities: 
(a) Introduction and nursery plots 
(I) Introduction plots for exotic forage grasses and 
legumes (supportive); 
(II) Introduction plots for new varieties of crops at 
present grown In the Kongor district and for new 
field and vegetable crops ; and 
(III) Nursery plots for growing young fruit, firewood 
and timber trees for ultimate distribution by the 
Project to farmers throughout the Kongor district. 
(b) Cultivation Investigations 
Simple trials to evaluate the most suitable methods of 
cultivation for the production of sorghum. 
(c) Fertility Investigations 
Simple trials to evaluate methods of lug»roving fertility 
without the use of chemical fertilizers. These would 
Include the introduction of a grain legume into the 
rotation. 
(d) The introduction of work animals 
Feasibility trials on the possible use of work animals for 
cultivation purposes. 
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(e) The Integration of crop and livestock husbandry 
Although the first investigation (a small nixed husbandry 
dairy farm at Kongor) can not be established until Phase 
II of the project, land requirements would be determined 
during Phase I. 
(f) Irrigated crop agriculture 
Investigations of the possibility for Irrigated agriculture, 
particularly In the eastern intermediate grasslands. 
5. The Improvement of fishing practices, fish preservation and 
fish marketing in the project area 
These objectives will be achieved through the agency of the 
'Sudd Fisheries Development Program, Phase I (SUD/79/001).• 
A marketing cooperative (Bor/Shambe) will be established that 
will Include fishermen from the Kongor district and extension 
training will be provided in fishing and fish preservation 
methods. Close cooperation will be established between the 
fisheries project (SUD/79/001) and the CINT, for the purposes 
of training and extension work. 
6. The improvement of the practical training and educational 
facilities available to the people in the district 
This will be achieved through the following activities: 
(a) Practical training in new livestock husbandry techniques 
at the Conmiialty Farm (supportive). 
(b) In-service training of intermediate level technicians 
required by the new services that will have to be provided 
at the CINT (supportive). 
(c) Practical training In agricultural and fishing techniques, 
to be gradually Introduced at the CINT. 
(d) Provision of training In cooperation with the relevant 
Provincial and Regional Authorities in simple sanitary 
measures, personal hygiene, household management, cooking 
and clothes making. 
(e) Assistance to formal education by: 
(I) Cooperation at all levels with the Regional and 
Provincial educational authorities in order to 
Improve primary and secondary school facilities in the 
area. Specific assistance could Include the provision 
of some building materials and possibly limited 
transport facilities for self-help school building 
programs. 
(II) Provision of grants to local secondary school graduates 
for training In specific disciplines at Sudanese 
institutions, on condition that the recipients return 
to work In the project area for a specific period. 
7. The Improvement of water supplies, sanitation and health 
These will be accomplished through the following activities: 
(a) Water supplies. 
There is a critical lack of water for the people and their 
livestock at the villages during the dry seasonT Shallow 
wells at 13 locations will be replaced and deep tube wells 
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at 16 localities will be rebored and/or reequlpped as 
necessary. The condition of these shallow and tube wells 
has been surveyed and reported on by the Jonglel Soclo-
Economlc Team in their report entitled, 'The Existing 
Services in Kongor and Bor Districts' (supportive). 
(b) Sanitation. 
Planning for simple sanitation facilities in cooperation 
with the Provincial Medical Authorities, first in Kongor 
and eventually in other villages. Specific assistance may 
be provided by UNICEF and through a 'food for work' project 
by WPP. 
(c) Health. 
In cooperation with the Provincial Medical Authorities, 
Dutch Bilateral Medical Aid and UNICEF to plan for Improved 
medical facilities at Kongor and In the district, through 
the agency of the Primary Health Care Program. In 
particular, a mobile medical team based on Kongor is 
required to tour cattle caiq>s during the dry season. 
Specific assistance would include: 
(I) The provision of a 4-W-D vehicle fitted out as an 
ambulance together with fuel and maintenance during 
(II) Provision for the storage of medical vaccines in 
the deep freezes to be provided by the Project for 
the storage of veterinary vaccines at Kongor. 
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(111) Funding of part of the foreign currency cost of 
vaccines and drugs required by the Primary Health 
Care Program. 
8. The improvement of basic Infrastructure in the district 
-This will be accomplished through the following activities: 
(a) Radio communications. 
Radio communication equipment will be installed linking 
Kongor to Bor, Halakal, Juba and Khartoum. The service 
will be available to serve the needs of the local 
adminls t rat ion. 
(b) Flood control. 
Assistance will be provided to the administration for the 
purpose of building an appropriate system of dykes and 
bunds in order to properly control flood waters. This 
will Include: 
(I) The provision of a contour map of the district; 
(II) Technical assistance in planning the dyke and 
bunds system; 
(ill) WFP 'food for work' assistance for voluntary self-
help dyke and bund building schemes; and 
(iv) The provision of some simple tools for voluntary 
self-help schemes and mechanical equipment where the 
latter is required. 
(c) Air strip 
The construction and maintenance of a 1200 m long, 40 m 
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wide air strip adjacent to Kongor village. 
Bor-Kongor road. 
An attempt will be made to obtain assistance for 
the up-grading of this road to all-weather status. 
